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Abstract 
 
 
The Existentialist thought of Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973), Albert Camus 
(1913-1960), and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) is dominated by a concern 
for the ethical, and Marcel, Camus, and Sartre all explored questions of 
morality in the works they produced for the theatre. Not only does this 
suggest that a particular appreciation of their ethical thought is necessary 
for their drama to be fully understood; an investigation of their dramatic 
works might equally provide a privileged access to their ethical thought. 
The study of Existentialist drama has been somewhat neglected ± and what 
research has been undertaken focuses on the work of the three individual 
playwrights, rather than offering a comparative analysis. No study to date 
has focused on Existentialist drama purely in relation to the ethical. 
Furthermore, existing studies tend to address either the aesthetic or the 
philosophical dimension of Existentialist theatre. But as this dissertation will 
argue, theatre is not a straightforward medium of expression; the 
GLVFXVVLRQRIDSOD\¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOµPHVVDJH¶PXVWWDNHWKLVLQWRDFFRXQW
The aims of the dissertation are to (i) analyse the fundamental concepts 
applied by Marcel, Camus, and Sartre in the field of ethics; (ii) examine the 
ways in which each adapts and experiments with the dramatic genre to 
address ethical issues; (iii) explore and compare the interplay of 
philosophy and drama in their respective °XYUHs, LQRUGHUWKDWWKHDWUH¶V
LQIOXHQFHRQHDFKSKLORVRSKHU¶VHWKLFDOYRLFHPLJKWEHreconsidered. The 
dissertation will be divided into two major parts: Section 1 will introduce 
the plays selected for analysis, aiming to identify the ethical discourse 
present in the theatre of each Existentialist philosopher; Section 2 will then 
explore the inter-relations between these ethical discourses, and consider 
KRZWKHWKUHH([LVWHQWLDOLVWV¶GUDPDWL]DWLRQRIWKHHWKLFDOLVUHIOHFWLYHRI
their theoretical ethical discussions.
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TS  Un théâtre de situations 
 
Full details of these works can be found in the bibliography.
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Introduction 
 
 
Theatre has always been an important form of expression for Gabriel 
Marcel (1889-1973), who published his first two plays (La Grâce and Le 
Palais de sable) in 1914, the year he began writing his first philosophical 
work (Journal métaphysique,QKLVDXWRELRJUDSKLFDOHVVD\µ5HJDUGHQ
DUULqUH¶0DUFHOdescribes how it was through the dramatization of ideas in 
his mind that he first came to understand and subsequently clarify his own 
philosophical thought,1 and thus his theatre held greater significance for 
him than did his philosophical writings.2 Albert Camus (1913-1960) also 
regretted that his dramatic works were not a greater success, as the 
theatre was one of the places where he felt most at home;3 and 
Verstraeten, like Jeanson, considers the theatre of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-
1980) to be the most complete expression of 6DUWUH¶V philosophical 
thought: 
VLHOOH>ODSDUWLHWKpkWUDOHGHO¶°XYUHGH6DUWUH@SHXWDSSDUDvWUHFRPPH
la transcription dramatique des différents thèmes philosophiques 
DQLPDQWVDSHQVpHHOOHQ¶HQUHVWHSDVPRLQVSDUVDQDWXUHPrPH
O¶H[SUHVVLRQODSOXVWRWDOLVDQWHGHVRQ°XYUH4 
 
The Existentialist thought of all three philosophers is dominated by a 
concern for the ethical, and Marcel, Camus, and Sartre all explored 
questions of morality in the works they produced for the theatre. Not only 
does this suggest that a particular appreciation of their ethical thought is 
necessary if their drama is to be fully understood; an investigation of their 
                                         
1 µ&HTXHM¶DSHUoRLV>«@DYHFXQHWUqVJUDQGHQHWWHWpF¶HVWTXHOHPRGHGHSHQVHUGUDPDWLTXH
>«@LOOXVWUDLWHWMXVWLILDLWjO¶DYDQFHWRXWFHTXHM¶DLSXpFULUHSOXVWDUGGDQVXQUHJLVWUH
SXUHPHQWSKLORVRSKLTXH¶ (*DEULHO0DUFHOµ5HJDUGHQDUULqUH¶LQ(WLHQQH*LOVRQ (ed.), 
Existentialisme chrétien: Gabriel Marcel (Paris : Plon, 1947), p. 297). 
2 µ0RQWKpkWUHJDUGHjPHV\HX[XQHVRUWHG¶LQWpUrWYLYDQWRXGHIUDvFKHXUTXLIDLWSRXUPRL
XQSHXWGpIDXWGDQVPHVpFULWVSKLORVRSKLTXHV¶*DEULHO0DUFHOEntretiens: Paul Ricoeur 
Gabriel Marcel (hereafter EPR), (Paris : Aubier-Montaigne, 1968), p. 68). 
3 µ8QHVFqQHGHWKpkWUHHVWXQGHVOLHX[GXPRQGHRMHVXLVKHXUHX[¶$OEHUW&DPXV
Théâtre, récits, nouvelles (hereafter TRN), (Paris : Gallimard, 1962), p. 1720). 
4 Pierre Verstraeten, Violence et éWKLTXHHVVDLG¶XQHFULWLTXHGHODPRUDOHGLDOHFWLTXHjSDUWLU
du théâtre politique de Sartre (Paris : Gallimard, 1972), p. 8. This is reminiscent of -HDQVRQ¶V
HDUOLHUVWDWHPHQWWKDW6DUWUH¶VWKHDWUHµDOHPpULWHG¶LOOXVWUHUGHPHWWUHHQVFqQHODTXDVL-
totalité des thèmes sartriens¶)UDQFLV-HDQVRQSartre par lui-même (Paris : Editions du Seuil, 
1955), p. 7). 
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dramatic works might equally provide a privileged access to their ethical 
thought, with the confrontation of ideas that is the very nature of drama 
helping to translate the situational implications of their more abstract, 
theoretical concepts. 
 
The study of Existentialist drama has in fact suffered a general neglect ± 
particularly in recent years ± and what research has been undertaken 
focuses on the work of the three individual playwrights, rather than 
offering a comparative analysis.5 This dissertation, on the other hand, aims 
to explore how the three Existentialists can be discussed together, rather 
than siding with one particular perspective and setting it up against the 
others. No study to date has focused on Existentialist drama purely in 
relation to the ethical. Furthermore, existing studies tend to address either 
the aesthetic or the philosophical dimension of Existentialist theatre; very 
rarely are the two related.6 I find this rather striking, for surely the 
philosophical content of a work cannot adequately be addressed without a 
simultaneous investigation of the constraints and implications of its genre. 
As will become evident as this dissertation progresses, theatre is by no 
means a straightforward or predictable medium of expression; the 
GLVFXVVLRQRIDSOD\¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOµPHVVDJH¶PXVWWDNHWKLVLQWRDFFRXQW 
                                         
5 Existing studies include: on Marcel: Chenu (1948), Lazaron (1978), Hanley (1997); on 
Camus: Cruickshank (1959), Gay-Crosier (1967), Coombs (1968), Freeman (1971), Lévi-
Valensi (1992); on Sartre: Champigny (1959; reprinted 1968), McCall (1971), Verstraeten 
/RUULV*DOVWHU,UHODQG2¶'RQRKRHSee bibliography 
for full details. 
6 No existing study on the theatre of Marcel relates aesthetics to the philosophical. 
&UXLFNVKDQN¶VAlbert Camus and the Literature of Revolt (1959) is quite exceptional in its 
simultaneous treatment of both theoretical and theatrical content and context, 
characterization, and reception. FreHPDQ¶VThe Theatre of Albert Camus: A Critical Study 
(1971) also offers an extremely detailed, critical analysis; and the breadth and analytical 
GHSWKRI0DUJHUULVRQ¶VHQWU\LQWKHUHFHQWCambridge Companion to Camus (2007) is 
admirable, considering and problematizing the relation between dramatic form and theoretical 
intention. In Sartre: Literature and Theory *ROGWKRUSH¶VFKDSWHURQHuis clos reflects 
on how the expectations of the audience might differ to the perceived message of the play, 
discusVLQJQRWRQO\6DUWUH¶VWKHRU\UHJDUGLQJWKHIXQFWLRQRIWKHDWUHEXWDOVRGUDPDWLF
technique and staging, the consideration of which Goldthorpe argues are crucial if the full 
PHVVDJHRIWKHSOD\LVWREHDSSUHFLDWHG*DOVWHU¶VLe Théâtre de Jean-Paul Sartre (1986) 
REVHUYHVWKHODFNRIDWWHQWLRQWKDWKDVEHHQSDLGWRWKHWKHDWULFDOIRUPRI6DUWUH¶VWKHDWUH
outlining the complexity of the medium and the many different factors that might influence 
the reception of a play in her introduction. However, only the first volume of her projected 
series currently exists, examining Bariona, Les Mouches, and Huis clos. 
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Thus, rather than immediately attempting to determine how the plays of 
each are able to engage with ethics, the focus will instead be on the extent 
to which the plays discussed are able to do this, if at all. 
 
The aims of the dissertation will therefore be to (i) analyse the 
fundamental concepts applied by Marcel, Camus, and Sartre in the field of 
ethics; (ii) examine the ways in which each adapts and experiments with 
the dramatic genre to address ethical issues; (iii) explore and compare the 
interplay of philosophy and drama in their respective °XYUHs, in order that 
WKHDWUH¶VLQIOXHQFHRQHDFKSKLORVRSKHU¶VHWKLFDOYRLFHPLJKWEH
reconsidered. The main content of the dissertation will be divided into two 
major parts. Section 1 will be a discussion of the theatre of the three 
Existentialist thinkers, as represented by three dramatic works for each, 
and its aim will be to determine the nature of the ethical discourse present 
in the selected plays. The ethical thought of Marcel, Camus, and Sartre will 
be explored specifically in relation to dramatic works from the 40s and 50s, 
as this was the time when all three were simultaneously producing works 
for the theatre, and also the period during which ethics was a primary 
concern in their writings. The plays that have been selected for analysis 
are: for Sartre: Huis clos (1944), Le Diable et le bon dieu (1951), Les 
6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD(1959); for Camus: Le Malentendu (1944), /¶(WDWGH
siège (1948), Les Justes (1949); for Marcel: /¶(PLVVDLUH(1949), Le Signe 
de la croix (1949), 5RPHQ¶HVWSOXVGDQV5RPH(1951).7 The plays will be 
examined in chronological order, so as best to follow any development or 
evolution in HDFKZULWHU¶V representations of the ethical, and conclusions 
drawn from these investigations will then be synthesized, to reflect on the 
                                         
7 The dates refer to the first performance of each play, with the exception of /¶(PLVVDLUH, for 
which no record of performance has been traced, and Le Signe de la croix, which has never 
been performed. It should also be noted that although originally published with /¶(PLVVDLUH in 
1949, Le Signe de la croix was republished with an epilogue in 1953. My analysis will 
therefore consider the modified version of the play. 
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dramatic °XYUH of each as a whole. Marcel, Camus, and Sartre will be 
considered individually in Section 1, so as to allow for a clear and coherent 
introduction to their theatre and ethical theory. This will then set the scene 
for subsequent analytical comparison in Section 2. 
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Section 1: 
French Existentialist Ethical Thought in the Theatre 
 
1.1 Existentialist Ethical Thought in the Theatre of 
Gabriel Marcel 
 
 
Unlike Camus or Sartre, Marcel did very little direct writing on the subject 
of ethics. Nevertheless, as Sweetman argues: 
>0DUFHO¶VZRUNLV@GHHSO\HWKLFDODQGLVYHU\PXFKFRQFHUQHGZLWK
correct ethical behaviour; indeed, from one point of view, the whole of 
his thought is a sustained discussion on the issue of how to live 
ethically in a world that is making it increasingly difficult to do so.1 
 
This said, the plays selected for analysis do contain more overt references 
to the ethical than his earlier works; written in the 40s DQGV0DUFHO¶V
experience of the Second World War placed ethical concerns at the 
forefront of his mind, and all three plays (/¶(PLVVDLUH, Le Signe de la croix, 
5RPHQ¶HVWSOXVGDQV5RPH) are directly concerned with Second World War 
issues. Since the three plays occupy a relatively late position in his °XYUH, 
they will not, on their own, be representative of any evolution that occurs 
LQ0DUFHO¶VHWKLFDOWKRXJKW However, it is not believed that their analysis 
will be especially narrow in scope: if Marcel¶VWKRXJKWGHYHORSHGDQG
progressed, the movement of his thought was principally on a vertical axis; 
as Marcel writes in his Du UHIXVjO¶LQYRFDWLRQ (1940): µ,OQHV
DJLVVDLWSOXV
WHOOHPHQWG
pGLILHUTXHGHFUHXVHURXLF¶HVWFRPPHXQIRUDJHELHQSOXW{W
qXHFRPPHXQHFRQVWUXFWLRQTXHO¶DFWLYLWpSKLORVRSKLTXHFHQWUDOHVH
GpILQLVVDLWSRXUPRL¶2 
 
/¶(PLVVDLUH 
 
Set in 1945, the action of /¶(PLVVDLUH is situated entirely within the Ferrier 
family household. The play opens with the return to his family of Clément 
                                         
1 %UHQGDQ6ZHHWPDQµ*DEULHO0DUFHO(WKLFVZLWKLQD&KULVWLDQ([LVWHQWLDOLVP¶LQ-RKQ-
Drummond and Lester Embree (eds), Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy: A 
Handbook (Dordrecht : Kluwer, 2002), p. 271. 
2 Gabriel Marcel, Du refuVjO¶LQYRFDWLRQ(hereafter RI), (Paris : Gallimard, 1940), p. 23. 
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Ferrier, a Jew who has escaped death in a Nazi concentration camp. The 
action IRFXVHVRQWKHIDPLO\¶VGLIIHUHQWUHDFWLRQVWR&OpPHQW¶VXQH[SHFWHG
homecoming, and the various ways in which its members struggle to re-
establish some sort of family life. Marcel does not present us with any 
straight-forwardly positive characters in /¶(PLVVDLUH; all are flawed in some 
respect, thus forcing any conception of ethical authenticity to be built up by 
LQGLUHFWPHDQV,QIDFW0DUFHO¶VHWKLFDOGLVFRXUVHLQWKLVSOD\Ls actually 
more apparent with regards to its other major subject of concern: the 
French Resistance movement during the Occupation, which it attempts to 
demystify through the dramatization of its internal dynamics and 
complexities of its reception. Emphasis on this second theme has the effect 
of making some characters appear rather resigned to the suffering they are 
confronted with in Clément, in contrast to the heated animation they 
display when arguing their particular position concerning the Resistance. 
Acting to undermine the Gaullist myth ± which downplayed conflicts within 
the Resistance and heralded the movement as a manifestation of the Good 
and Glory of France ± /¶(PLVVDLUHreveals the grey areas that lie between 
the black and white division of resistors and traitors.3 
 
As well as being presented with a man of the Resistance (Bertrand) and a 
collaborator (Roland), we are also confronted with individuals who are 
more difficult to categorize. Sylvie Ferrier, for example, has been a 
member of the Resistance but was forced to leave for health reasons; and 
her fiancé Antoine, despite being quite fiercely criticized for his non-
involvement in the Resistance, is still someone to whom one would want to 
attribute high moral calibre because of his noble service to the military 
before being wounded, and his general sensitivity of character. Neither is a 
VWHUHRW\SLFDOµKHUR¶RIWKH5HVLVWDQFHnor a traitor or collaborator; thus 
                                         
3 For a study of the French Resistance, see for example Julian Jackson, France: The Dark 
Years, 1940-1944 (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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0DUFHO¶VFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQTXHVWLRQVWKH extent to which preconceptions 
concerning the ethical are a transparent reflection of moral standing. 
$QWRLQHYRLFHVWKLVKLPVHOIZKHQKHVD\VµFHVHUDLWWRXWGHPrPHXQSHX
WURSVLPSOHVLG¶XQF{WpLO\DYDLWODVDJHVVHODYpULWpO¶KpURwVPHTXHVDLV-
MH"ODIRL«HWGHO¶DXWUHOHF\QLVPHODOkFKHWpODWUDKLVRQ¶4 Overly aware of 
the corruption and inhumanity that can be found on both sides, Antoine 
does not want to guarantee his support for any defined cause. 
 
$OWKRXJK%HUWUDQGUHSUHVHQWVWKHµPDQRIWKH5HVLVWDQFH¶he is not an 
unambiguous embodiPHQWRIWKHµ*RRG¶,QIDFW%HUWUDQGDQGKLVZLIH
Anne-0DULH6\OYLH¶VVLVWHU± the two main advocates of the Resistance ± 
are criticized by the mother, Mathilde, for their ideologically-conditioned 
opposition to the marriage of Sylvie and Antoineµ3DUfanatisme, vous vous 
évertuiez à détruire un bonheur¶E, p. 56). One might also expect the 
µPDQRIWKH5HVLVWDQFH¶WREHWKHFKDUDFWHUZKRFRQILGHQWO\SURYLGHV
answers to moral dilemmas; but Bertrand has a surprisingly low profile, 
and is not given any major lines of wisdom in the play. Rather, he is often 
the one asking questions, seeking clarification for what he has not quite 
understood. 
 
Similarly, even though Roland de Carmoy is guilty of collaboration, he is 
not a straightforward personification of immorality. Roland actually helped 
WRHQVXUH$QWRLQH¶VUHWXUQIURPWKHDUP\LQ$QWRLQH¶VH\HVRoland is not a 
traitor, but someone deserving of great admiration for his bravery. At the 
end of Act II ZHOHDUQIURP5RODQG¶VPRWKHUWKDWKHKDVEHHQDUUHVWHGIor 
his treachery. Bertrand is in favour of this condemnation, however Madame 
GH&DUPR\FRQWHQGVµ,O>O¶pYpQHPHQWLH5RODQG¶VDUUHVW@Q¶DULHQSURXYp
du tout; ou plutôt si, il est en train de prouver que mon fils et ses amis 
                                         
4 Gabriel Marcel, /¶(PLVVDLUH(hereafter E), in his Vers un autre royaume (Paris: Plon, 1949), 
p. 79. 
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voyaient parfaitement clair ORUVTX¶LOVDQQRQoDLHQWTXHODGpIDLWHDOOHPDQGH
OLYUHUDLWOD)UDQFHDXFRPPXQLVPH¶E, p. 70). Such an unequivocal 
judgement overlooks the reality of 5RODQG¶VVLWXDWLRQ, where voir clair 
would have been the last thing he or his companions were able to do. This 
difficulty in determining right from wrong thereby raises the question as to 
how it is possible, or rather, justifiable to judge the actions of another. 
/¶(PLVVDLUHtherefore severely problematizes any conception of 
authenticity, or indeed inauthenticity. Marcel emphasizes the important 
distinction between être and avoir: unlike material possessions, ethical 
VWDWXVLVQRWVRPHWKLQJWKDWDQLQGLYLGXDOFDQVLPSO\µKDYH¶UDWKHULWLVD
continual, and thus elusive, state of being. 
 
The misjudgement and misunderstandings which create moral obscurity in 
/¶(PLVVDLUH are shown to emanate from fundamental problems of 
communication. Anne-0DULHSURFODLPVµ2QQHFRQQDvWSHUVonne. Pas 
même les plus proches¶(E, p. 18), and characters frequently fail to 
understand each other in the play.5 The theme of misunderstanding equally 
exWHQGVWR&OpPHQW¶VUHWXUQ, and the reasons surrounding the possibility of 
his release cause much speculation in the play. Rather than a source of 
MR\&OpPHQW¶VUHXQLRQZLWKKLVORYHGRQHVLs actually a source of isolation. 
Incapable of participating in family or communal life, Clément dies a few 
weeks later without having shown any signs of happiness. This inability to 
SDUWLFLSDWHGLVWDQFHVKLPIURPRWKHUVVRWKDWKHODPHQWVµ4XHVWLRQQHU
UpSRQGUH«On ne peut tout GHPrPHMDPDLV>«@FRPPXQLTXHU¶E, p. 40). 
0DUFHO¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOZULWLQJVKLghlight the importance of intersubjective 
participation ± which necessitates genuine understanding and dialogue ± as 
an essential element of authentic BHLQJRUµrWUH¶DV0DUFHOUHIHUVWRLW
&OpPHQW¶VGHVSDLUFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDVDGLUHFWH[SUHVVLRQRIWKH
                                         
5 3KUDVHVVXFKDVµ9RXVQHYRXOH]SDVFRPSUHQGUH¶ESµ-HQHWHFRPSUHQGVSDV¶E, p. 
DQGµ9RXVQ¶DYH]MDPDLVFRPSULV¶E, p. 93) are common currency. 
 9 
ontological exigence to achieve this participation; for Marcel, all humans 
feel such exigences, and ontological authenticity is dependent on their 
fulfilment.6 However, such an interpretation cannot be derived directly from 
the play, which places little emphasis on the positive potential of Being. 
Indeed, for Clément, to hope to achieve être in any true sense of the word 
is futile. It is felt at the end that Clément never did return; the real 
Clément died in the concentration camp, overcome by the suffering he both 
witnessed and experienced. 
 
The theme of tragedy and suffering in the contemporary world permeates 
/¶(PLVVDLUH. All characters acknowledge this suffering, which they rather 
fatalistically accept because of the extent to which they recognize their 
displacement from others; in their isolation they feel powerless to alter 
their situation, each left ± as Sylvie expresses ± µGDQVVDSURSUHQXLWGDQs 
VRQSURSUHFKDRV¶E, p. 29). The figure of the Other merely serves to 
make the tragedy of human existence all the more complex, a good 
H[DPSOHEHLQJ0DWKLOGH¶VUHDFWLRQWRKHUKXVEDQG¶VUHWXUQ0DWKLOGHµQH
connai[t] que [son] devoir qui est de le guériU¶E, p. 12), and sets out on a 
IUHQ]LHGPLVVLRQWRFXUHKLPµ(OOHDpWpSDUWRXWDX0LQLVWqUHjOD&URL[-
5RXJHDX&RQVXODWGH6XqGH«¶UHFRXQWV$QQH-Marie (E, p. 7). But as 
6\OYLHSRLQWVRXW&OpPHQWLVQRWµXQHHVSqFHGHSHQGXOHRXGHUDGLRTX¶LO
V¶DJLWGHUHPHWWUHHQpWDW¶ (E, p. 11). This is a reference to what Marcel 
calls µOHPRQGHFDVVp¶ Marcel argues that society has become overly 
dependent on rational thinking, attempting to understand everything in 
terms of logical problems, which can then be solved through the application 
of reason. This mindset has been reinforced by the ever-increasing 
importance society places on technology, encouraging us to view the world 
                                         
6 &ROLQVXPPDUL]HV0DUFHO¶VSRVLWLRQZHOOKHUHµ/¶H[LJHQFHRQWRORJLTXHPHWRXUPHQWHPRQ
DFWLYLWpGHPDQGHjV¶H[HUFHUGDQVXQplein 3LHUUH&ROLQµ([LVWHQWLDOLVPHFKUpWLHQ¶LQ*LOVRQ
p. 99). 
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in purely functional terms, and to assume that all difficulties are resolvable 
if one only has the right tool. But although such scientific method has its 
uses, it is not a means to all ends, and particularly not with respect to the 
human dimension of existence. 
 
)RUDOO0DWKLOGH¶VSUHVXPSWLRQWRNQRZZKDWLVEHVWIRU&OpPHQWVKH
makes some rather spectacular blunders. When Antoine is introduced to 
&OpPHQWDV6\OYLH¶VILDQFp6\OYLHUHPDUNVWKDWKHUIDWKHUKDVDOZD\VOLNHG
this particular name. Clément does not remember this, and so Mathilde 
reminds him of how their child Maurice was goinJWREHFDOOHGµ$QWRLQH¶
But Maurice was the son they tragically lost at a very early age, the 
reminder of whom causes great distress to Clément. Earlier, Mathilde 
H[SODLQVWR6\OYLHWKDWKHUDFWLRQVIRU&OpPHQWDUHPRWLYDWHGE\µXQH
question de consciencH¶E, p. 11), but such events rather undermine the 
notion that this conscience represents genuine concern for Clément the 
individual ± KHQFH6\OYLH¶VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWµRQQ¶DSDVle droit de le traiter 
FRPPH>FHFL@¶E, p. 11; my emphasis). This illustrates the immediate 
ethical implications of le monde cassé; indeed, for Mathilde, caring for 
Clément seems to be more of an obligation than anything else. Preoccupied 
SULPDULO\ZLWKKHUVHOI0DWKLOGHLVZKDW0DUFHOZRXOGWHUPµLQGLVSRQLEOH¶WR
others; her actions are driven by the desire to appear concerned for 
&OpPHQW¶VZHOO-being, but in practice they only reinforce his Other-ness and 
illuminate in turn her own alienation. 
 
Although principally dominated by pessimism, the play does offer some 
hints of the positive: Antoine, who is CatholicVWDWHVµLOQ¶\DSDVTXHFHV
eaux inexplorables. ,O\DOHPRQGHGHODOXPLqUH¶E, p. 107); and Sylvie 
KLQWVDWZKDWDXWKHQWLFLW\PLJKWFRQVLVWRIZKHQVKHGHVFULEHVµODUpDOLWp¶DV
µXQPRQGHRRQSXLVVHJUDQGLUDLPHUFUpHU«¶E, p. 24). However, her 
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EURWKHU5pJLV¶ LPPHGLDWHUHVSRQVHWRWKLVLVWRVD\µ-HWHUDSSHOOHUDL
VLPSOHPHQWTXHODJXHUUHQ¶HVWSDVWHUPLQpH¶E, p. 24). 
 
Le Signe de la croix 
 
The tragedy of human existence is equally prominent in Le Signe de la 
croix. The first two acts are set in 1938 and centre on a Jewish family who 
are eventually forced to leave their home (just outside of Paris), on 
account of the pressures of the Nazi regime. Act III takes place in 1942 in 
unoccupied France, where the Bernauer family temporarily reside before 
deciding WRIOHHWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGWKHHSLORJXHPDUNVWKHIDPLO\¶V
return home in 1948. With Nazism as a backdrop, the threat of death is 
ever-present, its menace augmenting as characters are confronted with 
acts of anti-Semitism until it strikes the Bernauers themselves. One of the 
children ± David ± who stays in the occupied zone out of pride, is arrested 
and deported to Drancy when he refuses to let Nazi restrictions prevent 
him from going to a concert. Simon, the father, is also killed: deciding not 
to leave France when the rest of the family escape to America, he is 
murdered before they return. 
 
As in /¶(PLVVDLUH, individual isolation is greatly accentuated in the play. 
Tante Léna, who previously lived in Vienna but is now staying with the 
%HUQDXHUIDPLO\WHOOVWKH3DXOLQHWKHPRWKHUµ,O\DORQJWHPSVTXHMH
Q¶DLSOXVGHFKH]PRL¶7 The figure of the Other, again, acts to emphasize 
the alienation of individuals, and is particularly evident in the lack of 
communication or sympathetic understanding between Simon and Pauline. 
They do not appear to share anything in common except for their marital 
home ± and even then, Simon does not accompany Pauline when she and 
the rest of the family leave the country. 
                                         
7 Gabriel Marcel, Le Signe de la croix (hereafter SC), in his Cinq pièces majeures (Paris: Plon, 
1973), p. 456; original publication: 1949; republished with epilogue in 1953. 
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But Le Signe de la croix portrays alienation on a greater scale than in 
/¶(PLVVDLUH. The Bernauer family are all Jewish; yet this label of sameness 
masks what is predominantly difference between the set of characters in 
0DUFHO¶VSOD\,QIDFWQRQHRIWKHIDPLOy are practicing Jews; Simon does 
not feel any affiliation to the Jewish people at all, and Jean-Paul, the 
younger son, is about to be baptized a Protestant. 6LPRQ¶VUHIXVDOWR
recognize a Jewish consciousness powerfully challenges the significance of 
terms that seek to classify individuals into definable groups.8 µ$ORUVMHVXLV
condamné à penser, à sentir en Juif? Tu prétends me parquer dans une 
certaine façon de juger? 'DQVXQHHVSqFHGHJKHWWRPHQWDO"¶SC, p. 489) 
he exclaims in a moment of frustration, when David questions his fidelity to 
the Jewish people. 
 
6LPRQ¶VFRQWHQWLRQLVWKDW, in their efforts to assert Jewish solidarity, Jews 
are actually reinforcing their separation from the rest of society. On 
hearing news of a marriage between a Jew and a Catholic, Pauline 
expresses outrage ± and therefore her rigid notion of Jewishness ± to 
ZKLFK6LPRQUHVSRQGVZLWKKHDWHGFULWLFLVPµ3XLV-MHWHGHPDQGHUFHTX¶LOD
trahi! ,OQHV¶DJLWpYLGHPPHQWSDVG¶REOLJDWLRQVUHOLJLHXVHV&¶HVWGRQFXQ
devoir de solidarLWpUDFLDOHTX¶LODHQIUHLQWG¶DSUqVWRL"¶SC, p. 496). 
+RZHYHU6LPRQ¶VSRVLWLRQLVDOVRXQGHUPLQHGZKHQWDQWH/pQDVD\VWR
KLPµ0RQSDXYUH6LPRQMHFURLVTX¶XQIDX[SDWULRWLVPHYRXVpJDUH¶SC, 
p. 522). Simon thinks of himself as French citizen, through and through. 
%XWLILWLVQRWFOHDUZKDWVLJQLILFDQFHWKHZRUGµ-HZ¶FDQKROGLWLVQROHVV
FOHDUZKDWLWPHDQVWREHµ)UHQFK¶During an earlier conversation, tante 
/pQDDVNVµ9RXVGLWHVLOV>OHV-XLIV@YHXOHQW(VW-ce que vous vous mettez 
jSDUW"¶µ9RXVYHQH]GHPHWWUHOHGRLJWVXUXQHSODLHWUqVGRXORXUHXVH¶
                                         
8 µ&RPSUHQGUHREMHFWLYHPHQWF¶HVWXVHUGHFDWpJRULHVTXLQHVRQWjSHUVRQQH¶ (Gabriel 
Marcel, Journal métaphysique (hereafter JM), (Paris : Gallimard, 1927), p. 227). 
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replies Simon (SC, p. 474). He too has wrongly abstracted himself, acting 
as a spectator and judge of others. But as indicated by the above 
response, Simon cannot truly assume WKLVVSHFWDWRU¶V position, as he is also 
inextricably bound to their situation. 
 
Thus Le Signe de la croix continues /¶(PLVVDLUH¶VGLVFRXUVHRQWKH
impossibility of objective judgement. Not only is categorical definition or 
judgement presented as an absurd misrepresentation of reality, but also as 
something GDQJHURXV)RUWDQWH/pQDDEVROXWLVWFRQFHSWLRQVRIµMXVWLFH¶
DQGµYpULWp¶DUHDVRXUFHRIIHDUThis surprises 3DXOLQHµ-HP¶pWRQQHTXH
vous qui avez fait O¶H[SpULHQFHGHODGLFWDWXUH«¶ Tante Léna interrupts her 
howHYHUµ8QHWHUULEOHH[SpULHQFH3DXOLQHMHYRXVO¶DFFRUGHPDLV
beaucoup de chemins peuvent y conduire, et les plus dangereux sont ceux 
TXLQHSRUWHQWSDVG¶pFULWHDX[¶SC, p. 467). Evil is not definable in terms 
of set behaviour; if the significance held by abstract terms always fails to 
be sufficient, the same applies for Justice and Truth, thereby leaving the 
terms open to abuse due to the lack of objective division between µJood¶ 
and µHYLO¶. 
 
Pauline is particularly guilty of seeing things in terms of absolutes, 
DQQRXQFLQJIRUH[DPSOHµ-HQHVDLVTX¶XQHFKRVHjO¶KHXUHRQRXV
VRPPHVXQ-XLITXLVHFRQYHUWLWSDVVHjO¶HQQHPL¶SC, p. 503). But this 
extreme rigidity causes her to turn against her own son, Jean-Paul, who 
wishes to convert to Protestantism. For Marcel, the mistake that is made in 
adhering to absolute principles is to dissect into parties what is essentially 
un tout.9 The real is grounded in sensory experience, which is infallible. But 
µOHGUDPHGHODVHQVDWLRQF¶HVWTX¶HOOHGRLWrWUHUpfléchie, interprétée; par 
OjO¶HUUHXUGHYLHQWSRVVLEOH¶JM, p. 131). 
                                         
9 This distinction is made in JM, p. 89. 
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7KHH[SUHVVLRQµOHGUDPH¶LVXVHGRQVHYHUDORFFDVLRQVGXULQJWKHSOD\DVa 
description of social reality, one example being when Simon says: 
Le racisme, tante Léna, ce fléau, cette pesWH«F¶HVWQRXVTXLHQDYRQV
déposé le germe dans ce peuple épuisé, saigné à blanc, presque 
étranger à lui-PrPHTXLQRXVDDFFXHLOOLVHWTXHQRXVQ¶DYRQVPrPH
pas su respecter. Voyez-YRXVOHGUDPHjSUpVHQW« 
(SC, p. 482) 
 
0DUFHO¶VWKHDWUHLVOLWHUDOO\DSerformance of this drame, in which various 
examples of interpretive objectification act to show how such dissection of 
experience is not only inauthentic in terms of ontology, but also in terms of 
ethics. However, the irreducibility of the real renders ethical notions equally 
LQGHILQDEOHDQGWKXVLQNHHSLQJZLWKLWVSUREOHPDWL]DWLRQRIµ-XVWLFH¶DQG
µ7UXWK¶Le Signe de la croix also undermines conceptions of immorality. 
7KHµDQWL-6HPLWLF¶ODEHOJLYHQWR2GHWWHDQG;DYLHUIRULQVWDQFHLVDOVR
challenged. Xavier is condemned to death for his anti-Semitic involvement; 
but at the end of the play he repents DQG/¶$EEpVSHDNVYHU\KLJKO\RIKLP
testifying to corroERUDWHWKHJHQXLQHQDWXUHRI;DYLHU¶V conversion. It must 
also be noted that it was only thanks to Xavier DQG2GHWWH¶VKHOSWKDWLW
was possible for the Bernauer family to leave for America in safety. 
 
Faced with the injustices that human society breeds and the accompanying 
impossibility of freedom these seem to entail, as seen (to a lesser extent) 
in /¶(PLVVDLUH, Le Signe de la croix also argues for the necessity of faith. 
But whereas in /¶(PLVVDLUH, hope is only presented in relation to a reality 
that transcends the here and now, Le Signe de la croix hints that there is a 
possibility for hope in this world, as is manifest in the positive human 
relations between Simon and tante Léna. With their seemingly genuine 
ability to communicate and understand one another, Lazaron observes: 
µXWWHUORQHOLQHVVLVPLVVLQJIRUDOPRVWWKHILUVWWLPHLQDQ\SOD\RI
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MarFHO¶V¶10 In presenting us with an example of a relationship we might be 
encouraged to emulate, Le Signe de la croix therefore offers a much more 
substantial discourse on authenticity, for which intersubjectivity ± or 
µGLVSRQLELOLWp¶WR others ± is shown to be key. True respect, fidelity, and a 
love that is non-egocentric lay the ground for the authentic recognition of 
the Other not as a functional object, but rather a subject in their own right, 
a tu instead of a third-person lui or elle.11 It is suggested that when the 
rest of his family leave France, Simon stays behind because of the extent 
WRZKLFKKHLVPRYHGE\WKHµSUpVHQFH¶SC, p. 533) that tante Léna 
represents for him, the complete lack of VXFKDµQRXV¶H[SHULHQFHZLWK
Pauline having comparatively little value. But it is not only for tante Léna 
that Simon remains in France; through the reciprocal je-tu encounter he 
experiences in her presence, Simon comes to experience a unity beyond 
that which exists between two individuals ± what Marcel would refer to as a 
communion with the Toi absolu (God). Thus, the figure of the Other is 
rendered just as ambiguous as the significance of actions; for Marcel, the 
Other does not inevitably reinforce individual alienation, but may also 
provide a glimpse as to what human existence can potentially be (être). 
This may then stimulate further transcendence, which extends beyond the 
individual nous experience and encourages a wider disponibilité towards 
the tout of existence itself. 
 
However, the addition of an epilogue to the play in 1953 ± which Marcel 
FRQVLGHUHGWREHµODFRQFOXVLRQLQGLVSHQVDEOHGHODSLqFH¶SC, p. 551) ± 
replaces the original, rather uplifting ending, where the last words are 
those of Simon WRWDQWH/pQDUHJDUGLQJWKHµOXPLqUH¶(SC, p. 537) she 
embodies, with one that is more sombre. The epilogue mainly presents us 
                                         
10 Hilda Lazaron, Gabriel Marcel the Dramatist (Gerrards Cross: Smythe, 1978), p. 121. 
11 7KLVLVFRPSDUDEOHWR%XEHU¶VI-Thou encounter (Martin Buber, I and Thou, translated by 
Ronald Gregor Smith, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark, 1959)). 
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ZLWKGLVFXVVLRQUHJDUGLQJ;DYLHU¶VGHDWKVHQWHQFHDQG6LPRQ¶VIXQHUDO
Although death is not altogether negative for Marcel, given the lucidity that 
a confrontation with mortality can stimulate, there is nevertheless an 
overwhelming atmosphere of tragedy relating to the suffering of those still 
alive. Consequently, the hope that the original ending expressed in relation 
to the living world is transferred by the epilogue to the hereafter. 
 
RomHQ¶HVWSOXVGDQV5RPH 
 
5RPHQ¶HVWSOXVGDQV5RPHis set in France in 1951 and, again focusing on 
one particular family¶VLQWHU-relations, explores various possible reactions to 
a perceived threat of Communism following World War II. Pascal Laumière, 
the protagonist, is a political writer who has recently written a series of 
articles regarding O¶(SXUDWLRQ ± the pursuit of French collaborators after the 
Occupation. Just prior to the beginning of the play he receives an 
DQRQ\PRXVOHWWHUZKLFKUHDGVµ/HVFRPPunistes arrivent. Vous êtes sur la 
liste de ceux qui doivent être déportés. 3UHQH]YRVSUpFDXWLRQV¶12 The 
OHWWHUWHUULILHVKLVZLIH5HQpHZKRZLWKRXW3DVFDO¶VFRQVHQWZULWHVRQKLV
behalf to a new university in Brazil to arrange a teaching position for him 
there. The news of this appointment is not gratefully received by Pascal. 
5HQpHKDVOLWWOHUHVSHFWIRU3DVFDO¶VMRXUQDOLVWLFDUWLFOHVEHOLHYLQJWKHPto 
be written out of self-indulgence more than anything else. However, for 
Pascal, his writing is a form of political action towards which he feels great 
responsibility. To leave France strikes him as disloyal and cowardly, and all 
WKHPRUHVRJLYHQ)UDQFH¶VSRWHQWLDOO\XQVWDEOHSROLWLFDOVLWXDWLRQLQ
3DVFDO¶VH\HVLWLVGXULQJVXFKXQFHUWDLQWLPHVWKDW)rance needs 
commitment from its people the most. 
 
                                         
12 Gabriel Marcel, 5RPHQ¶HVWSOXVGDQV5RPH(hereafter RR), (Paris : La Table Ronde, 1951), 
p. 11. 
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3DVFDO¶Vcommitment to France is very similar to that of Simon. However, 
his predicament is complicated by the question of additional loyalties 
towards his family which, although acknowledged, is less explored in Le 
Signe de la croix (when Simon is considering whether or not to accompany 
his family to America). The first three acts of 5RPHQ¶HVWSOXVGDQV5RPH 
DGGUHVV3DVFDO¶VGLIILFXOWSURFHVVRIGHOLEHUDWLRQZKHUHE\KHWULHVWR
identify where exactly his responsibilities lie. His search for clarification is 
dramatized by means of the different conversations he has ± most notably 
ZLWK5HQpH¶VZLGRZHGKDOI-sister Esther with whom Pascal shares a 
SDUWLFXODUO\FORVHIULHQGVKLSDQG(VWKHU¶VVRQ0DUF-André for whom he also 
feels great affection. Pascal eventually agrees to leave France, hoping that 
this will still be compatible with his loyalty to France and his heritage. 
However, during the final two acts, set in Brazil, Pascal comes to realize 
that his consenting to leave France has failed to live up to his own needs 
and values. The decision was made out of a sense of duty to provide his 
children and Marc-André ± whom he also accompanies abroad and helps 
Esther to support ± with the opportunity for a better life than the socio-
political situation of France could promise; but Pascal had failed to attribute 
any meaning to this flight for himself. 
 
In Brazil the Laumière family acquire the status of refugees, and are 
expected to act in compliance with the customs of the host culture in 
exchange for their hospitality. But these expectations become more and 
more oppressive for Pascal: the time he spends in the company of Esther is 
frowned upon, his non-attendance at Church encourages further 
disapproval, and he is infRUPHGE\WKHFRPPXQLW\¶VSULHVWWKDWKHPD\
WHDFK*LGHDQG3URXVWRQO\RQFRQGLWLRQWKDWKHGHQRXQFHVWKHµHUURUV¶ZLWK
ZKLFKWKHLUZRUNVDUHULGGOHG7KH&KXUFK¶VUXOHVDQGFRQWUROV anger 
Pascal, and he exclaims to the priest: µ0RQ3qUHLO\DHQWUHQRXV un 
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HIIUR\DEOHPDOHQWHQGX-HQ¶DLSDVFKRLVLFRQWUHODOLEHUWp¶RR, p. 119). 
Pascal, whose freedom is even more limited in Brazil than it risked being in 
France, realizes that he was wrong to have left. Consequently, when he 
comes to give his fortnightly radio broadcast back to France, he announces 
WKDWWKHIDPRXVGHFODUDWLRQPDGHLQ&RUQHLOOH¶VSertorius ± that is, that 
6HUWRULXVLVWKHLQFDUQDWLRQRI5RPDQYDOXHVµ5RPHQ¶HVWSOXVGDQV5RPH
HOOHHVWWRXWHRMHVXLV¶RR, p. 148) ± is false: 
Nous avons eu tort de partir: il fallait rester, il fallait lutter sur place. 
/¶LOOXVLRQTX¶RQSHXWHPSRUWHUVDSDWULHDYHFVRLQHSHXWQDvWUHTXHGH
O¶RUJXHLOHWGHODSOXVIROOHSUpVRPSWLRQ9RXVTXLSHXW-être hésitez 
devant la menace de demain, restez, je vous en conjure >«@  
 
(RR, p. 148) 
Before his departure Pascal discusses his fears with Esther: 
3$6&$/>«@Beaucoup me blâmeront je le sais, vous le savez aussi. 
Puis-je prétendre que cette réprobation est négligeable? 
 
ESTHER: Le courage consiste peut-être à la juger en effet. 
 
PASCAL: Mais ce peut-être HVWHIIUD\DQW1¶\D-t-il pas moyen de 
O¶REOLWpUHUG¶rWUHVU" 
(RR, pp. 89-90) 
 
What the play goes on to show is that unfortunately, there is no way to 
obliterate WKLVµpeut-rWUH¶ 
 
If Pascal feels he should not have left France, this is not to say that, for 
Marcel, he was objectively wrong to have done so. Indeed, had he not left, 
it is doubtful whether he would have achieved this greater lucidity. Pascal 
recognizes this himself when he declares: µODOXFLGLWpQ¶HVWSRVVLEOHTX¶DX
SUL[GHGpSD\VHPHQW¶RR, p. 114). Nor does this mean to say that it is 
necessarily wrong for others to have emigrated; in Marc-$QGUp¶VFDVH, the 
PRYHVHHPVWRKDYHEHHQKLVVDOYDWLRQ$V/D]DURQQRWHVµ5HPRYHGIURP
the atmosphere of the preceding years in his own country, with its climate 
of defeatism, and from his Communistic friends whose credo he could not 
accept, [Marc-André is] able to establish himself happily in the New 
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:RUOG¶13 So whereas Pascal feels that his new situation is requiring him to 
choose µFRQWUHODOLEHUWp¶0DUF-André has actually been released from 
certain pressures that previously restricted his freedom. 
 
Such parallel and yet opposing perspectives are characteristic of the very 
conscious anti-dogmatism observablHLQDOOWKUHHRI0DUFHO¶VSOD\V5LJKW
from the introduction to his first philosophical work0DUFHOGHVFULEHVµOD
UpSXJQDQFHTXH>V@¶LQVSLUDLWHQVRLXQSURFpGpG¶H[SRVLWLRQGRJPDWLTXH¶
(JM, p. ix); to attempt to objectify in such a way is, for Marcel, to betray 
WKHUHDOLW\RI%HLQJ0DUFHO¶VGHQXQFLDWLRQRIWKHGLGDFWLFFRQWLQXHV
throughout his philosophical °XYUH, and is even manifest in the structure 
of his writing itself: continually critical of his own temptation to make 
declarative statements, he often replaces sentence endings with 
suspension points or question marks, or qualifies his statements so that 
they no longer express anything universal.14 Marcel explicitly insists in a 
OHFWXUHWKDWµGDQVOHVSHUVSHFWLYHVGUDPDWXUJLTXHVTXLVRQWOHV
mienQHVLOQHSHXWrWUHTXHVWLRQTX¶jDXFXQPRPHQWO¶DXWHXUSUHQQHXQGH
ses protagonistes comme porte-SDUROH¶RR, p. 154). Thus 5RPHQ¶HVWSOXV
dans RomeDVZLWKKLVRWKHUSOD\VLVIRU0DUFHOµHVVHQWLHOOHPHQW
V\PSKRQLTXH¶RR, p. 155):15 rather than relating exclusively to the 
protagonist, the message of his plays is intended to be a polyphonic 
symphony of all the voices presented. Not only are the words and actions 
of the later Pascal significant; the earlier Pascal also bears witness to 
human lived experience, as do the earlier and later Marc-André, Renée, 
Esther, and every other character. 
 
                                         
13 Lazaron, pp. 127-8. 
14 µ-HP¶HQWLHQVSRXUOHPRPHQWjGHVSRLQWVGHVXVSHQVLRQVLMHOHVUHPSODoDLVSDUOD
PHQWLRQG¶XQHGRQQpHREMHFtive ou objectivable, je retomberais en effet dans les 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQVTXHM¶DLUHSpUpHVSUpFpGHPPHQW¶(RI, p. 43). 
15 An extract from the 1951 lecture is included as an accompaniment to the play. 
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The lucidity gained by Pascal at the end ± where he finally clarifies the 
significance of his emigration for himself ± is accompanied by a religious 
awakening, through which he is able to transcend his previous tendency to 
VHHWKLQJVLQDYHU\ULJLGOLJKWDWWHPSWLQJWRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHULWLVµULJKW¶
RUµZURQJ¶WROHDYH)UDQFHIRUH[DPSOHDQGDFFHSWWKHXQFHUWDLQW\WKDW
SUHYDLOV7KLV0DUFHOUHIHUVWRDVµOHP\VWqUH¶RIH[LVWHQFH1RWHYHU\WKLQJ
is rationally explicable; if we are confronted with what seem to be 
irreconcilable dilemmas, it is because we are performing what Marcel calls 
µUpIOH[LRQSULPDLUH¶ DQGFRQILQLQJRXUVHOYHVWRWKHUHDOPRIµOHSUREOqPH¶
We should instead seek a transcendent form of reflection ± µUpIOH[LRQ
VHFRQGH¶± which does not insist that everything be explicitly definable, 
concretely representable, or conceptualizable.16 Although Pascal decides 
that the move to Brazil was not in keeping with his personal values, he also 
realizes that his departure has closed off further possibilities for action back 
in France: 
5HQWUpHQ)UDQFHTX¶\IHUDL-MH"UHSUHQGUHPHVFKURQLTXHV"pFULUH«
WRXWoDQ¶DSOXVDXFXQVHQV(QWUHUGDQVODOXWWH"P¶HPEULJDGHUGDns 
XQSDUWLUHMRLQGUH0DOUDX[HWVHVDPLV"&¶HVWLPSRVVLEOH>«@-HVXLV
YRXpjO¶LQHIILFDFLWpHWjSUpVHQWMHOHVDLV-HGRLVOHUHFRQQDvWUHDYHF
une humilité absolue. Mais peut-être est-FHjSDUWLUGHOjTX¶RQSHXW
monter vers Lui, être plus près de LXL« 
(RR, p. 145) 
 
5RPHQ¶HVWSOXVGDQV5RPHthus provides the clearest illustration of how, 
for Marcel, authentic being and the freedom it implies are indissolubly 
linked to faith; it is from this faith that Pascal will draw the strength to 
continue his difficult existence in Brazil. The play also suggests that an 
DXWKHQWLFXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRQH¶VVHOIDQGsituation is crucial if any form of 
genuine action is to be possible: it is only when Pascal ceases to make 
choices for others and turns his attention towards himself that he is able to 
experience any kind of liberation.17 Thus, even if freedom cannot be 
                                         
16 µ-¶DSSHOOHFHWWHSXLVVDQFHGHWUDQVFHQGDQFHOLEHUWp¶JM, p. 72). 
17 µ/¶obscurité du monde extérieur est fonction de mon obscurité pour moi-PrPH¶Gabriel 
Marcel, Etre et avoir (hereafter EA), (Paris : Aubier-Montaigne, 1935), p. 16). 
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defined in absolute terms, it appears that one thing its possibility does 
require LVµILGHOLW\¶DV0DUFHOWHUPVLWto the values one intuitively feels 
are important. But as illustrated by this change in the possibles open to 
Pascal, what constitutes such fidelity cannot be translated into any one 
IRUPRIDFWLRQLWPXVWLQVWHDGEHµFUHDWLYH¶GHSHQGLQJQRWRQO\RQHDFK
individual, but also each individual situation. 
 
However, as was the case in the other two plays, such genuine 
FRPSUHKHQVLRQRIRQH¶VVHOIDQGsituation is portrayed as extremely rare. 
8QWLO3DVFDO¶VFRQYHUVLRQDWWKHHQGDOOWKHFKDUDFWHUVDUHSresented as lost 
and alienated owing to their misunderstanding of both themselves and 
others. The relationship between Pascal and Renée illustrates this the most 
clearly. As the only married couple in the play, one might expect their 
relationship to be the closest - on the contrary, it is the most 
antagonistic.18 Renée is utterly selfish and constantly acts to undermine 
3DVFDO¶VFRQILGHQFHEXW3DVFDO¶VZHDNFKDUDFWHUGRHVQRWSDUWLFXODUO\
redeem him, his response being to label himself the victim and evade 
confrontation by seeking support from Esther. Yet even Esther, with whom 
Pascal does appear to share some reciprocal understanding, is unable to 
LGHQWLI\ZLWK3DVFDO¶VVSLULWXDOLW\DWWKHHQGShe in fact decides to return to 
France, whereas this is no longer an option for Pascal. Thus, the 
predominant discourse in the play is still one of individual isolation and 
ORQHOLQHVV,QVSLWHRI3DVFDO¶VLQFUHDVHGOXFLGLW\KHLVMXVWDVDOLHQDWHG- if 
QRWPRUHVRFRQVLGHULQJ(VWKHU¶VSODQQHGGHSDUWXUH6RDXWKHQWLF%HLQJ
in the Marcellian intersubjective sense, is not presented as any more 
possible at the end of the play than it is at the beginning; if any form of 
                                         
18 Here, a direct parallel can be drawn with Pauline and Simon. The characterization in both 
cases LVW\SLFDORI0DUFHO¶Vefforts to undermine any preconceptions we might have about the 
nature of Being. In Homo viator 0DUFHOGLVFXVVHVµOHP\VWqUHIDPLOLDO¶GHQRXQFLQJWKHQRWLRQ
that inter-IDPLO\UHODWLRQVDUHLQKHUHQWO\SULYLOHJHGµOHs relations familiales, comme les choses 
humaines en général, ne présentent par elle-mêmes aucune consistance, aucune garantie de 
VROLGLWp¶*DEULHO0DUFHOHomo viator ([Paris] : Aubier-Montaigne, 1944), p. 11). 
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liberating transcendence is possible, 5RPHQ¶HVWSOXVGDQV Rome offers no 
suggestion that this can be anything beyond psychological release. 
 
In all three of the plays discussed, objective conceptions of authenticity 
hDYHEHHQVHYHUHO\SUREOHPDWL]HGµLOQ¶\DSDVGHWHFKQLTXHPRUDOH¶JM, 
p. 210), Marcel writes. $Q\µWHFKQLTXH¶FRQFUHWHV\VWHPRUSULQFLSOHE\
GHILQLWLRQµVHUWOHSpFKp¶19 due to the intellectualizing and therefore 
dehumanizing effect characteristic of such refléxion primaire. In keeping 
with this refusal of didacticism, no character is judged or condemned any 
more than another; even the more negative characters are justified with 
respect to their particular capacities or situation. Pauline (SC), for example, 
is very narrow-minded and judgemental. Yet tante Léna still offers some 
GHIHQFHRQKHUEHKDOIµ-HVXSSRVHTX¶RQDLPHFRPPHRQSHXWFRPPHRQ
HVW«¶(SC, p. 514). As Clouard notes: µ/¶DXWHXUQHOHV>VHVSHUVRQQDJHV@
MXJHSRLQWLOOHVIDLWV¶DIIURQWHUSRXUGpFRXSHUHQUHOLHIVVLJQLILFDWLIV
TXHOTXHVJUDQGVDVSHFWVGHODEDWDLOOHpWHUQHOOHGHO¶kPHDYHFODFKDLUGH
O¶DPRXUDYHFO¶pJRwVPHGHO¶KpURwVPHDYHFWRXWHVVRUWHVG¶LQFRQVFLHQWes 
FRQWUDLQWHV¶20 The symphony of different situations created leaves all the 
moral questions raised open for the audience to reflect upon for 
WKHPVHOYHV7KXV0DUFHO¶VWKHDWUHLWVHOIDLPVWRHQFRXUDJHparticipation. 
But such an approach has proved problematic for Marcel, resulting in 
YDULRXVPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRQWKHSDUWRIWKHDXGLHQFH3DVFDO¶VILQDO
PHVVDJHWKDWµ1RXVDYRQVHXWRUWGHSDUWLU¶RR, p. 148), for example, was 
WDNHQYHU\OLWHUDOO\VRWKDW0DUFHOZDVIRUFHGWRVSHDNRXWLQKLVSOD\¶V
defencH6LPRQ¶VUHIXVDOWRUHFRJQL]HDFRPPRQ-HZLVKFRQVFLRXVQHVVLQ
                                         
19 Gabriel Marcel, /HV+RPPHVFRQWUHO¶KXPDLn (Paris : La Colombe, 1951), p. 72. 
20 Cited in Lazaron, p. 28. 
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Le Signe de la croix also caused controversy and resentment, to the extent 
that the play was never actually performed.21 
 
The plays do hint that intersubjective disponibilité is something Marcel 
wishes to link to authenticity; as Marcel writes in /H0\VWqUHGHO¶rWUH,, 
(1951)µWRXWSpFKp>«@HVWDXIRQGO¶DFWHGHVHUHIHUPHUVXUVRLRXGHVH
SUHQGUHSRXUFHQWUH¶22 Such egoism discourages recognition of incarnate 
Being proper which, for Marcel, has immediate moral implications, turning 
others into inaccessible objects of consciousness and therefore encouraging 
indisponibilité. However, tKHSOD\V¶RYHUZKHOPLQJHPSKDVLVRQWKH
individual and situational dependency of moral decisions actually creates 
the impression that it is a case of everyone for themselves: all three plays 
suggest WKDWZHDUHQRWLQDSRVLWLRQWRVXIILFLHQWO\DSSUHFLDWHDQRWKHU¶V
situation, and thus have no authority to make judgements. 
 
This refusal to judge seems to leave us with an ethical philosophy of 
interiority, which is incapable of addressing questions of morality on the 
wider societal plane. The character who is most consistently presented in a 
positive light, tante Léna, also presents us with a weary and resigned 
acceptance of injustice, making it difficult to see her as an entirely 
exemplary character when her behaviour implies that the unethical is 
unavoidable and inevitable.23 µ/DPRUDOLWpHVW-HOOHYUDLPHQW">«@(OOHHVW
GDQVODPHVXUHRM¶DIILUPHTX¶HOOHHVWRM¶DLIRLHQVDUpDOLWp¶JM, p. 
208), writes Marcel. Indeed, confronted with omnipresent tragedy, faith in 
pure defiance of human suffering and isolation appears to be the only 
SRVLWLYHUHVSRQVHWKDWFDQEHGUDZQIURP0DUFHO¶VWKHDWUH 
                                         
21 Lazaron, p. 120. This is not surprising given that Le Signe de la croix was first published in 
1949 ± only just after the Holocaust. 
22 Gabriel Marcel, /H0\VWqUHGHO¶rWUH,,(hereafter ME II), (Paris : Aubier-Montaigne, 1951), 
p. 182. 
23 µ'DQVFHPRQGH-FLRQQHSHXWHQYpULWpTXHVXELUPrPHORUVTX¶RQSURWHVWH«HWMHFURLV
TX¶RQJDUGHSOXVGHIRUFHVLRQV¶pSDUJQHODSHLQHRXOHSODLVLUGHSURWHVWHU¶ (SC, p. 515). 
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1.2  Existentialist Ethical Thought in the Theatre of
 Albert Camus 
 
 
In comparison with 0DUFHODQDO\VLVRI&DPXV¶SOD\VSXUHO\LQWHUPVRI
WKHLUHWKLFDOFRQWHQWLVPXFKPRUHVWUDLJKWIRUZDUG&DPXV¶SOD\VZHUHDOO
produced during the 40s and 50s; thus the plays selected for examination 
have been chosen in order to represent different stages in the evolution of 
his ethical thought. Le Malentendu was first produced soon after the 
SXEOLFDWLRQRI&DPXV¶ILUVWSKLORVRSKLFDOZRUNLe Mythe de Sisyphe (1942), 
and will provide an opportunity to introduce the distinctive concepts 
UHODWLQJWR&DPXV¶ethical position.24 /¶(WDWGHVLqJH and Les Justes will 
then be analysed in order to explore WKHSURJUHVVLRQRI&DPXV¶moral 
philosophy towards his other major work, /¶+RPPHUpYROWp (1951). 
 
Le Malentendu 
 
Le Malentendu tells the story of Jan ± a young man who returns home rich 
after having spent twenty happy years abroad in the sun. His hope is that, 
with his new prosperity, he will now be able to bring happiness to his 
widowed mother and sister Martha, who keep a guesthouse in a depressing 
region of central Europe. However, in order to maximize their joy he 
decides to stay at the inn under a different name, so that he can best 
choose the moment to reveal his identity. As he predicts, Martha and his 
mother do not recognize him; but as he has made allusions to his wealthy 
status, they drug and drown him for his money, ironically so that they 
might escape to a warmer country. His true identity is then revealed when 
the old servant ± µOH9LHX[¶± finds his passport. The discovery is too much 
for the mother, who subsequently commits suicide. Martha follows suit, 
                                         
24 For this reason, Le Malentendu will be discussed in slightly more detail than the other two 
plays. 
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feeling that she has been rejected in favour of the returned prodigal son; 
DQG-DQ¶s wife Maria is left all alone. 
 
This play represents the stDJHLQ&DPXV¶°XYUH concerned with µnégation¶25 
DQGWKHµDEVXUGLW\¶RIH[LVWHQFH. What is absurd, for Camus, is the futility of 
PDQ¶VVHDUFKIRUa meaning to H[LVWHQFHµ-¶DLEHVRLQGHPDOXFLGLWp¶Ess, 
p. 30), he writes in his first collection of essays, /¶(QYHUVHWO¶HQGURLW 
(1937), but the world he is confronted with appears unintelligible and 
indifferent to his confusion concerning human purpose; µFHWWHpSDLVVHXUHW
FHWWHpWUDQJHWpGXPRQGHF¶HVWO¶DEVXUGH¶.26 Camus famously begins Le 
Mythe de Sisyphe with the assertion that µLOQ¶\DTX¶XQSUREOqPH
SKLORVRSKLTXHYUDLPHQWVpULHX[F¶HVWOHVXLFLGHJuger que la vie vaut ou 
QHYDXWSDVODSHLQHG¶rWUHYpFXHF¶HVWUpSRQGUHjODTXHVWLRQ
IRQGDPHQWDOHGHODSKLORVRSKLH¶MS, p. 17). The paradox that Camus 
cannot resolve is how we can value human life so highly, whilst at the 
same time being fully aware of our mortality, for this would seem to render 
OLIH¶VHndeavours meaningless; life must have meaning in order to be 
valued, so if life appears essentially devoid of meaning does this then 
justify suicide? 
 
As will become evident, questions regarding the justifiability of death are of 
SULPDU\LPSRUWDQFHWR&DPXV¶HWKLFDOUHIOHFWLRQ27 Le Malentendu however, 
is not so much a philosophical enquiry into how we might respond to the 
Absurd as it is a dramatization of its very experience. In Le Mythe de 
Sisyphe Camus describes how µXQMRXU>«@OH³SRXUTXRL´V¶pOqYH¶MS, p. 
29): tKLVµSRXUTXRL¶WKHQEHFRPHVDQLQHVFDSDEOHSUHRFFXSDWLRQDQGVRXUFH
                                         
25 µJHYRXODLVG¶DERUGH[SULPHUODQpJDWLRQSous trois formes. Romanesque: ce fut /¶(tranger. 
Dramatique: Caligula, Le Malentendu. Idéologique: Le Mythe de Sisyphe¶(Albert Camus, 
Essais (hereafter Ess), (Paris : Gallimard, 1965), p. 1610). 
26 Albert Camus, /H0\WKHGH6LV\SKHHVVDLVXUO¶DEVXUGH(hereafter MS), (Paris : Gallimard, 
1942), p. 31. 
27 µ/H VHXOSUREOqPHTXLP¶LQWpUHVVH\D-t-LOXQHORJLTXHMXVTX¶jODPRUW"¶(MS, p. 24). 
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of anxiety, for once it is recognized, all decisions seem completely arbitrary 
and necessity of choice transforms human freedom into a burden. All of the 
main characters in Le Malentendu express frustration and despair, as they 
do not quite feel in control of the freedom that in principle they ought to 
possess. SRPHKRZWKHZRUOG¶VVWUDQJHDQGRSDTXHZD\VDOZD\VVHHPWR
scheme against them, causing them to feel dislocated and alone, and 
raising the question as to what freedom even means. As Freeman has 
noted, Le Malentendu presenWVWKH$EVXUGµDOPRVWDVLILWZHUHD
FRPSUHKHQVLYHPDOHYROHQWIRUFH¶.28 0DUWKDµD hâte de trouver [un] pays où 
OHVROHLOWXHOHVTXHVWLRQV¶29 that plague her, but for which the world offers 
no clarification; DQGWKHPRWKHUQRZWRRROGDQGZHDU\RIOLIH¶VLncessant 
TXHVWLRQVµDVSLUHVHXOHPHQWjODSDL[jXQSHXG¶DEDQGRQ¶LM, p. 158). 
Jan, who returns home because he KDVUHDOL]HGWKDWµOHERQKHXUQ¶HVWSDV
WRXWHWOHVKRPPHVRQWOHXUGHYRLU¶LM, p. 169), nevertheless remains 
torn between the responsibility he feels towards his mother and the 
responsibility he also has towards his wife. µ2PRQ'LHX>«@'RQQH]-moi 
DORUVODIRUFHGHFKRLVLUFHTXHMHSUpIqUHHWGHP¶\WHQLU¶LM, p. 209), he 
cries. 0DULDRQWKHRWKHUKDQGGHVSDLUVDW-DQ¶VZKROHHQWHUSULVH: not 
RQO\GRHV-DQ¶VUHQXQFLDWLRQRIWKHLUKDSS\VLWXDWLRQDSSHDUVXGGHQDQG
arbitrary; she also cannot understand why Jan must complicate things 
further by not initially revealing his identity. 
 
But if absurdity makes the experience of life feel contrived and false, for 
Camus there are also ontologically false ways of responding to this 
metaphysical reality. In his Carnets (1935-42) Camus summarizes the 
                                         
28 E. Freeman, The Theatre of Albert Camus: A Critical Study (London : Methuen, 1971), p. 
65. 
29 Albert Camus, Le Malentendu (hereafter LM), in Caligula, suivi de Le Malentendu (Paris : 
Gallimard, 1958), p. 164; original publication: 1944. 
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content of Le Malentendu DVIROORZVµ6XMHWGHSLqFH/¶KRPPHPDVTXp¶.30 
This is precisely the role that Jan plays, masking his identity in order to act 
out the idealistic scenario of surprise he imagines will bring the greatest 
happiness to his mother and sister. But, argues Camus: 
Nous finissons toujours par avoir le visage de nos vérités. /¶H[LVWHQFH
toute entière, pour un homme détournpGHO¶pWHUQHOQ¶HVWTX¶XQPLPH
démesuUpVRXVOHPDVTXHGHO¶DEVXUGH 
(MS, p. 130) 
 
-DQ¶VUROHplay is a form of what Camus calls µOHVXLFLGHSKLORVRSKLTXH¶ 
Acting out this new identity is a way of GpWRXUQHUGHO¶pWHUQHO(the 
ontological truth RIH[LVWHQFH¶VDEVXUGLW\and pretending that his actions 
have a significant purpose, when intrinsically they have none. &DPXV¶
GHVFULSWLRQRIWKLVDVµun PLPH¶LVSDUWLFXODUO\DSWIRU-DQ¶VDWWHPSWWRDFW
out his self-attributed part, which he thinks µ>SHXW@WRXWFRQFLOLHU¶LM, p. 
171), speaks no words to anyone else in the play; he only alienates himself 
further from his family and wife, his death giving KLPWKHVXSUHPHµYLVDJH¶
of the vérité of his alienation. 
 
Martha and her mother are equally misguided in believing that they will 
finally be content once they have secured enough money to allow them to 
live in the sun. Says Martha to her mother: µle jour où nous serons enfin 
GHYDQWODPHUGRQWM¶DLWDQWUrYpFHMRXU-là, vous me verrez sourire¶(LM, 
p. 160). But in practice, Martha¶V DQGKHUPRWKHU¶VSURMHFWdoes nothing 
but postpone their existence, and any freedom they might enjoy is put on 
hold in the name of a dream that has no actual reality. Furthermore, 
Freeman points out thaWµ-DQ¶VGLVVatisfaction with this Utopia [in the sun], 
and migration back from the south to the north, points to the illusory 
QDWXUHRI0DUWKD¶VJRDOLQWKHILUVWSODFH¶31 ,Q&DPXV¶H\HVµV¶LO\DXQ
                                         
30 Albert Camus, Carnets: mai 1935 ± février 1942 (hereafter C I), (Paris : Gallimard, 1962), 
p. 157. 
31 Freeman, pp. 66-7. 
 28 
SpFKpFRQWUHODYLHFHQ¶HVW>«@SDVWDQWG¶HQGpVHVSpUHUTXHG¶HVSpUHU
XQHDXWUHYLH¶Ess, p. 76). 
 
In fact, the mother is not altogether convinced WKDWWKHLUJRDOµYDXWOD
SHLQH¶ (LM, p. 164+HUHµODSHLQH¶VHHPVSULPDULO\WRUHIHUWRHIIRUWWhe 
harsh existence she has led has cultivated in her a death-wish, so that she 
ends her life rather willingly once she has learnt -DQ¶VWUXHLGHQWLW\,WLV
DOVRSRVVLEOHWKDWµODSHLQH¶PLJKWUHIHUWRDmoral burden, resulting from 
WKHLUSODQ¶VGHSHQGHQF\RQPXUGHU+RZHYHULIWKHPRWKHULVQRW
convinced that there is any need to perform such murders, neither is she 
convinced that there is any particular reason not to; she may not exhibit 
the same drive to execute their plans as Martha, but she does not display 
any strong objections either. 
 
The pessimism of the play is most apparent regarding Maria, who is not in 
pursuit of any ideal; she is completely innocent. Yet this innocence does 
not spare her any suffering ± if anything it only increases it. The fact that 
she has done nothing to deserve her pain merely renders the anguish of 
absurdity all the more acute for her. Maria spends all her time trying 
desperately to convince -DQWKDWKLVµPpWKRGHQ¶HVWSDVODERQQH¶LM, p. 
173). µ7XSRXUUDLVIDLUHWRXWFHODHQSUHQDQWXQODQJDJHVLPSOH¶LM, p. 
173) she insists, so at the end of the play when Martha informs her that 
KHUKXVEDQGLVGHDG0DULDKRZOVµ2KPRQ'LHXMHVDYDLVTXHFHWWH
FRPpGLHQHSRXYDLWrWUHTXHVDQJODQWH¶LM, p. 238). -DQ¶VWUDJLFHQGLVthe 
result of a misunderstanding he himself engineered; it seems that if Jan 
had only kept things simple and told the truth, all this suffering could have 
been avoided. 
 
In an un-dated archival text, Camus writes: 
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Le Malentendu est certainement une pièce sombre. >«@0DLVMHQHFURLV
SDVTX¶HOOHVRLWXQHSLqFHGpVHVSpUDQWH>«@ il serait faux de croire que 
cette pièce plaide pour la soumission à la fatalité. Pièce de révolte au 
contraire, elle pourrait même comporter une morale de la sincérité. 
 
(TRN, p. 1793) 
 
For Camus, the authentic man ± or µO¶KRPPHDEVXUGH¶32 ± must face up to 
the truth of absurdityµLOVXIILWGH>«@QHULHQPDVTXHU¶MS, p. 125). Only 
in doing this will it be possible to appreciate, and therefore live the here 
and now.33 +RZHYHU)UHHPDQLVQRWVDWLVILHGZLWK&DPXV¶MXVWLILFDWLRQRI
WKHSOD\¶VXQGHUO\LQJRSWLPLVPVHHLQJLWDVµDIDFLOHDUJXPHQW>ZKLFK@
would only work if Le Malentendu were centred on Jan as the sole tragic 
KHUR¶34 But the tragedy of the play is collective. In fact, as Freeman points 
RXWµIor much of the play Jan is not in the mDLQIRFXV>«@the agony of 
WKHVHWKUHHZRPHQ>«@LVWKHSURPLQHQWWKHPH¶35 Furthermore, Freeman 
draws attention to the brutal line spoken by Martha when she finds out that 
it is her brother who she has killed: µVLMHO¶DYDLVUHFRQQX>«@FHODQ¶DXUDLW
riHQFKDQJp¶LM, p. 230), she maintains.36 0DUWKDEOXUV&DPXV¶FRQFHSWLRQ
of the authentic homme absurde due to the lucidity she possesses: µ-¶DL
WRXMRXUVWURXYpGHO¶DYDQWDJHjPRQWUHUOHVFKRVHVWHOOHVTX¶HOOHVVRQW¶LM, 
p. 183), is ironically her motto, so despite her murderous crimes, in this 
respect she is arguably more authentic than Jan. 
 
Another µVHULRXVGHIHFW¶RIWKHSOD\LQ)UHHPDQ¶VH\HVµLVWKDW0DULDGRHV
QRWH[LVWRQWKHVDPHSODQHRIUHDOLW\>«@DVWKHRWKHUWKUHHPDLQ
characterV¶37 Instead, VKHLVDUHODWLYHRXWVLGHUWRWKHSOD\¶VDFWLRQDQG
                                         
32 As referred to in Le Mythe de Sisyphe. 
33 µ9LYUHF¶HVWIDLUHYLYUHO¶DEVXUGH/HIDLUHYLYUHF¶HVWDYDQWWRXWOHUHJDUGHU¶MS, p. 78). 
34 Freeman, p. 69. 
35 ibid., p. 59. 
36 0DUJHUULVRQZULWHVVLPLODUO\µ&DPXV¶UHWURVSHFWLYHFODLPWKDWLQDQXQMXVWZRUOGDPDQFDQ
VDYHKLPVHOIDQGRWKHUVWKURXJKVLQFHULW\>«@LVHYHQOHVVFRQYLQFLQJLIZHEHOLHYH0DUWKD¶V
declaration that she would have killed her brother HYHQKDGKHLGHQWLILHGKLPVHOI¶&KULVWLQH
0DUJHUULVRQµ&DPXVDQGWKHWKHDWUH¶LQ Edward J. Hughes (ed.), The Cambridge Companion 
to Camus (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 70). 
37 µ0DULDIDUIURPKHOSLQJWKHDXGLHQFHWR³JHWLQ´WRWKLs difficult play, serves only to keep it 
RXW¶)UHHPDQS0DUJHUULVRQDOVRQRWHVKRZ0DULDµLVQRWLQWHJUDWHGRQWKHVDPH
LQWHOOHFWXDOOHYHODVWKHRWKHUFKDUDFWHUV¶+XJKHVS 
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this detracts all the more from any underlying discourse of optimism. Thus 
any positive ethic presented in Le Malentendu is not one which can leave a 
lasting impression; at the end of the play we are still left feeling that 
murder and suffering are inevitable. 
 
Under the reign of absurdity, human freedom is portrayed as non-existent, 
thereby undermining the possibility for any genuine choice or 
responsibility; dHVSLWH0DULD¶VGHVSHUDWHDWWHPSWVWRDOWHU-DQ¶VFRXUVHRI
DFWLRQ-DQµQH>VDLW@SDVPLHX[>V@¶H[SULPHU¶LM, p. 185). The role of the 
Other in the play only serves to reconfirm human isolation. Indeed, Martha 
thought that she and her mother were acting together to realize a common 
dream, but even this is not the case; Martha is not enough of a reason for 
her mother to stay alive when she finds out that it is her son she has 
helped to murder.38 Any dialogue seems impossible between characters so 
locked up in their solitude, and there is little hope for change: the wisdom 
WKHPRWKHUKDVJDLQHGIURPKHUOLIHH[SHULHQFHLVWKDWµquand les choses 
V¶DUUDQJHQWPDORQQHSHXWULHQ\IDLUH¶LM, p. 213). Camus therefore 
presents the tragedy of the play as metaphysical, so that, for East, the 
entire play is a metaphor for the human condition.39 The end of the play 
VXJJHVWVWKHQDWXUDORUGHURIWKLQJVWREHµFHOXLRSHUVRQQHQ¶HVWMDPDLV
UHFRQQX¶LM, p. 242).40 In the final moments, Maria calls out to God to 
help her bear her pain, in response to which le Vieux appears, asking if she 
has called for him. Maria is initially unsure as to how to respond, but begs 
for his help anyway. To this however, the old servant EOXQWO\UHSOLHVµ1RQ¶
(LM, p. 245). Thus the play also implies that there is not even a God that 
                                         
38 µ-¶LPDJLQDLVTXHOHFULPHpWDLWQRWUHIR\HUHWTX¶LOQRXVDYDLWXnies, ma mère et moi, pour 
toujours. >«@0DLVMHPHWURPSais. Le crime aussi est une solitude, même si on se met à mille 
SRXUO¶DFFRPSOLU(WLOHVWMXVWHTXHMHPHXUHVHXOHDSUqVDYRLUYpFXHWWXpVHXOH¶LM, pp. 
240-1). 
39 Bernard East, Albert Camus, ou O¶KRPPHjODUHFKHUFKHG¶XQHPRUDOH(Paris : Editions du 
Cerf, 1984), p. 37. 
40 Phrases such as µ-HYRXVUHFRQQDLVPDO¶LM, p. 158), µ-HQHWHUHFRQQDLVSOXV¶LM, p. 224), 
DQGµ-HQHUHFRQQDLVSDVYRVPRWV¶LM, p. 226) permeate the entire play. 
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humans can turn to when in despair, or at least if God does exist, He is not 
a God of justice or compassion. 
 
/¶(WDWGHVLqJH 
 
While Le Malentendu focuses on the metaphysical and abstract nature of 
the Absurd, /¶(WDWGHVLqJH reveals a much greater concern for its political 
and social consequences. The play presents a more positive stage in 
&DPXV¶HWKLFDOWKRXJKWZKLFKFDQEHLGHQWLILHGZLWKWKHphilosophical shift 
that /¶+RPPHUpYROWprepresents when compared with Le Mythe de 
Sisyphe.41 Le Mythe de Sisyphe places great emphasis on the logic of the 
$EVXUGµ6LMHMXJHTX¶XQHFKRVHHVWYUDLHMHGRLVODSUpVHUYHU¶MS, p. 51). 
Camus then encourages us to make the present our own and defy 
absurdity, as opposed to committing physical or philosophical suicide. 
However, Camus himself came to recognize the unsatisfactory nature of his 
former, overwhelmingly fatalistic discourse, confessing in a 1943 letter that 
µ>Le Mythe de Sisyphe] Q¶DERUGHSDVHQUpDOLWpOHSUREOqPHGH³FHTX¶RQ
peut faire´¶Ess, p. 1423; my emphasis). )DFLQJXSWRDEVXUGLW\LVµULHQ
G¶DXWUHTX¶XQSRLQWGHGpSDUW>«;] il faut briser les jeux fixes du miroir et 
entrer dans le mouvement irrésistible par lequel O¶DEVXUGHVHGpSDVVHOXL-
PrPH¶42 so that O¶KRPPHDEVXUGHceases to be paralysed in the present 
by the Camusian imperative to maintain the Absurd. Le Malentendu can 
therefore be seen as setting the scene for a VHFRQGVWDJHLQ&DPXV¶
thought, which moves forward from this point de départ to present us with 
a more constructive ethic. /¶(WDWGHVLqge LV&DPXV¶ILUVWGUDPDWLFDWWHPSW
to do this. 
 
                                         
41 µ-HSUpvoyais le positif sous les trois formes encore. Romanesque: La Peste. Dramatique: 
/¶(WDWGHVLqJHet Les Justes. Idéologique: /¶+RPPHUpYROWp¶ (Ess, p. 1610). 
42 Albert Camus, /¶+RPPHUpYROWp(hereafter HR), (Paris : Gallimard, 1951), p. 23. 
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At the beginning of the play the Spanish town of Cadix is invaded by an 
epidemic of the plague, which is personified and presented in the form of a 
political dictator. The play dramatizes the effect of La Peste on the town, 
and the ways in which different members of the community react to this 
état de siège/D3HVWH¶VFUXHOGLFWDWRUVKLSVHL]HVFRQWURORIDQ\LQGLYLGXDO
autonomy, and thus ± as with Le Malentendu ± lack of recognition features 
as a predominant theme, acting as a metaphor for the absence of human 
freedom. In addition, the play features various actual mime scenes, further 
emphasizing the disastrous effect of totalitarianism, which cuts individuals 
off from each other and leaves them powerless and helpless in their 
solitude. µ2HVWO¶(VSDJQH"2HVW&DGL["&HGpFRUQ¶HVWG¶DXFXQSD\V¶43 
cries the protagonist Diego in dismay. 
 
If authenticity only necessitated recognition and acceptance of absurdity, 
/D3HVWH¶VDFWLRQVZRXOGEHMXVWLILDEOHIRUOLIH¶VPHDQLQJOHVVQHVVDQGWKH
lack of any fundamental human purpose would imply that all action is equal 
in value: 
/HVHQWLPHQWGHO¶DEVXUGHTXDQGRQSUpWHQGG¶DERUGHQWLUHUXQHUqJOH
G¶DFWLRQUHQGOHPHXUWUHDXPRLQVLQGLIIpUHQWHWSDUFRQVpTXHQW
possiEOH6LO¶RQQHFURLWjULHQVLULHQQ¶DGHVHQVHWVLQRXVQH
SRXYRQVDIILUPHUDXFXQHYDOHXUWRXWHVWSRVVLEOHHWULHQQ¶D
G¶LPSRUWDQFH>«@0DOLFHHWYHUWXVRQKDVDUGRXFDSULFH 
(HR, p. 17) 
 
However, the rest of the play serves to elaborate on what Camus 
expressed in a more abstract context in Le Mythe de Sisyphe ± that is, how 
µtRXWHVWSHUPLVQHVLJQLILHSDVTXHULHQQ¶HVWGpIHQGX¶ (MS, p. 96); and 
/¶(WDWGHVLqJHLQWURGXFHV&DPXV¶QRWLRQRIµrévolte¶which was only hinted 
DWLQ&DPXV¶DWWHPSWHGGHIence of Le Malentendu. :KLOH/D3HVWH¶V
authoritarian UHLJQVHUYHVWRLOOXVWUDWH&DPXV¶DUJXPHQW(in Actuelles I 
(1944-8)) WKDWµODYLHGHFKDFXQQHSHXWSDVrWUHDXWUHPHQWTX¶DEVWUDLWHj
                                         
43 Albert Camus, /¶(WDWGHVLqJH(hereafter ES), (Paris : Gallimard, 1998 [original publication: 
1948]), p. 114. 
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SDUWLUGXPRPHQWRRQV¶DYLVHGHODSOLHUjXQHLGpRORJLH¶Ess, p. 401), 
&DPXV¶FRQFHSWLRQRIUHYROWZLOODLPWRGHPRQVWUDWHKRZWKLVDEVWUDFWLGHD
of life might be transformed into a reality. 
 
Thus returns the question as to ZKDWµPRUDOLW\¶might consist of, when the 
logic of the Absurd seems to entail that tout est permis; does this not 
mean WKDWµIDXWHGHYDOHXUVXSpULHXUHTXLRULHQWHO¶DFWLRQRQVHGLULJHUD
GDQVOHVHQVGHO¶HIILFDFLWpLPPpGLDWH¶HR, p. 18)? Indeed, this is the line 
of argument manifest in La Peste, whose rule prioritizes efficiency above all 
else, so that bureaucracy and its calculated, impersonal rationality become 
WKHVXSUHPHRUGHU/D3HVWHLQVWLWXWHVµO¶DEVROXHMXVWLFH¶ES, p. 88), which 
he uses to organize the deaths of the WRZQ¶Vpeople ± effected by his 
secretary ± in an equal, orderly, and UHVSHFWDEOHIDVKLRQµYRXVDOOH]
DSSUHQGUHjPRXULUGDQVO¶RUGUH¶ES, p. 87). His response to the Absurd is 
to legitimize the suffering and murder which Le Malentendu presented as 
inevitable, so that instead of being the source of tragedy, murder is 
integrated into the order of things and becomes an acceptable, universal 
logic. +RZHYHUWKDWKLVµRUGUH¶PLJKWEHFRQVLGHUHGD true form of logic is 
ridiculed in the play, and is a principal source of humour.44 /¶(WDWGHVLqJH 
then aims to replace the logic of /D3HVWH¶VUDWLRQDOLVP± merely another 
form of philosophical suicide ± with the authentic ontological logic of revolt, 
FRQVLVWHQWZLWKKXPDQLW\¶VQDWXUDORUGHU45 
 
The intellectual despair of Nada, the nihilist, is equally condemned in the 
play. Nada may seem to express Le Malentendu¶VHWKLFZKHQKHsays, 
                                         
44 /D3HVWH¶VµRUGUH¶LVULGLFXOHGE\WKHDEVXUGLW\RIWKHFHUWLILFDWHVRIH[LVWHQFHLQVWDWHGIRU
example (ES, pp. 92-8). The application form requires citizenVWRGHFODUHWKHLUµUDLVRQVG¶rWUH¶
DQGWKHLUµPRWLIVGHO¶XQLRQ¶LIWKH\DUHPDUULHGQRWRQO\WKLVWKHFHUWLILFDWHUHFHLYHGLVRQO\
µSURYLVRLUHHWjWHUPH¶DQGLQRUGHUWRFROOHFWLWDKHDOWKFHUWLILFDWHPXVWILUVWEHDFTXLUHGAs 
/H3rFKHXUPXWWHUVµ-XVTX¶LFLQRXVDYLRQVWUqVELHQYpFXVDQVoD¶ES, p. 92). 
45 7KDW&DPXV¶UHYROWLVVWLOOJURXQGHGLQORJLFLVLOOXVWUDWHGLQWKHIROORZLQJH[DPSOHV µ/D 
révolte, quand elle débouche sur la destruction, est illogique¶(HR, p. 356);  µ/HUpYROWpH[LJH
sans doute une certaine liberté pour lui-même; mais en aucun cas, V¶LOHVWFRQVpTXHQW, le droit 
GHGpWUXLUHO¶rWUHHWODOLEHUWpGHO¶DXWUH¶HR, p. 355; my emphasis). 
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µ1¶HVSqUHULHQ/DFRPpGLHYDFRPPHQFHU¶ES, p. 45), but his 
understanding of this does not lead him to encourage life malgré tout. On 
the contrary, he advocates instead: µ9LYHULHQSXLVTXHF¶HVWODVHXOe chose 
TXLH[LVWH¶(ES, p. 99), and he welcomes La Peste¶V destructive order. The 
FKRUXVLQWKHSOD\FRQVHTXHQWO\DUJXHµLO\DGHVOLPLWHVEt ceux-là qui 
prétendent ne rien régler, comme les autres qui entendaient donner une 
règle à tout, dépassent égDOHPHQWOHVOLPLWHV¶ES, p. 186). Thus /¶(WDWGH
siège explicitly denounces the mother¶Vresignation to suffering and failure 
to oppose murder in Le Malentendu. 
 
It now starts to become evident how the ethical discourse in /¶(WDWGHVLqJH
builds on what is expressed in Le Malentendu. Lucid maintenance of the 
Absurd is not sufficient, for this is what La Peste, his secretary, and Nada 
do; absurdity is only one part of the éternel that Camus wants to be 
recognized. The second metaphysical truth that must be preserved is 
KXPDQLW\¶VLQQDWHLQQRFHQFHDQGGLJQLW\'LHJRSURWHVWVµ1RXVVRPPHV
innocents!¶(ES, p. 115). /D3HVWH¶VUpJLPHFDQWKHUHIRUHEHFRQGHPQHGIRU
the ontological injustice it performs. Throughout the play runs a sustained 
criticism of the inhumanity RI/D3HVWH¶VDEVROXWHSULQFLSOHVZKLFKKH
upholds as objective truths. Such principles do not take into account the 
needs of specific individuals.46 µL¶aEVROXHMXVWLFH¶, which is not in fact justice 
at all, awakens in the people a realization of that of which they are being 
deprived, and the true voice of the human speaks out when the chorus 
say: 
Nous, nous sommes devenus sages. Nous sommes administrés. Mais 
dans le silence des bureaux, nous écoutons un long cri contenu qui est 
FHOXLGHVF°XUVVpSDUps et qui nous parle de la mer sous le soleil de 
PLGLGHO¶RGHXUGHVURVHDX[GDQVOHVRLUGHVEUDVIUDLVGHQRV
IHPPHV>«@QRWUHF°XUUHIXVHle silence. Il refuse les listes et les 
PDWULFXOHVOHVPXUVTXLQ¶HQILQLVVHQWSDV >«@ 
(ES, pp. 116-17) 
                                         
46  µ$KVous [La Peste et La Secrétaire] ne tenez compte que des ensembles! Cent mille 
hommes, YRLOjTXLGHYLHQWLQWpUHVVDQW¶ES, p. 144). 
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This is WKHVWLUULQJRIUHYROWµOHPRXYHPHQWTXLGUHVVHO¶LQGLYLGXSRXUOD
GpIHQVHG¶XQHGLJQLWpFRPPXQHjWRXVOHVKRPPHV¶ (HR, p. 33). Whereas 
O¶KRPPHDEVXUGH¶VDXWKHQWLFLW\ZDVVROLWDU\GHILDQFH&DPXVQRZDUJXHV
for a revolt in the name of the collective:47 µla solidarité humaine est 
PpWDSK\VLTXH¶HR, p. 31), and this is the value that O¶KRPPHUpYROWpmust 
strive to uphold. Once Diego realizes this he is able to forget his fear, and 
as a result La Peste and La Secrétaire lose their powerful hold and the town 
is freed. 
 
This illustrates how, for Camus, freedom and revolt are one and the same. 
As well as absolutist notions of justice, absolute liberty is also denounced 
by the play; both have their limits. In /¶+RPPHUpYROWp Camus writes: 
/DUpYROWHQ¶HVWQXOOHPHnt une revendication de liberté totale. Au 
contraire, la révolte fait le procès de la liberté totale. Elle conteste 
justement le pouvoir illimité qui autorise un supérieur à violer la 
frontière interdite. Loin de revendiquer une indépendance générale, le 
rpYROWpYHXWTX¶LOVRLWUHFRQQXTXHODOLEHUWpDVHVOLPLWHVSDUWRXWRVH
trouve un être humain, la limite étant précisément le pouvoir de révolte 
de cet être. 
(HR, p. 355) 
 
During his final confrontation with La Peste, Diego is forced to make a 
choice. His beloved Victoria is amongst those dying from the plague, and 
so La Peste offers to save her life and let the two of them escape in return 
for his maintained power over the rest of the town. However, Diego refuses 
and gives up his own life out of his love for the community. Unlike La 
Peste, Diego has respect for humanity, and out of this respect comes the 
recognition that he has no right to make a decision that would result in the 
ORVVRIRWKHUV¶IUHHGRP48 
 
                                         
47 Note that Camus has chosen to voice his principles of revolt in the plural, by using the 
chorus. 
48 µ/¶DPRXUGHFHWWHIHPPHF¶HVWPRQUR\DXPHjPRL-HSXLVHQIDLUHFHTXHMHYHX[0DLVOD
liberté de ces homPHVOHXUDSSDUWLHQW-HQHSXLVHQGLVSRVHU¶ES, p. 172). 
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It is actually 9LFWRULD¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQWKHYDOXH of love that guides Diego 
towards a greater authenticity; yet interestingly, although this might 
suggest Victoria (like Maria in Le Malentendu) to be a voice of reason in the 
play, as Margerrison notes, LQWKLVILQDOVFHQH9LFWRULDREMHFWVWR'LHJR¶V
chosHQFRXUVHRIDFWLRQµinsisting he should put their love before heaven 
and earth, >«IRU@she would willingly sacrifice the entire town in exchange 
for his life¶.49 The conception of love she possesses is but another empty 
absolute. Indeed, love is never actually portrayed as anything more than a 
cliché in /¶(WDWGHVLqJH,50 and thus it is difficult for the audience to take 
WKHSOD\¶VHWKLFDOGLVFRXUVHYHU\VHULRXVO\51 
 
Les Justes 
 
Les Justes performs an even closer examination of the political and social 
consequences of the Absurd, staging the historical story of a group of 
socialist Russian revolutionaries who assassinated the Grand Duke Sergei 
Romanov in 19057KHVHDVVDVVLQV&DPXVUHIHUVWRDVµOHVPHXUWULHUV
GpOLFDWV¶DQGSUDLVHVWKHP for the purity of their revolt against the 
oppressive political rule under which Russia lived (HR, pp. 211-21). The 
play FRQWLQXHV&DPXV¶DUJXPHQWUHJDUGLQJWKHOLPLWVRIKXPDQDFWLRQ
ZKLFKDUHQHHGHGLQRUGHUWREHDEOHWRUHMHFWµtout est permis¶DVD
consequence of the Absurd. However, the play furthers the discussion by 
problematizing /¶(WDWGHVLqJH¶VVLPSOLVWLFHWKLFRIOLPLWV, addressing the 
difficulties involved in actually placing these limits. 
 
7KDWDJURXSRIDVVDVVLQVFRXOGVWLOOEHUHIHUUHGWRDVµOHVMXVWHV¶LV 
immediately indicative of the evolXWLRQRI&DPXV¶HWKLFDOWKRXJKW7his play 
                                         
49 Hughes, p. 74. 
50 See ES, p. 50 for example: 
',(*2µ(VW-FHO¶HDXFODLUHHWODQXLWTXLRQWODLVVpVXUWRLO¶RGHXUGXFLWURQQLHU"¶ 
9,&725,$µ1RQF¶HVWOHYHQWGHWRQDPRXUTXLP¶DFRXYHrte de flHXUVHQXQVHXOMRXU¶ 
51 :KHQ/D6HFUpWDLUHLQWHUUXSWVRQHRI'LHJRDQG9LFWRULD¶VORYHVFHQHVDQGDVNVµ4XHIDLWHV-
YRXV"¶9LFWRULDUHVSRQGVµ/¶DPRXUELHQVU¶(ES, p. 130). µ%XWQRRQHFDQKDYHEHHQ
FRQYLQFHG¶GLVPLVVHV)UHHPDQKXPRURXVO\ (Freeman, p. 96). 
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illustrates how he (reluctantly) came to accept that violence might have 
ethical uses. Like /¶(WDWGHVLqJH, the action of Les Justes is set under an 
authoritarian rule, and again, a general pessimism concerning the socio-
political reality pervadesµ/DOLEHUWpHVWXQEDJQHDXVVLORQJWHPSVTX¶XQ
VHXOKRPPHHVWDVVHUYLVXUODWHUUH¶,52 states Stepan, and at this particular 
moment in time there are no immediate prospects of release from this 
servitude. µ-HFURLVTXHODYLROHQFHHVWLQpYLWDEOHOHVDQQpHVG¶RFFXSDWLRQ
PHO¶RQWDSSULV¶ (Ess, p. 355), writes Camus earlier in his Actuelles I. 
However, Les Justes argues that, when confronted with human suffering, 
individuals have a responsibility to fight to reduce this; not to do this would 
be to choose to accept the present injustice of the world, and thereby 
effectively promote its duration. $V9RLQRYVD\Vµ-¶DLFRPSULVTX¶LOQH
VXIILVDLWSDVGHGpQRQFHUO¶LQMXVWLFHIl fallait donner sa vie pour la 
FRPEDWWUH¶LJ, p. 25). This was not expressed at all in Le Malentendu; and 
although human responsibility for absurdity is recognized in /¶(WDWGH
siège,53 this discourse has no overt voice in comparison with Les Justes, 
where Kaliayev cries out: µ/DMXVWLFHHVWQRWUHDIIDLUH¶(LJ, p. 102). 
 
Les Justes DOVRGUDPDWL]HV&DPXV¶FRQFHSWRIUHYROWPRUHFOHDUO\WKDQ
/¶(WDWGHVLqJH. The suffering and death propagated by the regime in power 
arouses anger in the revolutionaries against such a fundamental disregard 
IRUKXPDQLW\%XWDQHPRWLRQDOUHDFWLRQLVQRWHQRXJKWKHµMXVW
DVVDVVLQV¶54 realize the additional need for action proper, and are 
consequently driven to plot the death of Le grand-duc ± the political figure 
representative of the oppression that revolts them. As /¶(WDWGHVLqJH
illustrated, a feeling of solidarity is denied to people governed by an 
                                         
52 Albert Camus, Les Justes (hereafter LJ), (Paris : Gallimard, 1977), p. 17. 
53 The human origin of the Absurd is alluded to at the beginning of /¶(WDWGHVLqJH when Nada 
saysµ-¶DLO¶LPSUHVVLRQG¶DLOOHXUVTXHOHFLHOQ¶HVWSDVHQFDXVH¶ES, p. 40). It is then 
LOOXVWUDWHGDJDLQDWWKHHQGZKHQWKHFLWL]HQVJHWKROGRI/D6HFUpWDLUH¶VGLUHFWRU\DQGVHL]H
the opportunity to rectify their personal grievances. µ(WYRLOj! Ils font eux-mêmes le travail!¶
(ES, p. 164), exclaims La Peste as he watches them kill each other. 
54 7KLVLVKRZWKHSOD\¶VWLWOHKDVEHHQWUDQVODWHGLQWR(QJOLVK 
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authoritarian dictatorship. Les Justes then argues that the shared goal of 
the revolutionaries can allow this sense of solidarity to be regained. 
Annenkov, the leader of the group, expresses this when he makes the 
following affirmation: 
Vous souvenez-vous de qui nous sommes? Des frères, confondus les 
XQVDX[DXWUHVWRXUQpVYHUVO¶H[pFXWLRQGHVW\UDQVSRXUODOLEpUDWLRQ
du pays! Nous tuons ensemble, et rien ne peut nous séparer. 
 
(LJ, pp. 34-5) 
 
/¶+RPPHUpYROWp states that µOHPRXYHPHQWGHUpYROWHQ¶HVWSDVGDQVVRQ
HVVHQFHXQPRXYHPHQWpJRwVWH¶HR, pp. 30-1); iQVWHDGLWLVµO¶DYHQWXUH
GHWRXV¶HR, p. 38). However, although this characterizes the motivation 
EHKLQGWKHDVVDVVLQV¶UHYROWStepan and Kaliayev illustrate how its reality 
is somewhat different; unlike /¶(WDWGHVLqJH, Les Justes informs us of how 
things are not so simple in practice, and the majority of the play consists of 
a series of dramatic confrontations which embody the tensions and 
dilemmas involved. 
 
Kaliayev ± µOH3RqWH¶± is a symbol of optimism, who declaresµ,OIDXWrWUH
gaie, il faut être fière. /DEHDXWpH[LVWHODMRLHH[LVWH¶LJ, p. 28) This 
gaiety is manifest in his actions as well: he often laughs, he likes to quote 
verse, and he even has his own special signal to announce that he is at the 
GRRUEHFDXVHµLOV¶HVWDPXVpjOH[le signal du groupe] FKDQJHU¶LJ, p. 26). 
Stepan, on the other hand, is deeply suspicious oI.DOLD\HY¶VURmanticism 
and lightness of spirit, and accuses him of not taking things seriously: µOD
KDLQHQ¶HVWSDVXQMHXNous ne sommes pas là pour nous admirer. Nous 
VRPPHVOjSRXUUpXVVLU¶LJ, p. 33). The FRQWUDVWRI6WHSDQ¶VVREHUDQG
practical reDOLVPDJDLQVW.DOLD\HY¶VODXJKWHULVVRJUHDWWKDWZHWRRDUH
initially reluctant to take Kaliayev seriously. However, when the terrorists 
make their first assassination attempt, Kaliayev (who is in charge of 
throwing the first bomEDWWKH*UDQG'XNH¶VFDUriage) is unable to follow 
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through because he notices that the Duke is accompanied by two young 
children, and cannot bring himself to be responsible for their deaths. 
Stepan is furious: WKLVLQDFWLRQPHUHO\FRQILUPVWRKLP.DOLD\HY¶VODFNRI
courage, which he has suspected all along; .DOLD\HY¶V cowardice, dressed 
up as compassion for the innocence of these two children, will postpone the 
JURXS¶VUHYROXWLRQDU\DFWLRQIRUDIXUWKHUWZRPRQWKVGXULQJZKLFK
thousands more children will die of starvation under 5XVVLD¶VXQMXVWUXOH. 
However, the rest of the group side with Kaliayev. Dora explains: 
[Kaliayev] accepte de tuer le grand-duc puisque sa mort peut avancer 
le temps où les enfants russes ne mourront plus de faim. Cela déjà 
Q¶HVWSDVIDFLOH0DLVODPRUWGes neveux du grand-GXFQ¶HPSrFKHUD
aucun enfant de mourir de faim. Même dans la destruction, il y a un 
ordre, il y a des limites. 
(LJ, p. 62) 
 
6WHSDQ¶VIDXOWLVWKDWKHLVRYHUO\]HDORXVLQKLVVXSSRUWRIWKHLU
revolutionary cause and, as Annenkov observes, is effectively promoting 
the forbidden ethic where tout est permis.55 If it were up to Stepan, the 
terrorists would end up over-stepping the limits of just action; but as Dora 
points out, µce jour-là, la révolution sera[it] KDwHGHO¶KXPDQLWpHQWLqUH¶LJ, 
p. 59). Thus 6WHSDQGRHVQRWHPERG\&DPXV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIMXVWLFHIRU
he does not have any genuine love for life or humanity ± only an abstract 
love for an idea of justice in his mind. Camus thereby continues his critique 
of action in the name of abstract ideals, which ignores the present and 
postpones a more authentic existence indefinitely. We are therefore 
encouraged to identify with Kaliayev instead of Stepan. 
 
So Kaliayev represents µODUpYROXWLRQSRXUODYLH¶LJ, p. 36). But the play 
then complexifies this ethical message when Dora questions whether the 
JURXS¶VDFWLRQVDUHLQIDFWFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKLVSULQFLSOH,QLWLDOO\LQ
agreement with Kaliayev she then adds: µEt pourtant, nous allons donner la 
                                         
55 µ6WHSDQWRXWOHPRQGHLFLW¶DLPHHWWHUHVSHFWH0DLVTXHOOHVTXHVRLHQWWHVUDLVRQVMHQH
puis te laisser dire que tout est permis. De centaines de nos frères sont mortVSRXUTX¶RQ
VDFKHTXHWRXWQ¶HVWSDVSHUPLV¶LJ, p. 61). 
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PRUW¶LJ, p. 36). Kaliayev immediately protestsµ&HQ¶HVWSDVODPrPH
FKRVH>«@QRXVWXRQVSRXUEkWLUXQPRQGHRSOXVMDPDLVSHUVRQQHQH
WXHUD1RXVDFFHSWRQVG¶rWUHFULPLQHOVSRXUTXHODWHUUHVHFRXYUHHQILQ
G¶LQQRFHQWV¶However, Dora remains doubtful ± µ(WVLFHODQ¶pWDLWSDV"- 
and it seems that Kaliayev (on some level) also shares the same 
reservations; he just desperately wants to believe. µ7DLV-toi, tu sais bien 
TXHF¶HVWLPSRVVLEOH¶KHEUXVTXHO\UHWRUWV (LJ, p. 37). 
 
The abstract idea of love that we are presented with in /¶(WDWGHVLqJHis 
also questioned in Les Justes. Dora even goes as far as to say: µ/¶DPRXU"
1RQFHQ¶HVWSDVFHTX¶LOIDXW¶LJ, p. 83). Her contention is that there is 
too much suffering and injustice for any genuine conception of love to be 
imaginable, let alone realized. Again, Kaliayev objects: µ0DLVQRXVDLPRQV
QRWUHSHXSOH¶LJ, p. 84). But, replies Dora: 
1RXVO¶DLPRQVF¶HVWYUDL1RXVO¶DLPRQVG¶XQYDVWHDPRXUVDQVDSSXL
G¶XQDPRXUPDOKHXUHX[1RXVYLYRQVORLQGHOXLHQIHUPpVGDQVQRV
chambres, perdus dans nos pensées. Et le peuple, lui, nous aime-t-il? 
Sait-LOTXHQRXVO¶DLPRQV"Le peuple se tait. 
(LJ, p. 84) 
 
If Les Justes TXHVWLRQVµORYH¶DVDPRWLYDWLRQIRUUHYolt in a more direct way 
than /¶(WDWGHVLqJH, it also poses the problem of absolutes in a more 
subtle and complex way. Dora recognizes that O¶DPRXU they are fighting for 
is still an absolute, but this is not to say that she has another suggestion as 
to how they might try and act authentically; she confesses that this same 
ideal also motivates her own actLRQVµO¶DPRXUDEVROX>«@F¶HVWFHOXLTXL
me brûle en effet¶LJ, p. 84). ,WVHHPVWKDWWKHDVVDVVLQV¶µVHXOHYHUWX
sera, plongé dans les ténèbres, de ne pas céder à leur vertige obscur; 
HQFKDvQp>V@DXPDOGHVHWUDvQHUREVWLQpPHQWYHUVOHELHQ¶HR, p. 357). 
7KHJURXS¶VVHFRQGDVVDVVLQDWLRQDWWHPSWVXFFHHGV, and Kaliayev is taken 
to prison and condemned to death. Although he is given the option to 
repent and save his life, he does not accept. .DOLD\HYµHVVDLHG¶rWUHXQ
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MXVWLFLHU¶LJ, p. 63), and so he e[SODLQVµ6LMHQHPRXUDLVSDVF¶HVWDORUV
TXHMHVHUDLVXQPHXUWULHU¶LJ, p. 119). If he lived he would fail to act in 
accordance with his principles, for this would effectively legitimize the 
death he was responsible for and therefore turn him into a murderer. If he 
dies, however: 
Fidèle à ses origines, le révolté démontre dans le sacrifice que sa vraie 
OLEHUWpQ¶HVWSDVjO¶pJDUGGXPHXUWUHPDLVjO¶pJDUGGHVDSURSUH
PRUW,OGpFRXYUHHQPrPHWHPSVO¶KRQQHXUPpWDSK\VLTXH.DOLD\HYVH
place alors sous la potence et désigne visiblement, à tous ses frères, la 
OLPLWHH[DFWHRFRPPHQFHHWILQLWO¶KRQQHXUGHVKRPPHV 
(HR, p. 357) 
 
In all three of the plays discussed, Camus undermines the human hope 
that one might simply be able to tout concilier; ethical authenticity is 
dependent on the reality of absurdity being accepted, and this means that 
absolutist conceptions of justice and freedom must be rejected. Camus 
does not pretend that recognition of this metaphysical truth is easy, this 
difficulty being most clearly expressed by the tragedy of Le Malentendu. 
But as demonstrated by the above discussion, tragedy not only stems from 
anguish in the face of absurdity; it also arises as a consequence of actions 
which interpret the Absurd as meaning tout est permis.56 
 
In both /¶(WDWGHVLqJHand Les Justes Camus argues that µOa lutte elle-
PrPH>«@VXIILWjUHPSOLUXQF°XUG¶KRPPH¶MS, p. 168). But an 
overwhelming ambiance of pessimism still remains, preventing us from 
being convinced. The emphasis at the end of /¶(WDt de siège is on the 
WUDJHG\RI'LHJR¶VGHDWKUDWKHUWKDQWKHUHOHDVHRIWKHWRZQIURPLa 
3HVWH¶V siege; and the final scene in Les Justes IRFXVHVRQ'RUD¶VUH-
                                         
56 &DPXV¶WKHDWUHDVDZKROHLVLQIDFWDQDWWHPSWWRPRGHUQL]HWKHFODVVLFDOIRUPRIWUDJHG\
µ1RWUHpSRTXHHVWWRXWjIDLWLQWpUHVVDQWHF¶HVW-à-GLUHTX¶HOOHHVWWUDJLTXH$YRQV-nous du 
PRLQV>«@le théâtre de notre époque ou pouvons-QRXVHVSpUHUO¶DYRLU"$XWUHPHQWGLWOD
tragédie moderne est-HOOHSRVVLEOHF¶HVWODTXHVWLRQTXHMHYRXGUDLVPHSRVHU¶TRN, p. 
1701)), and the plays analysed represent a variety of different dramatic approaches to 
achieving this aim. Le Malentendu¶Vabstract and heavily ironic form is replaced by the 
grandiose spectacle of /¶(WDWGHVLqJH, which makes use of a more light-hearted, ridiculous 
humour reminiscent of the Theatre of the Absurd. Like /¶(WDWGHVLqJH, Les Justes then adopts 
a more traditional, highly dialogical structure in order to explore the possibility of moving 
beyond tragedy, in spite of tragedy. 
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questioning of justice and the future possibility of happiness in response to 
.DOLD\HY¶VGHDWKMaria, Victoria, and Dora are all left alone without the 
men they loved. All experience love and appreciate its value, but such 
UHFRJQLWLRQRQO\LQFUHDVHVWKHLUSDLQDV)UHHPDQSXWVLWLQ&DPXV¶WKHDWUH 
µWhe mask of the absurd has been put on human relations¶57 The mask may 
slip or be temporarily removed in an attempt to reveal a positive ethic for 
DFWLRQµbut is soon clamped back on after it has become apparent that 
alienation is irrevocable¶.58 
                                         
57 Freeman, p. 151. 
58 ibid., p. 152. 
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1.3 Existentialist Ethical Thought in the Theatre of
 Jean-Paul Sartre 
 
 
As with Camus, 6DUWUH¶VHWKLFDOSKLORVRSK\LVRIWHQGLVFXVVHGLQUHODWLRQWR
various stages. The plays selected for discussion have therefore been 
chosen in order to bear witness to this progression of thought. The first 
performance of Huis clos FORVHO\IROORZHGWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI6DUWUH¶VILUVW
major philosophical work, /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW(1943); Huis clos thus allows 
valuable access WR6DUWUH¶VHDUO\WKHRU\DQGVR will provide an opportunity 
to introduce the key philosophical concepts relatiQJWR6DUWUH¶VUHIOHFWLRQV
on morality. The development of 6DUWUH¶VHWKLFDOWKRXJKWZLOOthen be 
traced through analysis of the other two plays, Le Diable et le bon dieu and 
/HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD. 
 
Huis clos 
 
Having recently died, Huis clos¶ three main characters ± Garcin, Inès, and 
Estelle ± are introduced by a valet into a Second Empire-style drawing-
room, the rather alternative Hell to which they have been eternally 
condemned. Their situation is initially perplexing: the characters expect a 
torturer to arrive, yet no one else appears; and although they feel 
somewhat uncomfortable in this stark, claustrophobic room, the overall 
impression is surprisingly un-Hell-like. Gradually however, their 
conversations and interactions reveal to them the true nature of their 
damnation: their Hell is in fact each other. 
 
The fact that the play is set in Hell suggests, from the start, that we will 
not be presented with any exemplary characters as far as ethics is 
concerned. Nevertheless, it is still possible to learn something about 
authentic action indirectly, by establishing what authenticity is not. The 
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first question we must therefore ask is why these three characters merit 
eternal damnation. Garcin has been shot by a firing squad for attempting 
to desert the army, revealing him to be guilty of cowardice in addition to 
callous marital infidelity, where the emotional torture to which he subjected 
his wife was of such magnitude that it led to her death. Inès, a lesbian, 
declares herself to be responsible for three deaths: that of her cousin, his 
wife Florence, and also her own. Inès seduced Florence whilst staying with 
her cousinZUHFNLQJWKHFRXSOH¶VIRUPHUKDSSLQHVV. Shortly afterwards, 
her cousin was run over by a tram and killed. Inès, who confesses that she 
has always felt the need to make others suffer, describes how she then 
taunted Florence with the idea that the two women were to blame for his 
death. This eventually became too much for Florence and one night she 
turned on the gasUHVXOWLQJLQ,QqV¶death as well as her own. Finally, 
Estelle has two deaths on her conscience. Marrying an old friend of her 
IDWKHU¶VIRUmoney, she then fell in love with a younger man and became 
his mistress. On discovering she was pregnant, she escaped to Switzerland 
to conceal the birth from her husband. She felt no love for the baby 
however, and when she drowned it by tying a stone around its neck and 
dropping it from a balcony, her lover subsequently took his own life. 
 
$V.HUQZULWHVµcRQGHPQDWLRQRQWKHSOD\¶VPHORGUDPDWLFOHYHl is obvious 
and simple. For each one of the three characters has committed the most 
outrageous crimes¶59 However, if these crimes were to account for the 
WKUHHFKDUDFWHUV¶VHQWHQFH completely, this would leave the way in which 
they manage to act as each oWKHU¶VWRUWXUHUV± +HOO¶Vµéconomie de 
SHUVRQQHO¶60 ± unexplained. Kern continues: 
7KDW6DUWUH¶VUHDVRQVIRUFRQGHPQLQJKLVFKDUDFWHUVDUHQRWH[KDXVWHG
by our general feelings of what is right or wrong is indicated by the fact 
that, at the climax of the play, the door of hell opens and the 
                                         
59 Edith .HUQµ$EDQGRQ+RSH$OO<H«¶Yale French Studies, XXX, J-P Sartre (1963), p. 56. 
60 Jean-Paul Sartre, Huis Clos (hereafter HC), (Paris : Gallimard, 1947), p. 42. 
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characters are given a chance to escape. It is their inability to do so 
WKDWPDNHVWKHPWUXO\DQGILQDOO\JXLOW\LQ6DUWUH¶VH\HV)RUDWWKLV
moment of free choice, all three betray their total lack of authenticity, 
their inability to assume their human freedom which would enable 
them to reassume life and change. 
(Kern (1963), p. 57) 
 
Their more fundamental crime is in fact ontological. For Sartre, human 
existence is contingent: nothing about human nature is given, and so 
nothing can ever truly determine human action. With no fixed essence that 
might predispose us to act in a certain way, human existence is therefore 
grounded in absolute IUHHGRPµLOQ¶\DSDVGHGLIIpUHQFHHQWUHO¶rWUHGH
O¶KRPPHHWVRQ³être-libre´¶61 states Sartre in /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW. Thus 
Sartre sees it as our duty not only to recognize, but also to live this 
freedom, in order that we might realize our full potential as human beings. 
 
Similar to Camus, for Sartre the acknowledgment of the true nature of 
existence results in a feeling of absurdity and futility. Forced to make 
choices about RQH¶Vactions and orientation in the world, yet with the ever-
present uncertainty of the future ahead, the attribution of any concrete 
significance or direction to onH¶VDFWVLVLPSRVVLEOH.62 Self-definition ± as 
the sort of persoQZKRµGRHVWKLV¶RUµLVWKDW¶± is a way of fleeing the 
angoisse this creates, the framework its objectification provides offering a 
release from the burden of having to continually choose oneself. But this 
fails to recognize the essential contingency of existence and thus effectively 
removes, or at least refuses to consider, the full array of possibilities open 
to us. Such failure to assume the full responsibility RIRQH¶Vfreedom is 
what SarWUHUHIHUVWRDVµPDXYDLVHIRL¶; authentic identity on the other 
hand, requires what Friedman terms a corresponding µauthentication¶ of our 
                                         
61 Jean-Paul Sartre, /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW(hereafter EN), (Paris : Gallimard, 2004 [original 
publication: 1943]), p. 60. 
62 µ/DOLEHUWp>«@VHFDUDFWpULVHSDUXQHobligation perpétuellement renouvelée de refaire le 
Moi TXLGpVLJQHO¶rWUHOLEUH¶EN, pp. 69-70). 
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ontological condition,63 whereby the actions we make in the world serve to 
make the freedom of Being our own. 
 
Garcin¶VLQDXWKHQWLFLW\stemmed from his self-definition as a courageous 
pacifist hero; but as his act of desertion demonstrates, when the time 
came for him to defend this pacifism he was unable to live up to his idealist 
conception of self. Still refusing to recognize the truth of his cowardice at 
the beginning of the play, Garcin continues his bad faith, trying to justify 
why he should be thought of as courageousµ-HQ¶DLSDVUrYpFHWKpURwVPH
-HO¶ai choisi. 2QHVWFHTX¶RQYHXW¶HC, p. 90). However, the one person 
he cannot succeed in convincing is himself, and he eventually comes to 
realize the bad faith in which he has been acting. Indeed, although bad 
faith may appear to be a form of ontological self-deception, it cannot be 
equated with a lie; the fact that it is from his self that the truth is hidden 
changes everything. As the deceiver, he is required to know the truth in 
order to be able to conceal it,64 but if he is to be genuinely deceived, the 
truth must be unknown to him. So the duality of the deceiver and the 
deceived present in a typical lie cannot exist here; for Sartre, bad faith 
implies unity of consciousness, and thus when acting in bad faith one is 
always, on some level, aware that one is doing so.65 It is this paradoxical 
use, yet simultaneous denial of freedom, that explains precisely why it is in 
µEDG¶faith the characters are acting, and therefore why their inauthenticity 
is condemnable. 
 
(VWHOOH¶VEDGIDLWKLVKHUself-objectification as the embodiment of 
femininity. Obsessed with her self image as it appears to others, she is 
                                         
63 Maurice Friedman, The Worlds of Existentialism: A Critical Reader, Phoenix ed. (Chicago 
: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 9. 
64 µ-HGRLVVDYRLUWUqVprécisément cette vérité pour PHODFDFKHUSOXVVRLJQHXVHPHQW¶EN, p. 
83). 
65 µ/¶DFWHSUHPLHUGHPDXYDLVHIRLHVWSRXUIXLUFHTX¶RQQHSHXWSDVIXLUSRXUIXLUFHTX¶RQ
HVW¶EN, p. 105). 
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therefore devastated by the absence of mirrors in the room. Her 
superficial, narcissistic pride extends even to the language she uses: rather 
WKDQUHIHUWRWKHPVHOYHVDVµmorts¶ for example, she requests that they 
instead XVHWKHWHUPµabsents¶µ6¶LOIDXWDEVROXPHQWQRPPHUFHW«pWDWGH
FKRVHVMHSURSRVHTX¶RQQRXVDSSHOOHGHVDEVHQWVFHVHUDSOXVFRUUHFW
Vous êtes absent depuis longtemps"¶HC, p. 31). Her use of euphemism 
presents what Redfern refers to as DµFRVPHWLFL]HGYHUVLRQRIUHDOLW\¶66 
which is just another device for evading the truth about the way things are. 
 
However, Inès is able to see through the inauthenticity of both Garcin and 
Estelle. She LPPHGLDWHO\QRWLFHVWKHIHDUXQGHUSLQQLQJ*DUFLQ¶VEUDYDGR
and is not fooled by the sensational tales Garcin tells about his death early 
on in the play: 
GARCIN:  Je dirigeais un journal pacifiste. La guerre éclate. Que faire? 
Ils avaient tous OHV\HX[IL[pVVXUPRLµOsera-t-il"¶ (KELHQM¶DLRVp-H
me suis croispOHVEUDVHWLOVP¶RQWIXVLOOp2HVWODIDXWH? Où est la 
faute? 
 
>«@ 
 
INÈS: >«@3RXUTXLMRXH]-vous la comédie? Nous sommes entre nous. 
 
(HC, p. 40) 
 
Inès also sees how utterly dependent Estelle is on appearances; indeed, 
during her earthly life Estelle relied on mirrors to confirm the µUHDOLW\¶ of her 
existence, where the mirrors reflected back the image of the constructed 
µIHPLQLQH¶ object she wished to identify hHUVHOIZLWKµquand je ne me vois 
SDVM¶DLEHDXPHWkWHUMHPHGHPDQGHVLM¶H[LVWHSRXUGHYUDL¶HC, p. 
44). What this reveals is that Garcin and Estelle are acting µpour autrui¶ ± 
for others, and not for themselves. Because of the non-transparent nature 
RIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VFRQVFLRXVQHVVRWKHUVGRQRWKDYHWKHVDPHDFFHVV± and 
therefore knowledge ± of anyone eOVH¶VVHOI7KH2WKHU¶VJD]HLV
                                         
66 Walter Redfern, µ+XLVFORV¶DQG µ/HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD¶ (London : Grant & Cutler, 1995), 
p. 21. 
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LQHVFDSDEO\REMHFWLI\LQJIL[LQJRQH¶VLGHQWLW\DQGFRQILQLQJLWWRWKHPRGH
of the µen-soi¶: being-in-itself, the realm of the inert. Thus, to act solely for 
others is to imprison oneself in bad faith; authenticity requires action µpour 
soi¶ZKLFKVWD\VWUXHWRWKHVHOI¶VODFNRILQWULQVLFHVVHQFHDQGXQGHUWDNHV
the continual project of shaping its own identity by exercising its 
freedom.67 
 
/HUHJDUGGHO¶$XWUHis crucial to understanding the dynamics of this 
infernal triangle. Although self-objectification is often a source of comfort 
DQGVHFXULW\0F&DOOQRWHVKRZµWhe look becomes Hell when the Other 
refuses the image of myself I want him to see¶68 Because Inès sees Garcin 
for the lâche that he is, it would not have made any difference had Garcin 
left the room when the door opened. He says to Inès: 
&¶HVWWRLTXHMHGRLVFRQYDLQFUH>«@7¶LPDJLQDLV-WXTXHM¶DOODLVSDUWLU? 
Je ne pouvais pas te laisser ici, triomphante, avec toutes ces pensées 
dans la tête; toutes ces pensées qui me concernent. 
(HC, pp. 88-9) 
 
The power of le regard is equally demonstrated when Inès offers to act as 
a mirror for Estelle, and pretends to notice a smear of lipstick on her 
cheek. The very thought of this horrifies Estelle, who is then tormented all 
the more by her inability to establish WKHWUXWKRUIDOVLW\RI,QqV¶ claim. 
 
At this stage one might wonder why Inès has been condemned, if she 
possesses the lucidity that the other two have been damned for lacking. 
Again, the role of the Other is critical for understanding her inauthenticity. 
Inès too is guilty of self-objectification: µMoi, je suis méchante: ça veut dire 
TXHM¶DLEHVRLQGHODVRXIIUDQFHGHVDXWUHVSRXUH[LVWHU¶HC, p. 57).69 The 
                                         
67 µ/HSRXU-VRLHVWO¶rWUHTXLVHGpWHUPLQHOXL-PrPHjH[LVWHUHQWDQWTX¶LOQHSHXWSDV
coïncider avec lui-PrPH¶EN, p. 114). 
68 Dorothy McCall, The Theatre of Jean-Paul Sartre (New York : Columbia University Press, 
1971), p. 113. 
69 Note the use of the eternal present, which signifies how Inès chooses to set these 
characteristics in stone. 
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satisfaction of her sadism hinges on the suffering of others ± and for this, 
she depends on the others¶recognition of herself as a torturer. When the 
door to Hell opens Inès also has the chance to escape, but she does not, 
cannot. So although lucidity is necessary for authenticity, it is not enough; 
Inès also fails to live the freedom she possesses, for as Redfern writes: µWKH
only freedom she will imagine is that of choosing her own hell¶70 
 
The possibility of achieving authenticity is never questioned in Huis clos; if 
the characters are not free, it is because they have limited their freedom 
themselves. As Sartre explains in a spoken preface to the play: 
4XHOTXHVRLWOHFHUFOHG¶HQIHUGDQVOHTXHOQRXVYLYRQVMHSHQVHTXH
QRXVVRPPHVOLEUHVGHOHEULVHU(WVLOHVJHQVQHOHEULVHQWSDVF¶est 
HQFRUHOLEUHPHQWTX¶LOV\UHVWHQW'HVRUWHTX¶LOVVHPHWWHQWOLEUHPHQW
en enfer.71 
 
Although Garcin attains a more authentic level of consciousness at the end, 
it is too late; that this can no longer make a difference is part of his 
damnation. As Kern writes: µ7KLVODFNRIDXWKHQWLFLW\LVDWWKHURRWRIWKHLU
FULPHVDQG>«@LWFDUULHVZLWKLQLWVHOIWKHYHU\QDWXUHRIWKHSXQLVKPHQW
that is meted out to them¶72 Now deprived of freedom, they have to suffer 
the resultant loss of the possibility to act for themselves.73 However, when 
speaking of O¶KRPPHGHPDXYDLVHIRLin /¶([LVWHQWLDOLVPHHVWXQ
humanisme (1946), 6DUWUHVWDWHVµMHQ¶DLSDVjOHMXJHUPRUDOHPHQWPDLV
je définis sa mauvaise IRLFRPPHXQHHUUHXU¶;74 and in Réflexions sur la 
question juive (1946) 6DUWUHH[SODLQVKRZµOHWHUPHG¶LQDXWKHQWLTXH
Q¶LPSOLTX>H@ELHQHQWHQGXDXFXQEOkPHPRUDO¶75 But if Garcin, Inès, and 
(VWHOOHKDYHEHHQFRQGHPQHGIRUWKHLUEDGIDLWKDQGEDGIDLWK¶V
                                         
70 Redfern, p. 24. 
71 Jean-Paul Sartre, Un théâtre de situations (hereafter TS), (Paris : Gallimard, 1973), p. 283. 
72 Kern (1963), p. 57. 
73 Indeed, in terms of action, nothing takes place in this play. 
74 Jean-Paul Sartre, /¶([LVWHQWLDOLVPHHVWXQKXPDQLVPH(hereafter EH), (Paris : Gallimard, 
1996 [original publication: 1946]), p. 68. 
75 Jean-Paul Sartre, Réflexions sur la question juive (Paris : Gallimard, 1954 [original 
publication: 1946]), p. 113. 
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inauthenticity is not supposed to be a moral judgement, this raises the 
question as to whether morality is even addressed in Huis clos. 
 
Many commentators are rather quick to dismiss the significance of the 
FKDUDFWHUV¶HDUWKO\FULPHVLQIDYRXURIa discussion of bad faith. I would 
argue, however, that it is precisely these earthly crimes that introduce the 
play¶VPRUDOGLPHQVLRQ. If the inauthenticity of bad faith is not in itself 
ethical inauthenticity, it is nevertheless as a result of bad faith that moral 
sins were committed against others whilst the characters were alive. The 
reason why Inès caused others to suffer was because of her sadistic choice 
to be a µIHPPHGDPQpH¶HC, p. 55). As for Garcin, McCall explains that 
µalthough [he] is aggressively heterosexual, he is not really concerned with 
ZRPHQ>«@LWZDVLQWKHworld of men that he wanted to make his mark¶ 
7KHUHIRUHµsince his wife in no way contradicts the image he holds of 
himself, his treatment of her becomes in his mind merely an aspect of his 
virility¶ and it is because of this that he treats her like an object and 
causes her to suffer in the way he does.76 Similarly, Estelle is fixated with 
appearances to such an extent that the only emotion she displays is in 
relation to things which affect the µSXULW\¶ of her aesthetic being ± her 
melodramatic response tR,QqV¶ claim that she has lipstick on her cheek, 
for example. Her unwanted baby also disrupts this µpurity¶, and that is why 
it is murdered. So although bad faith may only be an ontologically 
inauthentic relation between RQH¶VVHOIDQGRQH¶VEHLQJWKLVRntological 
inauthenticity seems to be transformed into moral inauthenticity when 
other people enter into the equation. 
 
 
                                         
76 McCall, p. 115. 
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Le Diable et le bon dieu 
Le Diable et le bon dieu is set in the period of the Reformation, during the 
sixteenth-FHQWXU\SHDVDQWV¶UHYROt in Germany. Unlike the characters in 
Huis clos, its main protagonist, Goetz, has a conscious desire to embrace 
his freedom. Goetz, as he is initially presented to us, has decided to 
assume the identity of pure Evil, claiming all his actions to be manifest of 
WKLVµHYLO¶DQGWKHUHIRUHDQDVVHUWLRQRIKLVIUHHGRPDQGLQGLYLGXDOLW\ZLWK
respect to God, the author of the Good. µ0RLM¶LQYHQWH¶77 he explains to his 
mistress, Catherine. However, Goetz is running out of inventive ways to 
perform his Evil, and so beginning to tire of this project. Thus when 
Heinrich ± a disillusioned priest ± declares that it is not Evil which is 
exceptional on Earth, but rather Good that it is impossible for humans to 
achieve, Goetz jumps at the challenge to assert his freedom and bring this 
impossibility about. However, because Goetz has made a bet with Heinrich 
WKDWKHZLOOVXFFHHGDQ\JRRGKHEULQJVDERXWFDQQRWEHµJRRG¶IRULWVRZQ
sake, as part of the motivation driving his actions will be his desire to win 
the wager. So Goetz proposes to make his choice of Good depend on the 
roll of two dice. But actually, Goetz has already decided what he wants the 
RXWFRPHWREHDQGFKHDWVWRHQVXUHWKDWWKH*RRGZLQV2¶'RQRKRH
captures the contradiction involved: 
Several paradoxes reflect the over-arching self-contradiction of this 
pseudo-conversion. On the one hand, Goetz freely accepts the 
challenge to achieve the impossible; on the other, he tosses [two dice] 
in order (apparently) to make providence (God) responsible for the 
outcome. Then again, he cheats, making himself responsible again, but 
does not admit his trickery, allowing providence to take the blame 
>«@78 
 
The contradiction embodied by Goetz in this scene illustrates the tension 
that results from a confrontation with existenFH¶VFRQWLQJHQF\, and of the 
unity of consciousness implicit in bad faith. /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW states: 
                                         
77 Jean-Paul Sartre, Le Diable et le bon dieu (hereafter DBD), (Paris : Gallimard, 1951), p. 81. 
78 Benedict 2¶'RQRKRH6DUWUH¶V7KHDWUH$FWVIRU/LIH(Oxford : Peter Lang, 2005), pp. 148-9. 
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VLM¶HVVDLH>«@GHPHPHQWLUM¶pFKRXHFRPSOqWHPHQWGDQVFHWWH
HQWUHSULVHOHPHQVRQJH>«@HVWUXLQppar-derrière, par la conscience 
même de me mentir qui se constitue impitoyablement en deçà de mon 
projet comme sa condition même. 
(EN, p. 84) 
 
Although Goetz wishes to assert his freedom, he is still guilty of self-
objectification. *RHW]¶VWUXHLGHQWLW\LVQHLWKHUµJRRG¶QRUµHYLO¶DVWKHUHLV
no reason why he could not have been otherwise or could not still be 
otherwise. As Sartre writes in /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW: µLOV¶DJLWGHFRQVWLWXHUOD
réalité-KXPDLQHFRPPHXQrWUHTXLHVWFHTX¶LOQ¶HVWSDVHWTXLQ¶HVWSDVFH
TX¶LOHVW¶(EN, p. 93). Recognizing the reality of human freedom entails 
recognizLQJWKDWRQH¶VLGHQWLW\LVQRWMXVWFRQVWLWXWHGE\ZKDWRQHis at any 
particular moment, but also by everything one is not - that is, by 
everything that one is not yet, but might still choose to be in the future. 
Indeed, were µEvil¶ truly *RHW]¶VUDLVRQG¶rWUH, as he claims it to be at the 
beginning of the play, he would not be in a position to renounce it in favour 
of the µGood¶ 
 
If, through identification with his systems, Goetz¶VPLVWDNHLVWR define 
himself as Other, this is not to say that others will define him in the same 
way. When attempting to be the epitome of goodness and charity Goetz 
offers his lands as a gift to the peasants. But the offer is dismissed by their 
leader, Nasty: handing over his lands is not a solution to the social 
inequalities that separate the peasants from the rich, but will only provoke 
more violence by introducing further inequalities into the community. 
Champigny mDNHVWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQDµJRRG¶ gesture and good 
action, and sees Goetz as performing the former.79 *RHW]¶VRIIHULVQRW
something intrinsically good and therefore, as this case illustrates, whether 
or not it is µJRRG¶ cannot be determined by his judgement alone. Goetz 
decides to give up his lands anyway, declaring that he is not just going to 
                                         
79 Robert J. Champigny, 6WDJHVRQ6DUWUH¶V:D\-52, reprinted edition (New York : Kraus 
Reprint Corporation, 1968), p. 117. 
 53 
do Good µjODSHWLWHVHPDLQH¶DBD, p. 124), and he proceeds to set up his 
µ&LWpGX6ROHLO¶± KLVµSHUIHFW¶ society. He teaches his citizens to love all men 
and never to commit violence, so when a rebel peasant group invades he 
commands that non-violence be practised in response. His people are all 
slaughtered. For Sartre, this disaster was inevitable: in pretending to speak 
and hold true for all men, these idealist ethical values hold true for none, 
for as soon as reality is objectified in such a way, the generated image 
ceases to be representative of the actual situation in all its complexity. 
 
As Goetz comes to discover, his new project is no less destructive than the 
former LQWHUPVRIWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVLWKDVIRURWKHUV¶OLYHV80 nor does he 
gain any more satisfaction from it. Goetz plays the roles of Good and Evil 
as a means of realizing himself as an absolute object, where God is the 
Other he is acting for: µ+LVFULPHVDUHPHDQLQJOHVVZLWKRXWWKHSULQFLSOHRI
God to make his evil metaphysical¶ observes McCall,81 and the same 
DSSOLHVWRKLVµJRRG¶. But the fixed, eternal nature that Goetz craves does 
not exist on Earth, only in his imagination. In mimicking this relation to 
*RGWKH$EVROXWHµ*RRG¶DQGµ(YLO¶ coincide; the more faithful Goetz is to 
his ideological systems, the more his identity belongs to this imaginary 
object, and the less it belongs to himself. Thus Goetz demonstrates the 
LQHYLWDEOHIDLOXUHRIZKDW$QGHUVRQFDOOVWKHµ*RGSURMHFW¶.82 As Sartre 
writes in /¶(WUHHWOHnéant: µ/¶KRPPHVHIDLWSRXUrWUH'LHX >«@mais 
SUpFLVpPHQWSDUFHTX¶LOQ¶\DDXFXQHFRPPXQHPHVXUHHQWUHODUpDOLWp-
KXPDLQHHWODFDXVHGHVRLTX¶HOOHYHXWrWUHRQSHXWWRXWDXVVLELHQGLUH
TXHO¶KRPPHVHSHUGSRXUTXHODFDXVHGHVRLH[LVWH¶EN, p. 674). 
                                         
80 µEt voilà. Que je fasse le Mal, que je fasse le Bien, je me fais toujours détester¶DBD, p. 
158). 
81 McCall, p. 26. 
82 See Thomas C. Anderson, 6DUWUH¶V7ZR(WKLFV)URP$XWKHQWLFLW\WR,QWHJUDO+XPDQLW\ 
(Chicago : Open Court, 1993). 
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Such conscious ideological subscription is therefore the very opposite of 
authentic, free action. As Champigny suggests: µ*RHW]HQWHUVWKHVWDJHDV
a project not to be¶83 and this is something which rings true on several 
FRXQWVKLVSURMHFWLVµQRWWREH¶ in the sense that it is a project undertaken 
in bad faith, inconsistent with the true nature of Being, and therefore his 
SURMHFWLVµnot to be¶, that is, it is bound to fail. Goetz eventually comes to 
realize this, and the play ends with a conversion that is arguably genuine ± 
one in which Goetz rejects the God in relation to whom he has always 
defined his identity, and sees himself as human for the first time.84 Goetz is 
WKHUHIRUHDEOHWRVWDUWDFWLQJPRUHDXWKHQWLFDOO\DVµXQKRPPHSDUPLOHV
KRPPHV¶DBD, p. 245). 
 
*RHW]¶VILQDOFRQYHUVLRQPHUHO\VHHPVWRUHTXLUHUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHHUURULQ
seeking an absolute, objective identity: for Goetz to take his freedom into 
his own hands does not appear fundamentally problematic; the limiting 
factor is only himself. For this reason, the ending is often interpreted as 
positive and optimistic. However, closer inspection of the play reveals how 
Goetz¶VUHDOL]DWLRQRI the error of his ways does not mean that his actions 
are no longer open to criticism. In his reformed state Goetz joins forces 
with Nasty and, reputed for being the greatest military captain in Germany, 
*RHW]LVHOHFWHGOHDGHURIWKHSHDVDQWV¶UHYROW%XWLQWKHILQDOPRPHQWVRI
the play an officer rejecWV*RHW]¶VDXWKRULW\, and is stabbed by Goetz as a 
consequence. Not surprisingly, Nasty is somewhat taken aback. In 
response to this scene, Howells remarks: 
Goetz may be the last-DFWµKHUR¶RILe Diable et le bon dieuEXW>«@
HYHQKLVµFRQYHUVLRQ¶LVPDUNHGE\DQLQJORULRXVPXUGHUDQGD
readiness to be bRWKµERXUUHDXHWERXFKHU¶LQDUHYROXWLRQWKDWLVERXQG
to fail. Sartrean drama is essentially ambiguous, unresolved and 
unsynthesised.85 
                                         
83 Champigny (1968), p. 130. 
84 µ-¶DYDLVWUDKLWRXWOHPRQGH>«@MHYRXODLVrWUHLQKXPDLQ¶DBD, p. 234). 
85 Christina Howells, Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom (Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), p. 74. 
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If the relationship between ontological inauthenticity and moral 
inauthenticity was questionable with respect to Huis clos, the ending of Le 
Diable et le bon dieu blurs the boundaries between these supposedly 
separate notions even further. 
 
Wherever the divide lies, both Huis clos and Le Diable et le bon dieu 
VXJJHVWWKDWDXWKHQWLFDWLRQRIRQH¶VIUHHGRPSURSHULVDWOHDVWa 
SUHUHTXLVLWHIRUHWKLFDODFWLRQ+RZHYHU6DUWUH¶Vwar experiences revealed 
to him the realities of oppression, exploitation, and persecution: true 
freedom was not in fact possible in the world such as it is. Sartre came to 
recognize the extent to which WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶Vontological freedom was 
inescapably caught up and limited by µIDFWLFLWp¶; always embedded in a 
particular temporal moment, individuals could not be abstracted from their 
socio-historical situation, and thus no individual was ever in a position to 
be completely responsible for their freedom. This was to become the basis 
RI6DUWUH¶VµVHFRQGHWKLFV¶ ± a direct reaction against the more abstract and 
LQGLYLGXDOLVWLFµILUVWHWKLFV¶, which may be identified with the moral 
discourse in Huis clos.86 Le Diable et le bon dieu can be understood as 
marking the shift to this more realistic, contextualized ethics, beginning to 
problematize the possibility of living the freedom which (in principle) all 
humans possess. If Huis clos introduced the figure of the Other as the 
complexifying element, Le Diable et le bon dieu reiterates this message but 
with much greater force. Goetz may have shed his ideological conceptions 
about reality, but there is still a war to be waged. In keeping with marxist 
analysis, by the early 1950s Sartre sees the real problems as being real 
socio-economic contradictions, such as exploitation and poverty; mistaken 
ideas are what arise as a consequence of these contradictions, and their 
                                         
86 µ4X¶RQQ¶DLOOHSDVQRXVIDLUHGLUHVXUWRXWTXHO¶KRPPHHVWOLEUHGDQVWRXWHVOHVVLWXDWLRQV
>«@1RXVYRXORQVGLUHH[DFWHPHQWOHFRQWUDLUHjVDYRLUTXHOHVKRPPHVVRQWWRXVHVFODYHV¶
(Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique de la raison dialectique, Tome I (hereafter CRD I), (Paris : 
Gallimard, 1960), p. 369). 
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inauthenticity resides in how they obscure, conceal, or misrepresent the 
actual situation, therefore maintaining the status quo. But as Bottomore 
writesµLGHRORJLFDOGLVWRUWLRQV>«@FDQGLVDSSHDURQO\ZKHQWKH
contradictions which give rise to them are practically UHVROYHG¶87 Freedom 
thus becomes a goal as opposed to a given. 
/HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD 
/HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQDreinforces WKHPHVVDJHRI6DUWUH¶VVHFRQGHWKLFV
further emphasizing the complexities of Being en situation by illustrating 
how the objectification of le regard not only operates on the level of the 
individual, but also on the wider societal plane. Thus authenticity is 
rendered more difficult still, owing to the impersonal and consequently 
more elusive nature of the social systems that condition us. In his 
Questions de méthode (1957), published as an introduction to the Critique 
de la raison dialectique (1960), Sartre aligns himself with Marx, quoting 
Das Kapital when he ZULWHVµ&HUqJQHGHODOLEHUWpQHFRPPHQFHHQIDLW
que là où cesse le travail imposé par la nécessité et la finalité extérieure; il 
se trouve donc par-delà la sphère de la production matérielle proprement 
GLWH¶. Sartre then adds: µ0DLVQRXVQ¶DYRQVDXFXQPR\HQDXFXQ
instrument intellectuel, aucune expérience concrète qui nous permette de 
concevoir cette liberté ni cette philosophie¶.88 
 
The main protagonist in /HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD, Frantz von Gerlach, is 
guilty of an obsession with the Absolute similar to that of Goetz, namely his 
craving for grandeur ± power for its own sake. This lust for power has 
resulted in his committing crimes of torture, and he has been living in 
voluntary confinement in his room for the past thirteen years in an effort to 
                                         
87 Tom Bottomore et al., A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 
220; my emphasis. 
88 Jean-Paul Sartre, Questions de méthode ([Paris] : Gallimard, 1960 [original publication: 
1957]), p. 50). 
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escape his guilty conscience. The play is set in the von Gerlach household 
and, dramatizing a complex network of inter-family relations, explores the 
LPSDFWRI)UDQW]¶VVROLWDU\FRQILQHPHQWRQWKHUHVWRIWKHIDPLO\DQGWKH
succession of events which lead to a destruction of his sequestered world. 
 
*ROGWKRUSHGHVFULEHVKRZ)UDQW]¶VURRPKDVEHFRPHWKHµPDWHULDO
DQDODJRQ¶89 to the imaginary world he has created for himself: a world in 
which Germany is ruined, and therefore a world in which justice has been 
brought to Germany for Nazi acts of torture, including those committed by 
)UDQW],QWKHZRUGVRI2¶'RQRKRH)UDQW]LVWU\LQJWRµGHQ\WKHWLGHRI
KLVWRU\¶E\LQYHQWLQJDFRPSOHWHµFRXQWHU-KLVWRU\¶90 For actually: 
WKHµUHDO¶ZRUOGRXWVLGHGLVSOD\VWKHSHUYHUVHVRFLR-economic 
consequences of defeat: Germany is booming. This would be 
intolerable to Frantz, because wickedness should be punished not 
rewarded. If Germany wins the peace by virtue of having lost the war, 
WKHQWKHUHLVQHLWKHUORJLFQRUMXVWLFHµTXLSHUGJDJQH¶ 
 
2¶'RQRKRHS 
 
As ZLWK*RHW])UDQW]¶VIDXOWOLHVLQWU\LQJWRLPSRVHDIDOVHDEVWUDFW
system of coherence on the ZRUOG*ROGWKRUSHSRLQWVRXWWKDWµ)UDQW]¶V
GHWHUPLQDWLRQWRUHVSRQGWR>WKLV@LPDJHDVWKRXJKLWZHUHSHUFHSWLRQ>«@
eclipse[s] the spontaneity which initially created the image¶91 One of the 
observations she makes in her detailed discussion of Les Séquestrés 
G¶$OWRQD and 6DUWUH¶VWKHRU\RILPDJLQDWLRQ is that of the causal inefficacy 
of the imaginary object.92 An imaginary construct cannot determine action; 
Frantz chose to commit his acts of torture just as he now chooses to deny 
their significance, and he must therefore take personal responsibility for 
these choices. 
 
                                         
89 Rhiannon Goldthorpe, Sartre: Literature and Theory (Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), p. 148. 
90 2¶'RQRKRH, p. 231. 
91 Goldthorpe, p. 148. 
92 ibid., p. 146. 
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However, as mentioned above, what becomes evident in Les Séquestrés 
G¶$OWRQD is the extent to which freedom and responsibility are not as 
transparent as they are presented in Huis clos. The SOD\¶V discourse on 
freedom is one of extreme pessimism, where the attention paid to the 
conditioning forces of Society and History ± WKHµSUDFWLFR-LQHUW¶± in addition 
to the power-relations within the von Gerlach family itself cause one to 
question whether any freedom is involved at all.93 Contat and Rybalka 
summarize the significance of the play: 
Volontairement ambiguë, la pièce met en scène des personnages 
WRWDOHPHQWLPSXLVVDQWVTXLVRQWOHVYLFWLPHVFRQVHQWDQWHVG¶XQ
processus sur lequel ils Q¶RQWDXFXQHSULVHHWGRQWLOVUHVWHQWSRXUWDQW
HQWLqUHPHQWUHVSRQVDEOHV>«@94 
 
Frantz, with his thirst for power, has been created in the image of his 
father, an influential industrial magnate who views himself as omnipotent. 
For Sartre, von Gerlach typified the bourgeois world he lived in ± the same 
world that created Hitler and which sought greatness for its own sake, 
regardless of the means used to this end. For much of the play Frantz 
suffers from a feeling of impotence because it is his father who constructs 
his life for him. In his early twenties Frantz witnesses the horrors of a Nazi 
concentration camp, built on land sold to Himmler by his father. Realizing 
WKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIKLVIDWKHU¶VDFWLRQVKHLVDSSDOOHGDQGWULHVWRUHVFXHD
Polish rabbi, whom he hides in his room. But his father finds out and, to 
protect his son, calls the S.S., who then massacre the rabbi while Frantz 
ZDWFKHVKHOSOHVVWRLQWHUYHQHµ2ZLQJWRWKHSRZHURIKLVIDWKHU)UDQ[t]z 
is left unpunished for what he has done¶ McCall explains; µ7KHGDQJHURXV
risk he thought he was taking existed in fact only for the rabbi. Fran[t]z 
VHHVWKHQWKDWKHLVQRWUHVSRQVLEOHIRUKLVDFWVEHFDXVHDVKLVIDWKHU¶V
                                         
93 µ/e champ practico-inerte se fait en chaque praxis objectivée sa négation au profit de 
O¶DFWLYLWpSDVVLYHFRPPHVWUXFWXUHFRPPXQHGHVFROOHFWLIVHWGHODPDWLqUHRXYUpH¶CRD I, p. 
359). 
94 Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, Les Ecrits de Sartre: chronologie, bibliographie 
commentée (Paris : Gallimard, 1970), p. 325. 
 59 
son, he himself counts as nothing¶95 Indeed, it seems in response to this 
that Frantz pursues absolute power so resolutely, desperately seeking to 
act for himself. 
 
%XWLI)UDQW]¶VLGHntity can, in part, be seen as conditioned and defined by 
KLVIDWKHU¶VZLOOWKHVDPHFDQEHVDLGRIKLVIDWKHU¶VLGHQWLW\ZLWKUHVSHFWWR
larger social systems that extend beyond his control. As well as von 
*HUODFK¶VRZQSRZHU-driven agenda, Capitalism, Nazism, and Lutheranism 
are also key operators in the play, though what we come to realize is that 
none is so easily distinguishable in practice; the von *HUODFK¶VIDPLO\
relations present us with an internalization of all these ideological systems 
inextricably combined. Whereas Lutheranism was presented as a positive 
liberating force IURP&DWKROLFLVP¶VGRPLQDQFHDQGHOLWLVPLQLe Diable et le 
bon dieu,96 LHV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD offers an entirely different discourse. 
Emphasis on the individual as opposed to the Church has not diminished 
0DQ¶VGHVLUHIRUWKH$EVROXWHZKLFKKDVRQO\EHFRPHPDQLIest in other 
new social systems. Lutheranism is even explicitly blamed by the father: 
µ/HV*HUODFKVRQWGHVYLFWLPHVGH/XWKHUFHSURSKqWHQRXVDUHQGXVIRXV
G¶RUJXHLO¶.97 Thus, for Pucciani, Frantz was condemned to sequestration 
long before he bolted the door to his room upstairs; and his feeling of 
impotence and acts of torture carry the implication that one cannot pursue 
the Absolute without resultant violence, or violation of human freedom.98 
The SOD\¶VFHQWUDOWKHPHRIVHTXHVWUDWLRQcan therefore be understood as 
an illustration of how Man is alienated by the universalizing systems he 
creates; and Pucciani sees Frantz¶V DQGKLVIDWKHU¶VMRLQWVXLFLGHDWWKHHQG
                                         
95 McCall, p. 132. 
96 Le Diable et le bon dieu significantly takes place in the city of Worms ± most famously 
known in association with the Diet of Worms, during which Martin Luther was trialled prior to 
his excommunication from the Church. For Sartre, this historical moment, along with the 
subsequent rise of Protestantism, would have represented a liberating moment in history with 
UHVSHFWWRWKHFODVVUHODWLRQV&DWKROLFLVP¶VHOLWLVPVHUYHGWRSHUSHWXate. 
97 Jean-Paul Sartre, /HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD(hereafter SA), (Paris : Gallimard, 1960), p. 49. 
98 2UHVWH)3XFFLDQLµ/HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD¶LQ(GLWK.HUQHGSartre: A Collection of 
Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1962), p. 94. 
 60 
as the only authentic act open to them,99 necessary for the denunciation of 
LGHRORJ\¶VYLFLRXVFLUFXODULW\DQGLPSULVRQLQJHIIHFWV 
 
A critique of action in bad faith is thus sustained all the way through 
6DUWUH¶Vtheatrical °XYUHEXWZLWKWKHVKLIWREVHUYHGLQ6DUWUH¶VFRQFHSWLRQ
of liberté, in his later works it is no longer clear whether one should feel 
responsible for ontological infidelity ± that is, to what extent this critique 
can still apply. Indeed, Camus accused Sartre of contradicting his own 
basic principles, reducing Man to History and thus denying him his 
IXQGDPHQWDOIUHHGRPµ/¶H[LVWHQWLDOLVPH>de Sartre] a gardé du 
hegelianisme son erreur fondameQWDOHTXLFRQVLVWHjUpGXLUHO¶KRPPHj
O¶KLVWRLUH0DLVLOQ¶HQDSDVJDUGpODFRQVpTXHQFHTXLHVWGHUHIXVHUHQIDLW
WRXWHOLEHUWpjO¶KRPPH¶.100 Weber echoed this criticism in his analysis of Le 
Diable et le bon dieuGHVFULELQJ*RHW]¶VILQDOFRQYHUVLRQDV an act of 
surrender rather than a triumphant liberation.101 7KHIXWLOLW\RI)UDQW]¶V
efforts to save the rabbi in /HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD then seem to suggest 
that individual concern for the ethical ultimately makes no difference with 
respect to the wider sLWXDWLRQ7KXV+RZHOOVZULWHVRI6DUWUH¶VWKHDWUH 
+LVSOD\V>«@VKRZDFOHDUHYROXWLRQDZD\IURPWKHGUDPDRIWKH
LQGLYLGXDODQGKLVRUKHUH[LVWHQWLDOGLOHPPDV>«@WRZDUGVDQHTXDWLRQ
of History with Fate, in which drama is replaced by necessity, free 
choice by inevitability, praxis by the practico-inert. 
 
(Howells (1988), p. 89) 
 
As 6DUWUHEHFRPHVPRUHDZDUHRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIPDQ¶VVRFLR-historical 
situation, not only does it become increasingly difficult to understand the 
relationship between the ontological and the ethical; what the two notions 
might refer to themselves also becomes increasingly difficult to pinpoint. If 
establishing what authentic behaviour might constitute in light of 
                                         
99 Kern (1962), p. 102. 
100 Albert Camus, Carnets: janvier 1942 ± mars 1951 (hereafter C II), (Paris : Gallimard, 
1964), p. 180. 
101 Eugen Weberµ7KH6XUUHQGHURI*RHW]¶Symposium, XIII (1959). 
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situational complexities proves problematic, determining the nature of 
inauthenticity becomes equally so. However, what is clear is that, for 
Sartre, ethics is no science. Le Diable et le bon dieu and Les Séquestrés 
G¶$OWRQDboth illustrate the impossibility of formulating any fixed, universal 
code by showing all subscription to objective systems as necessitating 
failure. And in all three plays, the Other ± whether this be an individual or 
a social Other ± is presented as being pivotal with respect to the moral, as 
it facilitates disclosure of the ambiguity and complexity of ethics. 
 
The introduction to this dissertation suggested that analysis of Marcel¶V, 
Camus¶DQG6DUWUH¶V dramatic works might be a profitable approach to 
understanding their ethical thought. On reflection, theatre does appear to 
be a suitable choice of genre as far as their ethical philosophies are 
concerned. Marcel, Camus, and Sartre all emphasize the situational 
relativity of the ethical over absolutist conceptions such as those of 
µ-XVWLFH¶µ*RRG¶DQGµ(YLO¶DQGLWLVDSWWKDWWKHSOD\VRIDOOWhree sustain a 
crLWLTXHRIDFWLRQDVµUROHSOD\¶± that is, action performed out of a sense of 
duty to maintain some perceived objectivity, or motivated by an aspiration 
to bring about a certain objective state of affairs. In addition, the physical 
presence that theatre grants each individual character would seem 
especially complementary for Marcel, considering his desire for his 
philosophical message to emerge as a polyphonic symphony of different 
voices. This suggested relationship between Existentialist ethical thought 
and theatre will be further explored in Section 2.
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Section 2: Dramatizing French Existentialist Ethics 
 
2.1 A Staging of Conflict? 
 
 
Having analysed the fundamental ethical concepts applied by Marcel, 
Camus, and Sartre in their theatre, Section 2 now aims to address the 
inter-relations between the ethical discourses identified in Section 1, and 
FRQVLGHUKRZWKHWKUHH([LVWHQWLDOLVWV¶GUDPDWization of the ethical is 
reflective of their theoretical ethical discussions. As Section 1 
demonstrated, analysis of the representation of action in the theatre of all 
three has not provided a straight-forward discourse on ethical choice. Yet 
without an adequate suggestion as to FHTX¶LOIDXWIDLUH, the ethical position 
of the plays risks collapsing into moral relativism, rendering an existential 
ethics futile and meaningless. Section 2.1 will explore the conflictual nature 
of the ethical thought expressed in the theatre of Marcel, Camus, and 
Sartre. Section 2.2 will then consider whether it is nevertheless possible to 
see their theatre as contributing to the elaboration of their Existentialist 
ethical thought. 
 
Section 1 described how both Sartre and Camus argue for a lack of intrinsic 
meaning to life. With this ontological point de départ, values, for Sartre, 
ultimately depend on human choice en situation&DPXV¶SRVLWLRQLVVOLJKWO\
different however, arguing that absurdity is not a characteristic of 
existence itself, but rather the resulting sensation of a confrontation 
between Man and the world: 
Je disaiVTXHOHPRQGHHVWDEVXUGHHWM¶DOODLVWURSYLWH&HPRQGHHQ
lui-PrPHQ¶HVWSDVUDLVRQQDEOHF¶HVWWRXWFHTX¶RQSHXWGLUH0DLVFH
TXLHVWDEVXUGHF¶HVWODFRQIURQWDWLRQGHFHWLUUDWLRQQHOHWGHFHGpVLU
pSHUGXGHFODUWpGRQWO¶DSSHOUpVRQQHDXSOXVSURIRQGGHO¶KRPPH
/¶DEVXUGHGpSHQGDXWDQWGHO¶KRPPHTXHGXPRQGH 
(MS, p. 39) 
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Camus distinguishes between a lack of meaning and a lack of value.1 
Although life may be devoid of any essential meaning, this is not to say 
that values are equally arbitrary; on the contrary, Camus believes in an 
innate human dignity and metaphysical innocence which, along with 
associated values of life and love, the act of revolt simultaneously reveals 
and defends, thus grounding an intrinsic sense of human solidarity. Marcel 
provides no equivalent argument regarding the absurdity of existence but, 
like Camus, considers values (such as intersubjective respect, love, and 
fidelity) to be more discovered than chosen, recognizable through what he 
FDOOVDQµLQWXLWLRQUpIOH[LYH¶ (JM, p. 69).2 As has been noted, all three 
positions prove to be problematic when it comes to determining their 
precise consequences for action. In Sartre¶V case, if existence really is 
contingent, it is not obvious on what basis one is to make decisions about 
what to value in the first place. Heinrich (DBD) offers a prime example of 
ZKDW6DUWUHWHUPVµO¶DQJRLVVHpWKLTXH¶ 
Il y a angoisse éthique lorsque je me considère dans mon rapport 
originel aux valeurs. Celles-ci, en effet, sont des exigences qui 
réclament un fondement. Mais ce fondement ne saurait être en aucun 
FDVO¶être, car toute valeur qui fonderait sa nature idéale sur son être 
FHVVHUDLWSDUOjPrPHG¶rWUHYDOHXUHWUpDOLVHUDLWO¶KpWpURQRPLHGHPD
volonté.  
(EN, p. 73) 
 
This angoisse, Sartre argues, is a revelation of human freedom and thus of 
µO¶idéalité des valeurs [fixes]¶(EN, p. 73), which ought to then act as an 
incitement for O¶KRPPHDXWKHQWLTXHto take freedom into his own hands 
and create his own values. Thus Sartre argues in /¶([LVWHQWLDOLVPHest un 
humanisme WKDWµLOQ¶\DSDVGHGRFWULQHSOXVRSWLPLVWHSXLVTXHOHGHVWLQ
GHO¶KRPPHHVWHQOXL-PrPH¶EH, p. 56). But this recognition of freedom 
                                         
1 µOn DMXVTX¶jLFLMRXpVXUOHVPRWVHWIHLQWGHFUoire que refuser un sens à la vie conduit 
IRUFpPHQWjGpFODUHUTX¶HOOHQHYDXWSDVODSHLQHG¶rWUHYpFXH(QYpULWpLOQ¶\DDXFXQH
mesure fRUFpHHQWUHOHVGHX[MXJHPHQWV¶ (MS, p. 23). 
2 It must be noted, however, that Marcel is not satisfied with this deVFULSWLRQµ/¶H[SUHVVLRQ
intuition réflexive Q¶HVWFHUWHVSDVKHXUHXVH0DLVYRLFLFHTXHMHYHX[GLUH>«@&HWWHLQWXLWLRQ
QHVHUpIOpFKLWSDVHWQHSHXWSDVVHUpIOpFKLUGLUHFWHPHQW>«@. -HSHQVHTX¶jODUDFLQHGH
toute fidélité il existe une intuition de cette sorte ± mais dont la réalité peut toujours être 
remise en question. Je SHX[WRXMRXUVGLUH³RXLM¶DLcru YRLUPDLVMHPHVXLVWURPSp«´¶JM, 
p. 69). 
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only paralyses Heinrich. He cannot decide whether to identify with the 
values of the Church or with the values of the peasants, and so he tries to 
value both perspectives. As the following two passages illustrate, this only 
results in contradiction: 
NASTY: Es-tu pour nous ou contre nous? 
 
HEINRICH: Je suis pour vous quand vous souffrez, contre vous quand 
YRXVYRXOH]YHUVHUOHVDQJGHO¶eJOLVH 
 
NASTY: Tu es pour nous quand on nous assassine, contre nous quand 
nous osons nous défendre. 
 
+(,15,&+-HVXLVG¶eJOLVH1DVW\ 
(DBD, p. 35) 
 
And yet in a previous conversation with /¶(YrTXH, Heinrich did not express 
such certainty: 
HEINRICH: Je suis d¶Église G¶DERUGPDLVMHVXLVOHXUIUqUH [le frère des 
pauvres]. 
 
/¶(VÊQUE, (fortement)'¶eJOLVHG¶DERUG 
 
HEINRICH: Oui. '¶eJOLVHG¶DERUGPDLV« 
(DBD, p. 30) 
 
Condemned by both sides as a traitor, Heinrich is not presented 
favourably. However, if he is disingenuous it is not as a result of deliberate 
malice; his dilemma is clearly a source of great anguish for him. What is 
not clear is how he might resolve his contradictory position; his situation 
appears hopeless. 
 
As for Camus, he does not provide any philosophical foundation for the 
innate values he postulates, merely taking them as a given. IQ&DPXV¶
theatre his philosophy seems to have been transferred straight from his 
theory to the mouths of his characters, thus leaving us none the wiser as 
to the origin or substance of the values he argues for. Barilier writes: 
Camus prend ses émotions pour des raisons et ses idées pour des 
valeurs. Et si Platon non plus, en dernier ressort, ne prouvait pas ses 
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valeurs, il les fondait. Camus ne les fonde ni les prouve. Il en est réduit 
à les désirer.3 
 
Marcel, on the other hand, does offer some theoretical underpinning with 
which to legitimize his intuitive values:  
[La sensation] est à proprement parler immédiate et ne peut en aucune 
IDoRQrWUHUHJDUGpHFRPPHO¶LQWHUSUpWDWLRQGHTXHOTXHFKRVHTXLQH
serait pas elle. Elle est à la base de toute interprétation et de toute 
communication et ne peut donc être elle-même une interprétation ou 
une communication.  
(JM, p. 270) 
 
The immediacy of existential sensation renders it infallible, thereby 
providing metaphysical justification for the upholding of values which are 
intuitively recognized. Section 1 described how, for Marcel, authenticity 
LQYROYHVDµFUHDWLYHILGHOLW\¶WRWKHVHYDOXHV but again, it is not clear what 
fidelity to human values actually consists of in terms of action; indeed, this 
is a principal source of anguish for the characters in his plays. 
 
The seeming incoherence of an Existentialist ethics is particularly apparent 
with respect to Camus. Champigny argues that LI&DPXV¶WKHDWUHLV
philosophical, his moral philosophy is also theatrical. In Le Mythe de 
Sisyphe, Camus compares the absurd punishment of Sisyphus to the 
absurdity of human existence. Sisyphus ± µO¶KRPPHDEVXUGH¶± becomes 
the embodiment of &DPXV¶HDUO\IRUPRIUHYROW, and Camus imagines 
6LV\SKXVSURXGO\FKRRVLQJWRSXVKKLVURFNLQGHILDQFHRIWKHWDVN¶V
absurdity, thus allowing for the possibility of happiness because absurdity 
has been accepted.4 However, for Champigny, SisyphuV¶UHYROWVWLOODFWV
out a role, and thus involves no true action for himself: µ)URPWKHDWWLWXGH
of the tragic actor, one cannot draw a morals of active compassion, 
³SURXG´RUQRW¶.5 Sisyphus may recognize himself to be this actor, but this 
                                         
3 E. Barilier, cited in East, p. 172&UXLFNVKDQNDOVRWDONVRI&DPXV¶µfailure to separate clear 
WKLQNLQJIURPDQHPRWLRQDODWWLWXGH¶ (John Cruickshank, Albert Camus and the Literature of 
Revolt (New York : Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 47). 
4 µ,OIDXWLPDJLQHU6LV\SKHKHXUHX[¶MS, p. 168). 
5 Robert J. Champigny, Humanism and Human Racism: A Critical Study of Essays by Sartre 
and Camus (The Hague : Mouton, 1972), p. 73. It is striking that very little critical discussion 
makes reference to this text. 
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is not enough. IGHQWLI\LQJRQH¶VVHOIDVDQDFWRUDVRSSRVHGWRDSDUWLFXODU
character does not remove the element of role play Camus wished to 
condemn; the role of the actor remains, and the emphasis placed by 
Camus on O¶KRPPHDEVXUGH¶VGHILDQWSULde still implies a certain fixity.  
 
Camus acknowledged O¶KRPPHDEVXUGH¶VXQGHVLUDEOHWKHDWULFDOLW\DQG
subsequently tried to modify his approach in /¶+RPPHUpYROWp.6 However, 
Champigny does not believe that Camus appreciated the full extent of Le 
Mythe de Sisyphe¶VLQDGHTXDF\. Champigny sees the theatricality of 
&DPXV¶QRWLRQRIHWKLFDODFWLRQDVRULJLQDWLQJVSHFLILFDOO\IURP&DPXV¶
conception of death, the injustice of which incites the revolt of both 
O¶KRPPHDEVXUGHand O¶KRPPHUpYROWp. In Le Mythe de Sisyphe, death is 
SRUWUD\HGDVWKHRULJLQDOHYLOµ'DQVO¶XQLYHUVGXUpYROWpODPRUWH[DOWH
O¶LQMXVWLFH(OOHHVWOHVXSUrPHDEXV¶MS, p. 123); and similarly in 
/¶+RPPHUpYROWp, Camus argues that µGDQVVRQSULQFLSH>ODUpYROWH@HVW
protestation contre la PRUW¶HR, p. 356). It is this µconcentration on the 
LGHDRIGHDWKZKLFK>«@LVPDLQWDLQHGLQ/¶+RPPHUpYROWp[that] does not 
allow moral sense to liberate itVHOIIXOO\IURPDQHVWKHWLFLVP¶7 for 
Champigny argues that one cannot generalize about death as the absolute 
injustice.8 
 
&DPXV¶UHDFWLRQDJDLQVWWKHLQMXVWLFHRIGHDWKLVSDUWLFXODUO\DSSDUHQWLQ
Les Justes; but, continues Champigny, µnot to kill so as to bear witness to 
the honor of the revolted man [is] not [a] moral [decision] in the strict 
sense. Neither suicide nor murder, nor the rejection of either, can be 
                                         
6 µ'¶XQHFHUWDLQHPDQLqUHO¶DEVXUGHTXLSUpWHQGH[SULPHUO¶KRPPHGDQVVDVROLWXGHOHIDLW
vivre GHYDQWXQPLURLU¶HR, p. 21). 
7 Champigny (1972), p. 70. 
8 µThis generalization about death does not take into account the diversity of experiences. 
From a moral standpoint, death could, on the contrary, be considered as the only equalizing 
factor in this world. It comes to everyone and puts a stop tRVXIIHULQJDVZHOODVSOHDVXUH¶
(ibid., p. 71). 
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generalized as moral principles¶9 On the contrary, as far as Champigny is 
concerned, this idealist µSRVLWLQJ[of] non-violence [«@ as a practical moral 
principle is to present suicide as the RQO\SRVVLEOHPRUDODFWLRQ¶10 and this 
is effectively what Kaliayev (LJ) and Diego (ES) demonstrate. Not only 
this; Kaliayev and Diego display no significant ethical angoisse and agree 
to die rather too easily, so that Margerrison concludes her discussion of 
Les Justes E\DJUHHLQJZLWK%UDGE\WKDW&DPXV¶SOD\VDUHµPHORGUDPD>WLF@¶
DVRSSRVHGWRWUDJLFDVWKHLUKHURHVDUHQRWµWRUQDSDUWE\WKHLU
FRQWUDGLFWLRQV¶EXWUDWKHUDOOPDQDJHWRDFKLHYHVRPHIRUPRIUHVROXWLRQ
Margerrison consequently writes that .DOLD\HYµLQKLV³OLPLWHGUHYROW´
>GLHV@QRWDVDWUDJLFILJXUHEXWDVDQH[HPSODU\UHEHO¶11 Dora, it must be 
said, does struggle between her love for Kaliayev and her commitment to 
WKHJURXS¶VUHYROXWLRQDU\FDXVH BXWWKLVGRHVQRWZHDNHQ0DUJHUULVRQ¶V
DUJXPHQW'RUDPD\LQGHHGEHµOHVVFUXGH¶LQWKLVVHQVHEXW.DOLD\HY¶V
µGHDWKUHVROYHVWKLVFRQIOLFWZLWKKHUGHFLVLRQWRUHMRLQKLPE\YROXQWHHULQJ
to die throwing the next bomb¶.12 Thus both Margerrison and Champigny 
demonstrate how Camus fails to dissociate himself from absolutist ideals 
when addressing questions of ethics. Margerrison sees this ethical idealism 
DVFKDUDFWHULVWLFRI&DPXV¶WKHDWUHDQG&KDPSLJQ\EOXUVWKHGLYLGLQJOLQH
EHWZHHQWKHDWUHDQGSKLORVRSK\E\REVHUYLQJKRZ&DPXV¶HWKLFDO
philosophy may also be understood as theatrical, because of the role play 
that &DPXV¶ conception of authenticity fails to escape. 
 
It must be noted that &KDPSLJQ\¶VDUJXPHQWGRHVQRWrecognize the 
FRPSOH[LW\RI&DPXV¶SRVLWLRQUHJDUGLQJGHDWK&DPXVDFWXDOO\XVHs death 
in two senses - GHDWKDVWKHXOWLPDWHDEVXUGLW\KHUHDIWHUµGHDWKabs¶DQG
GHDWKDVLQMXVWLFHKHUHDIWHUµGHDWKinj¶&KDPSLJQ\¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
                                         
9 Champigny (1972), p. 71. 
10 ibid., p. 54. 
11 Hughes, p. 74. 
12 ibid. 
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µGHDWK¶LVRQO\WKDWRIGHDWKinj, EXWDFWXDOO\WKHµORJLFRIDEVXUGLW\¶ZKLFK
JURXQGV&DPXV¶UHYROt has deathabs as its foundation. Suffering is only a 
secondary consideration WRµOHVXSUrPHDEXV¶WKDWLVGHDWKEHFDXVHDVWKH
culmination of absurdity, death prevents any justification for action or 
sense of purpose in life. Camus states: 
Le révolté ne demande pas la vie, mais les raisons de la vie. Il refuse la 
FRQVpTXHQFHTXHODPRUWDSSRUWH6LULHQQHGXUHULHQQ¶HVWMXVWLILpFH
TXLPHXUWHVWSULYpGHVHQV>«@/DSURWHVWDWLRQFRQWUHOHPDOTXLHVW
DXF°XUPrPHGHODUpYROWHPpWDSK\VLTXHHVWVLJQLIicative à cet égard. 
&HQ¶HVWSDVODVRXIIUDQFHGHO¶HQIDQWTXLHVWUpYROWDQWHHQHOOH-même, 
mais le fait que cette souffrance ne soit pas justifiée. 
(HR, p. 132) 
 
So whereas deathabs signifies the fundamental meaninglessness of life, 
deathinj implies that life is the absolute value; only deathabs is consistent 
with &DPXV¶ logic. TKHIDFWWKDWWKHVHWZRVHQVHVRIGHDWKH[LVWLQ&DPXV¶
work is not in itself contradictory, due to the distinction Camus makes 
between meaning and value. However, because Camus uses the word 
µGHDWK¶LQERWKFDVHVLWLVXQFOHDUDVWRZhich sense is intended. In Les 
Justes WKHDVVDVVLQV¶UHYROWDFWXDOO\VHHPVWREHGULYHQLQUHVSRQVHWR
deathinj; Camus appears to have smuggled deathinj into his logic of 
absurdity so that his angoisse concerning life and its meaninglessness 
(which stems from deathabs) equivocates to become angoisse about the 
reality of death (i.e. deathinj). Davis believes that µPXFKRI&DPXV>«@ can 
be read as staging the impossibility of maintaining oneself unflinchingly in 
WKHGRPDLQRIWKH$EVXUG¶,13 RUDWOHDVW&DPXV¶RZQLQDELOLW\WR
unflinchingly confront absurdity. $VLOOXVWUDWHGE\.DOLD\HY¶VGHVSHUDWH
outbursts, in spite of the Absurd, Camus needs to be able to justify why life 
should be valued. Even Le Malentendu expresses this, for as Davis notes, 
µDPELJXLW\LVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKGHDWK¶14 But in the words of Champigny: µIf 
my decision to go on living derives from the judgement that human life in 
                                         
13 &ROLQ'DYLVµ9LROHQFHDQG(WKLFVLQ&DPXV¶LQ+XJKHVS 
14 ibid., p. 113. In /¶+RPPH révolté Camus also writes: µ&KDTXH équivoque, chaque 
PDOHQWHQGXVXVFLWHODPRUW¶HR, p. 354). 
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general is worth living, then I do not exactly decide to go on living my life: 
,GHFLGHUDWKHUWRSOD\WKHSDUWRI/LIH¶.15 
 
The theatricality of 'LHJR¶Vdeath at the end of /¶(WDWGHVLqJH might 
almost be undermined by the females in the chorus, when they lament: 
Puisque tout ne peut être sauvé, apprenons du moins à préserver la 
PDLVRQGHO¶DPRXU>«@0DLVOHVKRPPHVSUpIqUHQWO¶LGpH,OVIXLHQWOHXU
PqUHLOVVHGpWDFKHQWGHO¶DPDQWHHWOHVYRLOjTXLFRXUHQWjO¶DYHQWXUH
>«@DSSHODQWVRXVXQFLHOPXHWXQHLPSRVVLEOHUpXQLRQHWPDUFKDQWGH
VROLWXGHHQVROLWXGHYHUVO¶LVolement dernier, la mort en plein désert! 
 
(ES, p. 184) 
 
However we are not able to take their suggestion of authenticity seriously 
either, as the notion of love /¶(WDWGHVLqJH presents us with is no less of an 
µLGpH¶WKDQ'LHJR¶VµDYHQWXUH¶In his theoretical writings Camus plainly 
states: µ-HQ¶DLULHQjIDLUHGHVLGpHVRXGHO¶pWHUQHO¶MS, p. 123); but in 
spite of such arguments against objectification a residual idealism 
permeates his thought, asserting itself particularly when questions of ethics 
or values are involved. Thus, eYHQ&DPXV¶ODWHUµKHURHV¶ live as if in front of 
a mirror, acting as spectators to their own idealized conception of authentic 
action. Ironically, despite the strong emphasis Camus places on logic in 
wanting to uphold a consistency between metaphysical truth and his notion 
of revolt,16 not only does Camus fail to ground the moral values with which 
he presents us; the fact that he presents us with such universal values at 
all renders his ethical thought philosophically inconsistent and thus 
incoherent because in theory he argues against such objectification. 
5HJDUGLQJWKHHWKLFDOPHVVDJHLQ&DPXV¶WKHDWUHDXGLHQFHVWRKLVSOD\V
are consequently spectators twice over: firstly, of the action on stage, and 
secondly, of an abstract and idealist morality that does not sufficiently 
relate to the complex, diverse realities of individuals en situation. 
                                         
15 Champigny (1972), p. 56. 
16 µ0RQUDLVRQQHPHQWYHXWrWUHILGqOHjO¶pYLGHQFHTXLO¶DpYHLOOp&HWWHpYLGHQFHF¶HVW
O¶DEVXUGH¶MS, p. 73). 
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The notion of spectatorship has numerous applications with regard to 
Existentialist ethical thought in the theatre. Spectatorship may represent 
the passive observation of the action and characters on stage by an 
audience, wherein no participation takes place; or it may refer to the rigid 
REMHFWLILFDWLRQRIDSOD\¶VHWKLFDOPHVVDJHEHLWE\WKHDXGLHQFHWKH
producer, or the playwright. Spectatorship may also apply to internal 
relations between the characters themselves, whereby certain characters 
HLWKHUYLHZWKHPVHOYHVDVSHUIRUPLQJDVSHFLILFUROH&DPXV¶µKHURHV¶
*RHW]¶VREMHFWLILFDWLRQRIKLPVHOIDVµ(YLO¶RUµ*RRG¶(DBD)), or objectify 
other characters and reduce their existence to one role in particular 
ODEHOOLQJ5RODQGDVµWKHFROODERUDWRU¶(E)). The one-dimensional characters 
LQ&DPXV¶WKHDWUHIRUFHD VSHFWDWRU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKHDXGLHQFHZLWK
respect to his moral philosophy, as the objectified ethical message they 
represent does not allow the audience room for active involvement. 
 
7KLVVHHPVWREHDIDLOLQJRI&DPXV¶LQSDUWLFXODUIRUparadox and 
ambiguity appear to be inherent in the very structure of Sartre¶V and 
0DUFHO¶VWKHDWUH, thus preventing such unequivocal interpretation. Ethical 
questions in Sartre¶V DQG0DUFHO¶VSOD\VDUHRIWHQH[SORUHGE\SUHVHQWLQJ
moments of choice in terms of binary oppositions. Although a sustained 
criticism of absolute judgement is maintained in all WKUHHRI0DUFHO¶VSOD\V
there is nevertheless a strong sense of the necessity of choice. Contrary to 
what one might expect, Antoine (E), who fails to pronounce himself for or 
DJDLQVWWKH5HVLVWDQFHGRHVQRWEHFRPHµWKHVWURQJFKDUDFWHU¶DVDUHVXOW
and Simon (SC) and Pascal (RR) must both make a definitive choice as to 
whether to remain in France or to leave, in spite of the conflict in values 
EHWZHHQDIHHOLQJRIGXW\ERWKWRWKHLUµSDWULH¶, and to their family) that 
either decision will entail. In response to this ethical anguish, Marc-André 
(RR) consequently despairs at how he is µGRXEOHHWSRXUWDQWOHPrPH¶RR, 
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p. 80) ± an emotional outburst which Marcel himself echoes when he 
writes: 
Nous vivons hélas! dans un monde de plus en plus coupé en deux [«@
/HVSRVLWLRQVLQWHUPpGLDLUHV>«@WHQGHQWGHSOXVHQSOXVjGLVSDUDvWUH
et ceux qui veulent à tout prix les maintenir [sont] condamnés à être 
SULVGDQVFHWWHVRUWHG¶pWDX 
(RR, pp. 162-3) 
 
ThHHWKLFDOLVSUHVHQWHGXVLQJVLPLODUFRQIOLFWLQ6DUWUH¶VWKHatre. Heinrich 
(DBD), who is in possession of the key to an underground passage leading 
into the town of Worms, must decide whether to safeguard the key and 
allow the peasants to massacre the clergy in revolt, or give the key to 
Goetz, whose entrance into the town will entail the massacre of the 
peasants. And Frantz (SA) is forced to choose between two principles which 
circumstance renders incompatible ± his own moral feelings regarding his 
IDWKHU¶VLQYROYHPHQWZLWKWKH1D]LVDQGlove for his father along with 
familial respect for his authority. Furthermore, not only does Sartre 
embrace contradiction in the structure and characterization of his plays; 
6DUWUH¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWRWKHWKHDWULFDOPHGLXPLWVHOILVDOVRSDUDGR[LFDO
wanting his theatre to be one of both distance and of participation.17 The 
element of participation was important in order for the audience to be able 
to identify with the action and for the play to speak to them on some level; 
yet a certain element of distance was also necessary so that a play was not 
taken too literally and its message objectified. However, the financial 
viability of a play ± and hence its existence altogether ± rested on its 
acceptance both by a producer and the public themselves, thereby 
entailing a certain loss of control over its presentation, which is then 
further magnified by subsequent reproductions of the play. As Sartre 
regrets: µOHWKpkWUHest tellement la chose publique, la chose du public [...]. 
0HVSLqFHV>@P¶RQWSUHVTXHWRXWHVpFKDSSpElles deviennent des objets¶
(TS, p. 101).  
                                         
17 µ-¶DLPHUDLVTXHOH public voie, du dehors, notre siècle, chose étrangère, en témoin. (WTX¶HQ
PrPHWHPSVLOSDUWLFLSHSXLVTX¶LOIDLWFHVLqFOH¶TS, p. 112). 
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Ireland views 6DUWUH¶V ambiguous relationship with theatre very negatively, 
DUJXLQJWKDWµle théâtre figure un microcosme où se trouvent condensés et 
intensifiés les divers éléments du problème obsédant pour Sartre de 
O¶pFULWXUHHWGHO¶HQJDJHPHQW¶18 µSartre veut que le théâtre, en posant des 
problèmes politiques actuels, parvienne à rendre aux mots un pouvoir 
effectif >HW«@ OHVGpEDUUDVVHUGHOHXUGLPHQVLRQLPDJLQDLUH¶19 However, 
Ireland attributes WKHIDLOXUHRI6DUWUH¶VSOD\VWo significantly further his 
political activism ± indeed, many were misunderstood ± to 6DUWUH¶VLQDELOLW\
to dissociate himself from O¶pFULW, thus rendering his theatre the 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIµ>XQH@FRQIXVLRQLGpRORJLTXH¶20 because of the 
fundamental incompatibility between les mots and O¶HQJDJHPHQW.21 So 
although Camus has been criticized for his failure to present us with true 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQV,UHODQG¶VDQDO\VLVQRZFDXVHVXVWRTXHVWLRQZKHWKHUWKH
presence of the paradoxical is any more desirable, for IrelanG¶VVXJJHVWLRQ
is that ambiguity LQ6DUWUH¶VWKHDWUHPLJKWRQO\EHLQGLFDWLYHRI6DUWUH¶V
own unresolved struggle concerning FHTX¶LOIDXWIDLUH.  
 
As regards Marcel, the paradoxes his plays present us with (which tend to 
be predominantly psychological in nature) curiously seem to shift, so that a 
character who appears to be very complex in certain respects may also 
appear very rigid in a different situation. Sylvie (E), for example, is initially 
presented as quite a wise and understanding character, who has an open 
mind. However, when Antoine comes to pick her up for an arranged visit to 
see his uncle, she suddenly, and rather surprisingly, becomes very difficult, 
insisting that he cancel the arrangement at the last minute for no apparent 
reason. Although confrontations and conflicts both within and between 
                                         
18 John Ireland, Sartre: un art déloyal, théâtralité et engagement (Paris : Jean-Michel Place, 
1994), p. 40. 
19 ibid., p. 220. 
20 ibid., p. 17. 
21 ibid., p. 14. 
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characters raise questions about the ethical status of actions, for Marcel, 
no character is beyond blame, nor can any be completely condemned. 
0DUFHO¶VGHOLEHUDWHUHIXVDOWRobjectify seems to have gone to the extreme, 
so that we are made to feel that he ought to have offered some form of 
judgement ± at least of his most negative characters such as Pauline (SC) 
and Renée (RR). One is thus left wondering what ethical message Marcel 
offers at all, and whetheU0DUFHO¶VPRUDOSRVLWLRQPLJKWin fact stem from a 
more personal ethical angoisse, which his principle of anti-dogmatism then 
attempts to alleviate.22 So the ethical thought in the theatre of all three 
Existentialist philosophers seems open to the charge of subjectivism, which 
would therefore make it of little use as a general approach to ethics. 
 
Not only is the subjectivism of the playwrights problematic regarding the 
ethical discourse of Existentialist theatre; the subjectivism of the audience 
is also of concern. Although Marcel may not wish for characters such as 
Pauline and Renée to be objectively condemned, how the audience respond 
to such characters is not something which can be controlled. Thus the 
creation of an Existentialist ethical discourse is significantly complexified by 
the theatrical medium itself. At the end of Section 1 it was suggested that 
theatre might be particularly complementary to Existentialist ethical 
WKRXJKWEXWLIDOOWKUHHSKLORVRSKHUV¶FRQFHSWLRQRIPRUDODXWKHQWLFLW\LV
(at least in theory) opposed to objectification, the spectatorship imposed 
RQWKHDXGLHQFHE\WKHDWUH¶VLQKHUHQWGLVWDQFHUDLVHVWKHTXHVWLRQDVWR
whether theatre is consistent with Existentialist ethical thought at all. 
Indeed, as mentioned in Section 1, their plays were not always received as 
intended: Marcel had to speak out in defence of 5RPHQ¶HVWSOXVGDQV
Rome, and Le Signe de la croix was so controversial that it could not 
actually be staged; Camus also felt the need to defend Le Malentendu 
                                         
22 /D]DURQLVRIDVLPLODURSLQLRQµ*DEULHO0DUFHOKDVEURXJKWWRKLVWKHDWUHKLVRZQDQ[LHW\¶
(Lazaron, p. 32). 
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against charges of pessimisPDQG6DUWUH¶VSOD\VKDYHFDXVHGPXFK
controversy ± Huis clos in particular, as will later be discussed. Do such 
examples of objectification on the part of the audience not therefore 
suggest the theatre to be a rather inappropriate medium for voicing 
Existentialist ethical thought? 
 
McCall identifies a tension between theatrical form and Existentialist ethical 
thought in relation to *RHW]¶s ILQDOµFRQYHUVLRQ¶ in Le Diable et le bon dieu. 
Although the ending seems to be one of optimism, McCall observes an 
underlying negativity with respect to the grandiose language of Goetz-the-
converted, which she argues does not actually register his conversion: 
µ*RHW]¶VUKHWRULFLQGLFDWHVWKDWKHLVVWLOOSHUIRUPLQJIRUDQDXGLHQFH¶.23 
Indeed, Goetz seems to dismiss his former actions a little too readily in his 
QHZO\µFRQYHUWHG¶VWDWHWKHZisdom of which he almost boasts. Goetz still 
appears to be acting pour-autrui, so that it is not evident that his project 
has fundamentally changed at all. The protagonists in all three RI6DUWUH¶V
plays (Garcin, Goetz, Frantz) all undergo some kind of conversion, but 
*RHW]¶VFRQYHUVLRQLVWKHRQO\RQHIRUZKLFKWKHWLPLQJLVQRWREYLRXVO\WRR
late. However, it now seems that if Goetz is any kind of hero, it is only in 
the theatrical, role-playing sense. The question we are then left with is on 
KRZPDQ\OHYHOV*RHW]¶VUROHSOD\RSHUDWHV$UHWKHPHPEHUVRIWKH
audience merely spectators to a rhetoric which is in keeping with the 
theatrical genreRUGRHV*RHW]¶VUROHSOD\Hxtend beyond his character on 
stage to the authentic character that Sartre was attempting to represent? 
If the latter were the case, Sartre would be no more successful than 
Camus, as he himself would contribute an additional dimension to the 
spectatorship RIKLVWKHDWUHQRWRQO\ZRXOGWKHSOD\¶VWKHDWULFDOIRUP
                                         
23 0F&DOOS+RZHOOVDUJXHVVLPLODUO\µHYHQ*RHW]¶VHYHQWXDOFRQYHUVLRQIURPSULGHWR
modesty is transformed by the dramatic process into a rhetorical heroics of modesty¶ (Howells 
(1988), p. 76). 
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present the audience with an objectifiable Goetz; Sartre would be writing 
an objectified Goetz, thus contradicting his own Existentialist principles. 
 
Marcel has condemned 6DUWUH¶VSKLORVRSK\LQJHQeral for being essentially 
the philosophy of a spectator. For Marcel, to subscribe to the dualistic 
opposition between subject and object as he accused Sartre of doing ± 
most notably in /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW when Sartre discusses le regard and 
relations with the Other ± LVRQHRIµOHVSOXVJUDQGVHUUHXUVGRQWDXFXQH
PpWDSK\VLTXHVHVRLWUHQGXHFRXSDEOH¶EA, p. 26). Marcel argues that this 
Cartesian outlook EUHHGVVXEMHFWLYLVPLQWDNLQJWKHµ,¶RUWKHµH\H¶DVLWV
first point of reference, whereas true contact with the real involves 
participation. For Marcel, reality is not an object I can behold from the 
outside, but rather something in which I, and others, are completely 
embedded, and so by nature distinctly µQRQ-optique, non-VSHFWDFXODLUH¶ (ME 
II, p. 18; my emphasis). It is this state of µincarnation¶ that we must 
recognize if we are to appreciate what it is to be in any authentic sense,24 
DVRSSRVHGWRWKHLQDXWKHQWLFµ³RXEOLGHO¶rWUH´RXEOLGRQFGHIUDWHUQLWp¶DV
Parain-Vial puts it,25 which the spectatoU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHSURSDJDWHV Marcel 
writes in Etre et avoir: 
6LM¶DGPHWVTXHOHVDXWUHVQHVRQWTXHma pensée des autres, mon idée 
GHVDXWUHVLOGHYLHQWDEVROXPHQWLPSRVVLEOHGHEULVHUXQFHUFOHTX¶RQD
commencé par tracer autour de soi ± VLO¶RQSRVHOHSrimat du sujet-
objet ± de la catégorie du sujet-objet ± O¶H[LVWHQFHGHVDXWUHVGHYLHQW
impensable.  
(EA, p. 74) 
 
One could even go as IDUDVWRVD\WKDWLQ0DUFHO¶VYLHZje pense, donc je 
ne suis pas: whereas Sartre and Camus use µêtre¶ in quite an everyday 
VHQVHEXLOWLQWR0DUFHO¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIêtre is a rejection of the distance 
and objectifying judgement of individual reflection so that it already implies 
                                         
24 µ/DUpDOLWpTXHOHFRJLWRUpYqOH>«@HVWG¶XQRUGUHWRXWGLIIpUHQWGHO¶H[LVWHQFHGRQWQRXV
tentons ici >«@de reconnaître¶JM, p. 315). 
25 Jeanne Parain-Vial, *DEULHO0DUFHOHWOHVQLYHDX[GHO¶H[SpULHQFH(Paris : Seghers, 1966), p. 
72. 
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a disponibilité towards others, which recognizes them as subjects rather 
than objects.26 
 
Marcel does not only REMHFWWRWKHZD\LQZKLFK6DUWUH¶VSKLORVRSKLFDO
GXDOLVPIRUFHVDVSHFWDWRU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHwith respect to the Other; further 
still, 6DUWUH¶V objectifying regard excludes the possibility of knowing the 
Other as toi, due to the pessimistic way in which it defines human 
relations. 0DUFHOVHHV6DUWUH¶VXVHRIµêtre¶ as degrading; for Marcel, être 
involves living the full potential of existence, unlike faire, which is the 
superficial, automaton-like performance of the functional. For Sartre 
however, être often refers to the stagnant, inactive occupation of the en-
soi, in contrast to faire, which involves the active, engaged use of freedom 
by the pour-soi. 0DUFHO¶VRXWUDJHDW6DUWUH¶Vfailure to acknowledge the 
positive potential of être is illustrated particularly well in his fierce criticism 
of Huis clos: 
Ce nihilisme moral est à mon avis tout à fait apparent dans Huis clos; il 
PHSDUDvWpYLGHQWTXHO¶DXWHXUHQPHWWDQWH[FOXVLYHPHQWO¶DFFHQWVXU
ODGpSHQGDQFHGHO¶LQGLYLGXSDUUDSSRUWDXUHJDUGHW au jugement 
G¶DXWUXLHVFDPRWHV\VWpPDWLTXHPHQWOHµQRXV¶ véritable qui est celui de 
O¶DPRXURXGHO¶amitié.27 
 
For Marcel, this play is a schematic representation of the spectatorship he 
attributes to /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW¶VFODLPWKDW 
nous [autrui et moi] ne pouvons jamais nous placer concrètement sur 
XQSODQG¶pJDOLWpF¶HVW-à-dire sur le plan où la reconnaissance de la 
OLEHUWpG¶DXWUXLHQWUDvQHUDLWODUHFRQQDLVVDQFHSDUDXWUXLGHQRWUH
OLEHUWp$XWUXLHVWSDUSULQFLSHO¶LQVDLVLVVDEOHLOPHIXLWTXDQGMH le 
cherche et me possède quand je le fuis. 
(EN, p. 449) 
 
,QqV¶ desire for Estelle cannot be satisfied as it was with Florence, for 
Estelle only seeks self-confirmation in the eyes of men, and so desperately 
hankers after *DUFLQ¶Vrecognition of her femininity. Garcin, however, is 
                                         
26 µ8QHILFWLRQ>«@SUHQGQDLVVDQFHGDQVO¶DFWHDUELWUDLUHSDUOHTXHOODSHQVpHSUpWHQG
WUDQVIRUPHUHQDIILUPDWLRQG¶REMHWFHTXLHVWXQHFRQQDLVVDQFHLPPpGLDWHHWXQHSDUWicipation¶
(JM, p. 315). 
27 Gabriel Marcel, Théâtre et religion (Lyon : Vitte, 1958), p. 47. 
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obsessed with coming to terms with his cowardice and, already semi-aware 
of the truth, can only receive the reassurance he needs from Inès, in whom 
he detects the ability to see things for what they are. But Inès, bitter that 
Estelle has eyes only for Garcin, DOVRWDNHVVDGLVWLFSOHDVXUHIURP*DUFLQ¶V
suffering and will never tell Garcin what he wants to hear. And so the cycle 
begins again. Thus for Marcel, Huis clos illustrates that µOHFRQIOLWHVWOHVHQV
RULJLQHOGHO¶rWUH-pour-DXWUXL¶EN, p. 404), and this vicious circularity of 
relations traps each character in their inauthenticity without hope of 
escape, reinforcing ontological inauthenticity, or indisponibilité. 
 
,Q&RRQH\¶VRSLQLRQµ0DUFHO¶VZDUQLQJDQGUHDFWLRQDJDLQVWRStical or 
spectacular thinking forms the vehicle through which his philosophy can 
EHVWEHXQGHUVWRRG¶.28 Such an approach then becomes all the more 
illuminating ZKHQDSSOLHGWR0DUFHO¶VWKHDWUHQRWRQO\ZDV0DUFHO
determined that his own philosophy would not display such objectifying 
spectatorship; he was equally determined that his plays would not permit 
passive spectatorship on the part of the audience. Indeed, Marcel saw it as 
the fundamental duty of a dramatist to present a range of different 
perspectives and situations within the unified whole of a single play, 
thereby putting the true dramatist at odds with a moralizing discourse. 
Marcel consequently writes of Camus: 
[Camus] ne me semble pas authentiquement dramaturge, je ne vois 
SDVTX¶LODLWpYLWpQXOOHSDUWO¶pFXHLOGHODSLqFHjWKqVHMHQHWURXYH
pas chez lui ce respect absolu de ses personnages et de leur liberté qui 
doit apposer soQVFHDXjXQH°XYUHGUDPDWLTXH 
(RR, p. 151) 
 
With such conscious awareness of the problems of spectatorship when 
dealing with ethics, one might H[SHFW0DUFHO¶VWKHDWUHWREHPRUH
successful than that of Camus or Sartre; but as has already been observed, 
even if the ethical message Marcel has written into his theatre escapes 
                                         
28 William Cooney (ed.), Contributions of Gabriel Marcel to Philosophy: A Collection of Essays 
(Lewiston, NY : Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), p. iii. 
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spectatorship, his plays have nevertheless still fallen prey to problems 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHDXGLHQFH¶VUHVSRQVH 
 
,WPXVWDOVREHVDLGWKDW0DUFHOKLPVHOIRFFDVLRQDOO\µVSHFWDWHV¶DQG
objectifies. For example, although Marcel refuses to officially condemn 
Renée (RR) within the play itself, in his 1951 lecture Marcel refers to her as 
µO¶RGLHXVH5HQpH¶RR, p. 154), which would imply that he does actually 
judge her. Similarly, Marcel declares that he does not wish his philosophy 
to presuppose a religious outlook, pronouncing that his position µQ¶HQWUDvQe 
>«@DXFXQHPHQWO¶DGKpVLRQjXQHUHOLJLRQGpWHUPLQpH¶.29 He also states that 
he has no wish for his thought to be defined as essentially distinct from 
6DUWUH¶VDWKHLVWLF([LVWHQWLDOLVPµLOQHPHVHUDLWMDPDLVYHQXjO¶LGpHGH
GRFWULQDOLVHUVLM¶RVHGLUH O¶RSSRVLWLRQTXLSRXYDLWH[LVWHUHQWUH6DUWUHHW
PRL¶.30 Yet in response to Huis clos, Marcel writesµ1XOOHSDUW>«@
Q¶DSSDUDvWSOXVQHWWHPHQWO¶LQFRPSDWLELOLWpUDGLFDOHHQWUHODSRVLWLRQGH
Sartre HWGHVHVGLVFLSOHV>«@HWXQHPpWDSK\VLTXHRXXQHpWKLTXe 
FKUpWLHQQHTXHOOHTX¶HOOHVRLW¶31 and in reference to Le Diable et le bon 
dieu¶VµSURRI¶RIDWKHLVPKHWDONVRIWKHSOD\¶VµFDUDFWqUHEODVSKpPDWRLUH¶
ZKLFKLVµSURSUHPHQWRGLHX[¶32 So despite his claims otherwise, Marcel 
does appear to view this religious distinction as a fundamental opposition 
EHWZHHQKLVSRVLWLRQDQG6DUWUH¶V,WLVDVLILQWKHKHDWRIWKHPRPHQW
0DUFHO¶VFRQFHQWUDWLRQKDVODSVHGDQGDSDUWLDOLW\PDVNHGE\KLVXVXDO
extreme tolerance is able to speak through. 
 
                                         
29 Gabriel Marcel, Positions et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique (hereafter PA), 2e 
ed. (Paris : Louvain, 1967), p. 91. 
30 Gabriel Marcel, /¶([LVWHQFHHWODOLEHUWpKXPDLQHFKH]-HDQ-Paul Sartre (hereafter EL), 
(Paris : Vrin, 1981), p. 16. 
31 Gabriel Marcel, /¶+HXUHWhéâtrale (Paris : Plon, 1959), pp. 190-1. 
32 ibid., p. 214. AOWKRXJK0DUFHOGLGQRWDGGUHVV&DPXV¶WKRXJKWVRGLUHFWO\RQHFDQDVVXPH
that the ending of Le Malentendu DQG.DOLD\HY¶VH[FODPDWLRQWKDWµ'LHXQHSHXWULHQ¶LJ, p. 
102) in Les Justes (to cite but a few examples) would incite a comparable response. 
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Although the theatrical works of all three Existentialists seem to suggest 
that there are certain moral limits - WRXWQ¶HVWSDVSHUPLV ± it has been 
noted that all three argue very strongly against objectifying values, so that 
identifying where these ethical limits might lie becomes extremely 
problematic. A pronounced moral pessimism emerges in Section 1, for the 
dramatic works of all three seemed to present humans in a helplessly 
exiled state. 0DUFHO¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOZULWLQJVSXWJUHDWHPSKDVLVRQKRSH
however, this optimism is not expressed in his plays. Instead, the message 
LQ0DUFHO¶VWKHDWUHappears to be one of resignation to the overwhelming 
presence of suffering and moral anguish that he sees in humans, where the 
only possibility of hope emanates from un autre royaume. Similarly, the 
life-DIILUPLQJDVSHFWVRI&DPXV¶SKLORVRSK\ZKLFKalso appear in his prose, 
do not shine through in his theatre. In Le Malentendu, not even the pride 
that Camus attributed to Sisyphe is present, so that its message can 
express nothing other WKDQGHVSDLULQWKHIDFHRIDEVXUGLW\&DPXV¶ODWHU
works then portray violence and suffering as inevitable regardless of efforts 
made to combat this reality. Finally, with respect to Sartre, if the optimism 
that Le Diable et le bon dieu¶VHQGLQJ might propose has been challenged 
by McCall, it is destroyed altogether by /HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD which, 
DFFRUGLQJWR&RQWDWDQG5\EDONDµUHSUpVHQWHOHPRPHQWOHSOXVSHVVLPLVWH
OHSOXVVRPEUHGHWRXWHO¶°XYUHGH6DUWUH¶33 Thus the theatre of all three 
seems unable to offer any hope that the unethical acts with which we feel 
we are being presented can ever be justifiably condemned in the name of 
an ethical outlook. 
 
Furthermore, while all three thinkers seem to share a similar philosophical 
vocabulary, this often conceals quite different philosophical positions. 
Firstly, there is the religious division between Sartre¶V DQG&DPXV¶DWKHLVP
                                         
33 Contat and Rybalka, p. 325. 
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and MaUFHO¶V&KULVWLDQ([LVWHQWLDOLVPGHVSLWH0DUFHO¶VLQVLVWHQFHWKDWKLV
philosophy does not presuppose a religious outlook, the ethical discourse in 
DOOWKUHHRI0DUFHO¶VSOD\VVHHPVWREHLQH[WULFDEO\OLQNHGWRDn argument 
for a role for faith. In addition, the discussion concerning his reactions to 
Huis clos and Le Diable et le bon dieu revealed an extreme discomfort with 
SDUWUH¶VDWKHLVP 
 
Secondly, not all are in agreement over the origin of moral values: whilst 
Marcel and Camus both believe that values are innate, Sartre denies that 
there is any human nature at all. The difference between Sartre¶VDQG
0DUFHO¶VSRVLWLRQ is indicated particularly clearly by their different uses of 
µreconnaître¶. In /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW Sartre writes: 
La valeur tire son être de son exigence et non son exigence de son 
être. Elle ne se livre donc pas à une intuition contemplative qui la 
saisirait comme étant YDOHXU>«@HOOHQHSHXWVHGpYRLOHUDXFRQWUDLUH
TX¶jXQHOLEHUWpDFWLYHTXLODIDLWH[LVWHUFRPPHYDOHXUGXVHXOIDLWGH
la reconnaître pour telle. 
(EN, p. 73) 
&RQWUDVWWKLVZLWK0DUFHO¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHRULJLQRIYDOXHV 
En réalité, si je P¶LQWHUURJHVLQFqUHPHQWHWVDQVPHUpIpUHUjXQH
SKLORVRSKLHSUpFRQoXHMHP¶DSSDUDLVQRQSDVGXWRXWFRPPH
choisissant mes valeurs, mais comme les reconnaissant >«@. 
 
(EL, p. 86) 
 
0DUFHO¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIreconnaître is clearly not the meaning Sartre has 
in mind. And as has also been noted in this section, Sartre¶V DQG0DUFHO¶V
understanding of faire and être seem equally at odds. 
 
With respect to Sartre and Camus, Royle also observes µEDVLF
disagreements often masked by an overlapping of subjects of concern, 
VLPLODULWLHVRIFOLPDWHDQGYRFDEXODU\¶.34 For example, the revolutionary 
message at the end of Le Diable et le bon dieu portrays violence as 
necessary. Additional support can also be drawn from the Cité du Soleil 
                                         
34 Peter Royle, The Sartre-Camus Controversy: A Literary and Philosophical Critique (Ottawa, 
Canada : University of Ottawa Press, 1982), p. 1. 
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PDVVDFUHZKLFKSUHVHQWVWKHFLWL]HQV¶ attempt to maintain the moral high 
ground in practicing non-violence as supremely naïve. Camus, on the other 
hand, remains convinced that no human ever has the right to take the life 
of another, arguing WKDWLQRUGHUIRU.DOLD\HY¶VDVVDVVLQDWLRQWREH
genXLQHO\µMXVWH¶.DOLD\HYPXVWVDFULILFHKLVRZQOLIHLQRUGHUWR
demonstrate that he UHFRJQL]HVOLIH¶VYDOXH. In fact, this difference in 
position regarding the status of violence was so deep-set that it was 
responsible for creating an irreparable rift between Sartre and Camus; 
after 1952 they never spoke again.35 
 
Not only do intra-Existentialist tensions seem to undermine Existentialism 
as a coherent approach to ethics; these inter-Existentialist tensions then 
raise the question as to whether it is even meaningful to speak of 
µ([LVWHQWLDOLVW¶ethical thought. In addition, it has been suggested that the 
various forms of spectatorship which may be associated with the theatrical 
medium (regarding the audience and the action, the playwrights or 
producers and the plays, or even theatrical rhetoric and the characters 
themselves) are fundamentally inconsistent with Existentialist ethical 
thought: conflict is not merely presented on the stage, in the ethical 
discourses which emanate from the plays; it also occurs with the stage, 
where the Existentialist opposition to objectification clashes with the 
differing kinds of spectatorship that theatre seems to encourage. How, 
therefore, can Existentialist thought, and especially Existentialist thought in 
the theatre, make any valuable contribution to ethics? 
                                         
35 $URQVRQ¶VUHFHQWSXEOLFDWLRn, Camus and Sartre: The Story of a Friendship and the Quarrel 
that Ended It JLYHVDQH[FHOOHQWDFFRXQWRIWKHTXDUUHO6DQWRQLDOVRGLVFXVVHV6DUWUH¶V
DQG&DPXV¶GLVSXWHLQWKHVHFRQGSDUWRIKLVSartre on Violence, Curiously Ambivalent (2003), 
and Royle takes a literary approach in his study of the controversy (1982). See bibliography 
for full details. 
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2.2 In Defence of Conflict and the Stage 
 
 
In Section 2.1 Existentialist ethical thought was portrayed as deeply 
problematic, not only in terms of the philosophical inconsistency and 
subjectivism of its phenomenological approach, but also due to conflict 
between the positions of these three Existentialist thinkers themselves. 
That such differences exist is no great revelation in itself; yet what is 
puzzling is the fact that Marcel, Camus, and Sartre have been and are still 
all referred to as Existentialists, despite what seems like a considerable set 
of disagreements. CharacteriziQJWKHLUSKLORVRSKLHVDVµ([LVWHQWLDOLVW¶ZRXOG
surely lead us to expect some common denominator to unite their thought. 
Is this purely the aforementioned phenomenological approach, whereby all 
three give primacy to existence and its experience in their philosophical 
reflection? Or can they be said to agree on something more substantial, 
ZKLFKPLJKWDOORZXVWRUHIHUWRWKHLUHWKLFDOFRQFHUQVDVµ([LVWHQWLDOLVW¶LQD
more significant way? 
 
Section 2.1 did detect a common opposition to objectification in the 
philosophies of all three, identifying the process of objectification with the 
VSHFWDWRU¶VSerspective. However, Section 2.1 also suggested that, in some 
way or another, all three thinkers failed to consistently uphold this 
opposition to spectatorship. In addition, the spectatorship necessitated by 
theatre itself, encouraging the audience, the producer, or even the 
playwright to label the message of the plays, seemed to undermine the 
theatre entirely as a vehicle of expression for Existentialist ethical thought; 
spectatorship appeared inescapable, and doubly so when their thought was 
translated into theatrical form. And yet the ethical thought of Marcel, 
Camus, and Sartre is an undeniable driving force behind the dramatic 
works they produced. Is their choice of theatre as inconsistent as Section 
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2.1 implied? Can the ethical discourses in their plays be defended? These 
are the questions that Section 2.2 will explore. 
 
Section 2.1 presented the ethical thought in &DPXV¶theatre as the most 
problematic, failing to provide a coherent discourse on ethics because of an 
omnipresent idealism. Indeed, unlike in the plays of Marcel or Sartre, 
whose characters present moral decisions as wrought with tension, the 
confrontations ZLWKZKLFKZHDUHFRQIURQWHGLQ&DPXV¶Wheatre seem to be 
false oppositions: 0DULD¶VODFNRILQWHJUDWLRQLQto Le Malentendu¶VSORW 
prevents her from representing a genuine challenge to Jan DQGKLVµGHYRLU¶; 
Victoria and the women in the chorus do not offer an effective counter 
position to Diego in /¶(WDWde siège as their ideals lack substance, and so 
FDQQRWRXWZHLJKWKHµKHURLFV¶RIWKHSURWDJRQLVW; and the bias towards 
Kaliayev and his ideals in Les Justes makes it difficult to see any other 
character as offering a legitimate, alternative position.36 Camus defined 
WKHDWUHDVµODUpDOLVDWLRQFROOHFWLYHGHODSHQVpHG¶XQVHXO¶Ess, p. 1405), 
and this certainly seems to be the case as far as his dramatic works are 
concerned. 0DUJHUULVRQZULWHVµWKHPDMRUFKDOOHQJH&DPXVIDFHGDVD
SOD\ZULJKW>«@OD\LQSXWWLQJKLPVHOILQWKHSODFHRIRWKHUVWREULQJ
RSSRVLQJYLHZVWROLIH¶37 Indeed, the only life which seems to be on the 
stage is his own, thus prompting Freeman to criticize Les Justes IRUµQRW
ZHLJKW>LQJ@FLUFXPVWDQFHVKHDYLO\HQRXJKDJDLQVW.DOLD\HY¶DQGDOORZLQJ
.DOLD\HYµWREH[the hero] &DPXVREYLRXVO\EHOLHYHGKLPWREHLQUHDOOLIH¶38 
Whilst Sartre and Marcel tried to reduce the spectatorship encouraged by 
theatre by creating a theatre of participation, Camus only seems to 
UHLQIRUFHLW7KLVGLGDFWLFLVPLVWKHQEROVWHUHGIXUWKHUE\&DPXV¶DQ[LRXV
endeavours to clarify the meaning of his plays ± the optimism of Le 
                                         
36 ,QGHHG.DOLD\HY¶VPDLQRSSRVLWLRQ6WHSDQODWHUDGPLWVWRKDYLQJZURQJO\MXGJHG.DOLD\HY
(LJ, p. 89). 
37 Hughes, p. 68. 
38 Freeman, p. 115. 
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Malentendu for example. $V0DUJHUULVRQQRWHV&DPXVµZDVTXLFNWR
correct what he perceived as misinterpretations of his work, or to insist on 
ZKDWKHKDG³UHDOO\´PHDQW¶39 
 
+RZHYHUDOWKRXJKWKHHWKLFDOPHVVDJHLQ&DPXV¶WKHDWUHPD\DSSHDUone-
dimensional and unambiguous, in his theoretical writings there is evidence 
to show that he too argues for the paradoxical nature of morals. In a 1943 
letter Camus wrote that the human experience of values is inevitably one 
of contradictionµ/¶HIIRUWGHODSHQVpHDEVXUGH>«@F¶HVWO¶H[SXOsion de 
WRXVOHVMXJHPHQWVGHYDOHXU>«@2UQRXVVDYRQVYRXVHWPRLTX¶LO\D
GHVMXJHPHQWVGHYDOHXULQpYLWDEOHV¶Ess, p. 1423). And as he argues that 
µDXFXQHPRUDOHQLDXFXQHIIRUWQHVRQWa priori MXVWLILDEOHV¶MS, p. 32), 
there are bound to be occasions when these value judgements, which we 
cannot help but make, come into conflict with each other, thus rendering 
moral principles forcibly ambiguous.40 As regards tragedy, the genre of 
which all his plays were intended to be a modern example, Camus also 
ZURWHµOHVIRUFHVTXLV¶DIIURQWHQWGDQVODWUDJpGLHVRQWpJDOHPHQW
légitimes, également armées en raison. >«@$XWUHPHQWGLWODWUDJpGLHHVW
DPELJXs¶TRN, p. 1705). Significantly, in the first draft of Le Malentendu 
Maria had even less of a presence. Camus then developed her character in 
order to give her role greater weight and philosophical depth; only he does 
not appear to have succeeded.41 In theory therefore, Camus seems to 
share a similar position to Marcel and Sartre, but his discourse highlighting 
contradiction and paradox is obscured in the dramatization of his thought. 
This therefore suggests that the principal difficulty lies not so much in a 
                                         
39 Hughes, p. 69. 
40  µ6LM¶HVVDLHGHVDLVLUFHGRQWMHP¶DVVXUHVLM¶HVVDLHGHOHGpILQLUHWGHOHUpVXPHULOQ¶HVW
SOXVTX¶XQHHDXTXLFRXOHHQWUHPHVGRLJWV¶MS, p. 36). 
41 See Freeman (pp. 67-8), and Margerrison (Hughes, p. 70). 
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fundamental disagreement between Camus, Sartre and Marcel, but more 
ZLWK&DPXV¶WKHDWULFDOPHWKRG42 
 
&ORVHUH[DPLQDWLRQRI&DPXV¶ plays does in fact reveal instances of 
genuine confrontation, the best example of which being perhaps the prison 
conversation between Skouratov and Kaliayev in Les Justes. In this scene 
Skouratov offers Kaliayev the chance to escape his death sentence if he 
DJUHHVWRUHSHQWHQFRXUDJLQJKLPWRFKRRVHOLIHµSRXUUpSDUHU¶LJ, p. 
111). Skouratov makes reference to .DOLD\HY¶V µDVVDVVLQDW¶ZKLFK.DOLD\HY
FDQQRWEHDUµ-HYRXVLQWHUGLVG¶HPSOR\HUFHPRW¶Kaliayev WKHQµMXVWLILHV¶
himself in response to this accusation of murder with the stubborn, childish 
LQVLVWHQFHWKDWµ-HUHFWLILH¶LJ, p. 108). .DOLD\HYWULHVWRPDLQWDLQWKDWµ-¶DL
ODQFpODERPEHVXUYRWUHW\UDQQLHQRQVXUXQKRPPH«¶µ6DQVGRXWH¶
replies 6NRXUDWRYµ0DLVF¶HVWO¶KRPPHTXLO¶DUHoXH¶Regardless of the way 
LQZKLFK.DOLD\HYFKRRVHVWRUHIHUWRKLVDFWµLO\DHXPRUWG¶KRPPH¶LJ, 
p. 109), DQG6NRXUDWRY¶VFRQFHUQVDUHZLWKLQGLYLGXDOSHRSOHQRWLGHDV 
 
$OWKRXJK6NRXUDWRY¶VUROHLVRQHRItemptation in a way similar to that of 
La Peste at the end of /¶(WDWGHVLqJHZKHUHDV/D3HVWH¶VRIIHUZDVQRW
difficult for Diego to reject (La Peste causes nothing but suffering in the 
WRZQWKXVJLYLQJKLPDQXQHTXLYRFDOO\µHYLO¶VWDWXV, Skouratov is harder to 
dismiss. In this scene Kaliayev, who has previously been very convincing in 
his arguments, loses all power of persuasion in his attempts to defend his 
position against Skouratov; he can offer no real grounding for the 
principles he is adamant to uphold, thereby seriously undermining his 
conception of justice. However, the final moments of the play return us to 
Dora who re-DIILUPV.DOLD\HY¶VKHURLVP, removing any emphasis on this 
TXHVWLRQLQJRI.DOLD\HY¶VLGHDOVDVDUHVXOW. The overriding dramatic bias 
                                         
42 ,QGHHG&DPXV¶WKHDWUHLVZidely seen as a failure (see Gay-Crosier, for example), with 
criticism focusing primarily on his dramatic technique (e.g. Cruickshank, Freeman). 
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towards KaliayeY¶VSHUVSHFWLYH similarly prevents the complexities raised 
by Dora (her VXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHJURXS¶VµUpYROXWLRQSRXUODYLH¶is 
paradoxical; her problematization of the µORYH¶PRWLYDWLQJWKHJURXS¶V
actions) from being of much consequence. Nevertheless, these scenes 
SURYLGHHYLGHQFHWRVKRZWKDWWKHHWKLFDOGLVFRXUVHLQ&DPXV¶WKHDWUHLV
not as one-dimensional as it may first appear. As far as the audience is 
FRQFHUQHGµOHVIRUFHVTXLV¶DIIURQWHQW¶LQKLVSOD\VGRQRWDSSHDU
µOpJLWLPHV¶LIWKH\GLGDQGother characters were allowed to speak out 
more, &DPXV¶HWKLFDOdiscourse would not seem quite so distinct from 
6DUWUH¶VRU0DUFHO¶V.43 
 
A refusal to allow any one character to be dominant is clearly 
communicated E\0DUFHO¶VHPSKDVLVRQV\PSKRQLFH[SUHVVLRQ where a 
SOD\¶V message is composed by the whole ensemble of characters. But 
Camus (again, in his theoretical writings) also argued that his position was 
not reducible to the voice of one particular character. In his Essais critiques 
KHVWDWHVµ6DQVGRXWH, un romancier se traduit et se trahit dans tous ses 
personnages en même temps: chacun représente une de ses tendances ou 
GHVHVWHQWDWLRQV¶Ess, p. 1143). This idea of trahir is common to Camus, 
Marcel, and Sartre, all three arguing for the impossibility of objectivity 
when it comes to trying to describe human experience. Nevertheless, it is 
human to be tempted by objectivity. For Sartre, the need to attribute some 
graspable meaning to existence is the immediate response to contingency 
and the angoisse which it incites; and in Etre et avoir Marcel declares: 
 
&HQ¶HVWSDVDVVH]GHGLUHTXHQRXVYLYRQVGDQVXQPRQGHROD
WUDKLVRQHVWSRVVLEOHjWRXWPRPHQWHWVRXVWRXWHVOHVIRUPHV>«;] 
                                         
43 7KLVLVQRWWRVD\WKDW&DPXV¶ theory always presents us with true paradoxes. Indeed, there 
are many instances where phrases whose syntax implies the paradoxical do not express true 
contradictions, e.g. µ/¶H[SOLFDWLRQHVWYDLQHPDLVODVHQVDWLRQUHVWH¶ (MS, p. 131)µ/¶H[LVWHQFH
est mensongère et HOOHHVWpWHUQHOOH¶MS, p. 152). However, the discursive nature of &DPXV¶ 
theory means that its message is not dominated by the same dogmatism as his theatre. 
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cette trahison, il semble que la structure même de notre monde nous 
la recommande. 
(EA, p. 68) 
 
AV6DUWUHVD\VµLOHVWGDQJHUHXVHPHQWIDFLOHGHSDUOHUWURSYLWHGHYDOHXUV
pWHUQHOOHV¶44 and Camus expresses the same in /¶(QYHUVHWO¶HQGURLWwhen 
he confesses: µ$FHWWHH[WUrPHSRLQWHGHO¶H[WUrPHFRQVFLHQFHWRXWVH
rejoignait HWPDYLHP¶DSSDUDLVVDLWFRPPHXQEORFjUHMHWHURXjUHFHYRLU
-¶DYDLVEHVRLQG¶XQHJUDQGHXU¶Ess, p. 39). This µJUDQGHXU¶is what seems 
to be expressed by the leading protagonists in his plays; indeed, it seems 
precisely because RI&DPXV¶XQGHUO\LQJUHcognition of the paradoxical that 
he shies away from contradictions. Scenes such as the prison conversation 
between Kaliayev and Skouratov are thus not given the weight which they 
are due; the play has to end with some form of resolution.45 µ&HWWH
nostalgie G¶XQLWpFHWDSSpWLWG¶DEVROXLOOXVWUHOHPRXYHPHQWHVVHQWLHOGX
GUDPHKXPDLQ¶MS, p. 34), writes Camus. The ethical thought in &DPXV¶
theatre can therefore be interpreted as a literal manifestation of this 
µGUDPHKXPDLQ¶, the drama on the stage being ilOXVWUDWLYHRI&DPXV¶LQQHU
drame as he struggles (unsuccessfully) to fight this human desire for 
clarity. 
 
This global form of interpretation actually seems a more appropriate 
approach to understanding Existentialist ethical thought, as it remains 
faithful WRWKHWKUHHWKLQNHUV¶critique of objective principles. Furthermore, 
WKLVIRUPRIµUpIOH[LRQUpFXSpratrice¶FDQEHOLNHQHGWRWKH0DUFHOOLDQQRWLRQ
of secondary reflection,46 and is also in line with the way in which 
Verstraeten analyses 6DUWUH¶Vmorale: 
VLOHVDUWULVPHVHYHXWHVVHQWLHOOHPHQWXQHOHoRQG¶H[LVWHQFHLO
importe, peut-rWUHDXMRXUG¶KXLSOXW{WTXHG¶HQVHUYHUjWLWUHGH
                                         
44 Jean-Paul Sartre, 4X¶HVW-ce que la littérature? ([Paris] : Gallimard, 1948), p. 87. 
45 In this sense, Le Malentendu LV&DPXV¶VWURQJHVWSOD\IRUQRVXFKUHVROXWion is offered at 
the end. 
46 µLDUpIOH[LRQVHFRQGHHVWHVVHQWLHOOHPHQWUpFXSpUDWULFHHOOHHVWXQHUHFRQTXrWH¶Gabriel 
Marcel, /H0\VWqUHGHO¶(WUH, (Paris : Aubier-Montaigne, 1951), p. 98). 
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précepte, de nRXVHQGLVWDQFLHU>«@G¶HQWUDKLUO¶H[LJHQFHSUDWLTXHSDU
XQUHFRXUVUpIOH[LI>«@HWDLQVLSHXW-être en assurer une pénétration 
>«@ 
(Verstraeten, pp. 7-8) 
 
9HUVWUDHWHQDQDO\VHV6DUWUH¶VWKHDWULFDO°XYUH in terms of two stages, 
which progressively develop an argument for the dialectical nature of 
ethics. The first stage begins to question the universality of moral values, 
constituting µXQHdialectique critique FRQWHVWDQWO¶DWWLWXGHpWKLTXH¶47 
9HUVWUDHWHQWKHQDUJXHVIRUWKHQHFHVVLW\RIµXQHcritique de la dialectique¶
µ,OQHVXIILWSDVHQHIIHWG¶RSSRVHUjODYLVLRQpWKLTXHO¶HIILFDFLWpGHO¶DWWLWXGH
dialectique, il faut en assurer la validité pour éviter de la voir glisser dans 
VRQDQWLWKqVH¶48 The second stage, with which he identifies Le Diable et le 
bon dieu and /HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD, therefore illustrates how this 
µDWWLWXGHGLDOHFWLTXH¶PXVWEHGLDOHFWLFDl in itself. Despite *RHW]¶VLQVLVWHQFH
WKDWµ0RLM¶LQYHQWH¶, his projects of Good and Evil are actually defined in 
relation to, and thus dependent upon, pre-existing societal notions of these 
values. *RHW]¶VDFWVdo not involve any creativity, and he in fact ends up 
KDYLQJGLIILFXOW\GLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQµ*RRG¶DQGµ(YLO¶µLO faut avoir 
bonne vue pour distinguer le Bon Dieu du DiDEOH¶DBD, p. 224). However, 
*RHW]¶VODVWFRQYHUsion is arguably different because he no longer treats 
such accepted values as a given; he opts instead to make use of his 
freedom, and decide what to value by considering the specific requirements 
of the surrounding situation7KHDVVXPHGLQFRPSDWLELOLW\RIµ*RRG¶DQG
µ(YLO¶LVFRQVHTXHQWO\UHIXWHGWKHUHE\DOORZLQJIRUWKHSRVVLELOLW\µG¶rWUH
PDXYDLVSRXUGHYHQLUERQ¶DBD, p. 245). Whereas one might initially be 
tempted to reject this as a nonsensical contradiction in terms, the purpose 
of Le Diable et le bon dieu is to demonstrate the need to accept the 
inverse; the true nature of reality is dialectical and situationally dependent, 
                                         
47 Verstraeten, p. 71. To this stage Verstraeten assigns Les Mouches, /¶(QJUHQDJH, and Les 
Mains sales. 
48 ibid. Gabriel Marcel was similarly critical of the first part of his Journal métaphysique, 
confessing to 3DXO5LFRHXUWKDWµF¶HVWSDUOHVPR\HQVPrPHVGHODGLDOHFWLTXHTXHMH
P¶HIIRUoDLVWUqVJDXFKHPHQWPHVHPEOe-t-LOGHPHGpOLYUHUGHODGLDOHFWLTXH¶ (EPR, p. 14). 
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so it is actually these absolute divisions between concepts such as good 
and evil that are meaningless, not the paradoxical combination of the two.  
 
One might be tempted to see *RHW]¶Vexistential development as paralleling 
the +HJHOLDQGLDOHFWLFHYHQWXDOO\UHVXOWLQJLQV\QWKHVLVZLWK*RHW]¶VILQDO
conversion.49 In one sense, Goetz does seem to have attained a more 
authentic state of being through his final renunciation of absolutes; but 
closer inspection reveals evidence in support of a Hegelian synthesis to be 
rather superficial: the ILQDODQGDOOHJHGO\µDXWKHQWLF¶conversion presented 
in Le Diable et le bon dieu is simultaneously undermined ± ERWKE\*RHW]¶V
continuing rhetoric pour autrui (as illuVWUDWHGE\0F&DOO¶VUHDGLQJRIWKH
ending of the play), and also by the wider, unresolved socio-historical 
situation. /HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQDthen takes one step further, presenting 
only the irreconcilability of a socio-historical dialectic, aiming to express in 
LWVHQWLUHW\µOHVHQWLPHQWGHO¶DPELJXwWpGHQRWUHWHPSVLa morale, la 
SROLWLTXHSOXVULHQQ¶HVWVLPSOH¶TS, p. 363). The ethical notion of 
dialectics which emerges is thus Kantian rather than Hegelian - a dialogical 
oscillation between opposing forces that will never reach absolute 
synthesis, for the ethical contradictions arise from a use of human reason 
(which translates experience into the objective and the logical) that 
extends beyond its limits.50 $V6LPRQWZULWHVµWKHUHLVQRWRWDOUDWLRQDOity 
in the world that is not a part of the world, hence that does not fall short of 
LWVRZQWRWDOLW\¶51 
 
                                         
49 Bell, for example, holds such a position (see Linda Bell, 6DUWUH¶V(WKLFVRI$XWKHQWLFLW\
(Tuscaloosa : University of Alabama Press, 1989%HOO¶VSULPDU\H[DPSOHLVDFWXDOO\WKDWRI
Jean Genet in 6DUWUH¶VSaint Genet, comédien et martyr +RZHYHU*RHW]¶V
development in Le Diable et le bon dieu is a widely accepted close parallel to this; indeed, Le 
Diable et le bon dieu can be seen as a literary preface to this subsequent longer, biographical 
work. 
50 )RU.DQWKLVµWUDQVFHQGHQWDOGLDOHFWLF¶LVµDFULWLTXHRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGUHDVRQLQUHVSHFW
RIWKHLUK\SHUSK\VLFDOHPSOR\PHQW¶,PPDQXHO.DQWCritique of Pure Reason (1781), e-text 
based on 1929 Norman Kemp Smith translation, 
<http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html> [accessed 31 July 2007], pp. 100-1). 
51 -XOLHWWH6LPRQWµ6DUWUHDQHWKLFV¶LQ&KULVWLQD+RZHOOVHGThe Cambridge Companion to 
Sartre (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 208. 
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6DUWUH¶VGHVLUHWRHPSKDVize the ambiguous and the contradictory can be 
further confirmed by the development of his thought in his theoretical 
writings6WRQHDQG%RZPDQYLHZ6DUWUH¶VXQSXEOLVKHGRome Lecture 
notes and 1965 Cornell Lecture notes as preparing the ground for a 
dialectical ethics. The Rome Lecture notes are more fully argued through 
than 6DUWUH¶VCahiers pour une morale (composed 1947-8), making them a 
more suitable source IRUJDLQLQJDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI6DUWUH¶VHWKLFDO
position. Importantly, Sartre is not documented to have made any 
significant criticism of these writings. Stone and Bowman therefore suggest 
that the ensemble of Sartre¶VXQSXEOLVKHGZULWLQJVIrom WKLVSHULRGµPLJKW
even be called the missLQJFHQWHURI6DUWUH¶VSURMHFWDV a philosopher. They 
were certainly much more satisfactory to him than either his lecture on 
humanism or the notes he made on ethics after finishing [/¶Etre et le 
néant]¶52 Indeed, in a 1978 interview with Sicard, Sartre referred to his 
Cahiers pour une morale as a failed effort: 
j'ai essayé après /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQWHQ«GHIDLUHXQH
morale, dans la même direction, avec les mêmes principes originels et 
SRXUPDUTXHUFHTX¶LO\DYDLWGHSURSUHPHQWPRUDOjODVXLWHGH/¶(WUH
et le néant-¶DLUpGLJpXQHGL]DLQHGHJURVFDKLHUVGHQRWHVTXL
représentent une tentative manquée pour une morale.53 
 
This would therefore rank these two sets of lecture notes amongst the 
PRVWLPSRUWDQWWKHRUHWLFDOZULWLQJVRQHWKLFVLQ6DUWUH¶V°XYUH. 
 
In the second section of his Rome Lecture notes HQWLWOHGµ([SpULHQFHGHOD
PRUDOH¶54 Sartre presents a detailed discussion of the phenomenology of 
ethical norms, attempting to discern the basis for their existence and to 
understand how they function. In so doing, Sartre identifies µle paradoxe 
pWKLTXH¶ZKLFKLVURRWHGLQWKHµWZR-VLGHGQHVV¶RIQRUPVStone and 
                                         
52 Robert V. Stone and Elizabeth A. BRZPDQµ6DUWUH¶VMorality and History: A First Look at the 
1RWHVIRUWKH8QSXEOLVKHG&RUQHOO/HFWXUHV¶LQRonald Aronson and Adrian Van den 
Hoven (eds), Sartre Alive (Detroit : Wayne State University Press, 1991), p. 56. 
53 Jean-3DXO6DUWUHµ--P. SaUWUH	06LFDUG(QWUHWLHQ¶Obliques, 18-19 (1979), p. 14. 
54 Jean-Paul Sartre, cited by Bob Stone and Elisabeth Bowman, in Gilbert Hottois (ed.), Sur les 
écrits posthumes de Sartre, $QQDOHVGHO¶,QVWLWXWGH3KLORVRSKLHHWGH6FLHQFHVPRUDOHV
(Bruxelles : (GLWLRQVGHO¶8QLYHUVLWpGH%UX[HOOHVS 
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Bowman describe how Sartre argues, on the one hand, WKDWµQRrms 
prescribe acts, and hence futures, that are given as unconditionally 
possible¶55 In choosing to obey a norm I make myself a subject, this 
subject being defined (in part) by the future I have created for myself in 
making this choice. FRU6DUWUHµthis pure future in which I produce myself 
in interiority is the original and fundamental aspect of the experience of the 
QRUPDWLYH¶56 However, as Stone and Bowman also explain, µWKHcontent of 
a norm can involve alien, inert elements, such as repetition and social 
roles¶,57 that is, norms often occur in the imperative mode and are adopted 
accordingly. In this case, upholding a certain norm is not an instance of 
personal creativity, but instead action under the influence of the practico-
LQHUWµ,QREH\LQJVXFKDQRUP,GR not produce myself, as a pure future, I 
repeat the past praxis of others¶.58 The fact that action in the name of 
ethical norms can possess both these aspects LV6DUWUH¶VHWKLFDOSDUDGR[59 
 
The value conflicts presented in /HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD can be understood 
as leading directly towards this analysis, as the characters who suffer them 
are shown to be both products and producers of systems (such as 
capitalism and Nazism). This is illustrated particularly clearly by the 
anguish experienced by von Gerlach and Frantz, demonstrating the 
inadequacy of social imperatives originating from the structural 
organization of society when it comes to determining ethical conduct. 
Frantz and von Gerlach represent morality in terms of objective value 
conflicts, but ethical conflicts cannot be objectified in this way. 
                                         
55 Robert V. Stone and Elizabeth A. Bowman, µ'LDOHFWLFDO(WKLFV$)LUVW/RRNDW6DUWUH¶V
8QSXEOLVKHG5RPH/HFWXUH1RWHV¶Social Text, no. 13/14 (Winter-Spring, 1986), p. 197. 
56 ibid. 
57 ibid. 
58 ibid., pp. 197-8. 
59 The ethical paradox is also discussed by Verstraeten and Simont (see Hottois (ed.), 
(1987)). It is significant that Verstraeten discusses the importance of the paradoxical with 
UHVSHFWWR6DUWUH¶VHWKLFVJLYHQWKDWWKLVGLVVHUWDWLRQKDVLdentified with his interpretative 
DSSURDFKWR6DUWUH¶VSKLORVRSK\ 
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SWUXFWXUDOLVPWHQGVWRµFROODSV>H@WKHQRUPLQWRLWVLPSHUDWLYHDVSHFW¶60 
write Stone and Bowman; and this reduction then neglects the other 
dimension of ethical norms, namely, that conforming to a norm also 
involves an element of choice. 
 
This is not to say that one can completely escape the practico-inert. 
Indeed, it is due to the inescapability of its influence that the characters in 
/HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQDDUHGHVFULEHGDVEHLQJµséquestrés¶. Within the 
circle of the von Gerlach family, the father may seem to pull the strings; 
but what the play then reveals is how von Gerlach is not the chief puppet 
master ± rather, he is perhaps the greatest séquestré of them all, a mere 
pawn controlled by the ruthless systems which created him. Indeed, the 
business von Gerlach created himself KDVFRPHWRFRQWUROKLPµ,O\DEHDX
temps que je ne décide plus rien. -HVLJQHOHFRXUULHU¶SA, p. 22), he 
confesses. EYHQDIWHUYRQ*HUODFK¶VGHDWKWKHOLEHUDWLRQRIWKHUHPDLQLQJ 
characters is not assured; the influence of these authoritarian systems on 
von Gerlach has entered the family household, passed on through the 
IDWKHU¶VPLPHWLFUXOH7KHUHLVQRFOHDUHUH[DPSOHRIWKLVLGHRORJLFDO
infiltration than when the daughter, LeniWDNHV)UDQW]¶VSODFHDWWKHHQGRI
WKHSOD\DQGORFNVKHUVHOILQKLVURRPµ,OIDXWXQVpTXHVWUpOj-haut. Ce 
VHUDPRL¶SA, p. 221), she says. Nevertheless, one would be mistaken to 
conclude that there is no room for WKHSHUVRQDOFUHDWLRQRIRQH¶VIXWXUe or 
values at all. The reality concerning ethical norms just is this paradoxical 
two-sidedness. One is VWLOOµFRQGHPQHG¶WRPDNHchoices (EH, p. 39), 
however, instances of personal creativity with respect to moral values are 
not guaranteed to be applicable beyond the situation in which they were 
originally made. 
 
                                         
60 Stone and Bowman (1986), p. 198. 
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Despite their very different approaches, Sartre and Camus can therefore 
both be understood as illustrating the dialectical nature of ethics. This then 
allows a direct parallel to be drawn with MarFHOZKRDUJXHVWKDWµOHSRLQW
GHYXHGLDOHFWLTXHHVWOHSRLQWGHYXHGHO¶H[SpULHQFH¶JM, p. 144), and 
who WKHUHIRUHµ>V¶LQFOLQH@jFRQFHQWUHU>VD@réflexion sur les anomalies que 
WRXWUDWLRQDOLVPHHVFDPRWH¶JM, p. x). As suggested by the discourse on 
the impossibility of absolute judgement LQ0DUFHO¶VSOD\VFoncepts such as 
good and evil are merely the result of an arbitrary dissection of experience, 
so that is does not actually make sense to talk of anything or anyone as 
GHFLGHGO\µJRRG¶RUµHYLO¶. As Marcel writes in his Journal métaphysiqueµ[Le 
SUREOqPH@VHSUpVHQWHVRXVODIRUPHG¶XQHTXHVWLRQSRUWDQWVXUXQH
relation entre des termes distincts; mais les termes eux-mêmes ne sont 
distincts que parce que le problème est posé¶(JM, p. 25). It is therefore 
wrong to reify these notions and view paradoxes as definitively 
problematic; instead, the realm of le problème must be transcended and 
the more elusive mystère of existence embraced.61 It is for this reason that 
3DVFDO¶VFRQYHUVLRQFRLQFLGHVZLWKWKHrealization that he must accept 
µO¶LQVpFXULWpDEVROXH¶RR, p. 146). 
 
But what of the problem of pessimism identified in Section 2.1? The above 
analysis may have helped to elucidate the notion of authenticity, linking it 
to an acceptance of the dialectical nature of existence; but the question as 
to the possibility of this authenticity still remains. Indeed, the theatrical 
works of all three emphasize nothing but the difficulty, if not impossibility, 
of overthrowing the temptation to objectify. It has been suggested, for 
example, that /HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQDsucceeds in conveying the true 
ambiguity of reality; and yet the ending of the play has only ever been 
regarded as pessimistic. So in this respect, the play is decidedly 
                                         
61 Thus Marcel goes even further than Sartre when arguing for the transcendence of 
contradiction. 
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unambiguous. If the systems which GRPLQDWHWKHDFWLRQVRIWKHSOD\¶V
characters are, in the end, shown to succeed, how then is the play able to 
demonstrate the two-sidedness of norms? 
 
It is my belief that there is a further ambiguity which needs to be brought 
to the fore, specifically in relation to the ending of /HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD, 
which uncovers a possibility for optimism and thereby reinstates the 
GLDOHFWLFDOLQ6DUWUH¶VWKHDWUH7RYLHZWKHSOD\¶VHQGLQJDVHQWLUHO\QHJDWLYH
rests on an interpretation of the play which centres on Frantz and his 
father, focusing on their joint suicide and the tragedy of the fact that, for 
them, this seems the only action open to them. However, this is not how 
the play ends for all of the characters. Out of the three von Gerlach 
children, Frantz is FOHDUO\WKHIDYRXULWHLQGHHGWKHHQWLUHW\RIWKHSOD\¶V
DFWLRQLVGULYHQE\YRQ*HUODFK¶VEXUQLQJGHVLUHWREHUHXQLWHGZLWKKLV
eldest son before he dies. Consequently, )UDQW]¶V\RXQJHUEURWKHU:HUQHU
is on a continual quest to prove his worth to his father,62 which causes 
strain in his relationship with his wife Johanna. But the ending of the play 
actually marks a liberation with respect to Werner and Johanna, as Werner 
LVUHOHDVHGIURPWKLVQHHGWRWU\DQGEHµWKHSHUIHFWVRQ¶ through absolute 
devotion to his father.63 :HUQHUDQG-RKDQQD¶VVLWXDWLRQLVQRWLPPHGLDWHO\
hopeful, as their relationship deteriorates progressively throughout the 
SOD\+RZHYHUWKHSOD\¶VHQGLQJLVQHYHUWKHOHVVOHIWRSHQDVIDUDVWKH\
are concerned, leaving room for speculation about their particular situation 
and the options available to them. Thus, a possibility for optimism remains. 
This possibility is UHLQIRUFHGE\6DUWUH¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWµ4XDQGMHSDUOHGH
O¶DPELJXwWpGHQRWUHWHPSVMHYHX[GLUHSDUOjTXHMDPDLVO¶KRPPHQ¶DpWp
DXVVLSUrWTX¶DXMRXUG¶KXLjFRQTXpULUVDOLEHUWp¶± HYHQWKRXJKµLOVHWURXYH
                                         
62 Being the only daughter, Leni is not so deprived of her IDWKHU¶VDWWHQWLRQZKLOVWYRQ*HUODFK
is dismissive of Werner altogether, he does have a soft spot for Leni. However, Leni is still in a 
GLIIHUHQWµFDWHJRU\¶WR)UDQW]LQWHUPVRIYRQ*HUODFK¶VDIIHFWLRQV 
63 µ3qUHMHYRXVDSSURXYHVDQVUpVHUYH¶SA, p. 55). 
 95 
HQPrPHWHPSVSORQJpGDQVOHVFRPEDWVOHVSOXVJUDYHV¶TS, p. 366). It 
is then FRQVROLGDWHGDOOWKHPRUHE\6DUWUH¶VGHFODUDWLRQWKDW he would have 
liked to develop the character of Werner further: 
-¶DXUDLs YRXOXTX¶LOUHSUpVHQWHMXVTX¶jODILQODSRVVLELOLWpG¶XQFKRL[64 
>«@Sa libération, précisément à cause de la mort de son père et de 
son frère, lui donne la possibilité de penser sa vie à neuf, même sa vie 
avec JohanQD&¶HVWDLQVLTX¶HWpWpODSHUVRQQDOLWpGH:HUQHUVLRQ
P¶DYDLWGRQQpFLQTKHXUHVGHUHSUpVHQWDWLRQ 
(TS, p. 407) 
 
But even without the additional scenes there is still an element of 
ambiguity at the end of the play. Werner¶V DQG-RKDQQD¶VXQGHWHUPLQHG
IXWXUHFDQWKHQDFWDVDFRXQWHUEDODQFHWR/HQL¶VVHTXHVWUDWLRQDQGWKXV
the contrast which the ending sets up between these two different stances 
FDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVDQLOOXVWUDWLRQRI6DUWUH¶VHWKLFDOSDUDGR[DQGWKH
two-sidedness of norms. So not only is it important to pay attention to the 
multitude of voices in Marcel¶V DQG&DPXV¶WKHDWUHLQRUGHUWRIXOO\
DSSUHFLDWHWKHLUSKLORVRSKLFDOFRQWHQWWKHVDPHDSSOLHVWR6DUWUH¶VSOD\V
as well. 
 
It is for this reason that McCall believes Huis clos to be SDUWUH¶VWKHDWULFDO
masterpiece: µ>Huis clos] is the only Sartrean play to contend successfully 
with thHSUREOHPRIGUDPDWLFODQJXDJH¶65 that is, its rhetorical didacticism. 
Huis clos¶ mastery lies in the impossibility of reducing the play to the 
perspective of one main character and thus, for McCall, Sartre has 
VXFFHHGHGLQµWUDQVODW>LQJ@SKLORVRSK\LQWRGUDPDWLFIRUP¶66 Although 
Sartre did not state anything directly analogous to Marcel or Camus 
regarding the importance of all FKDUDFWHUV¶SRVLWLRQVLQKLVliterary works, 
his success regarding Huis clos¶ dynamic structure can be seen as 
representative of a similar aim. 6DUWUH¶VFULWLFLVPRIWKHRPQLVFLHQWQDUUDWRU
                                         
64 7KLVµSRVVLELOLWpG¶XQFKRL[¶LVH[SUHVVHGWRVRPHH[WHQWLQWKHSOD\VXFKDVZKHQ-RKDQQD
VD\VµWerner, le tour est joué. $QRXVGHFKRLVLU¶SA, p. 34). 
65 McCall, p. 125. 
66 ibid., p. 111. 
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LQ0DXULDF¶VZRUNVis also indicative of this. Sartre disagreed that there 
could be any absolutHµWUXWK¶FRQFHUQLQJa certain succession of events and 
their significance. However, for Sartre, µl¶LQWURGXFWLRQGHODYpULWpDEVROXH
ou point de vue de Dieu, dans un roman est une double erreur 
WHFKQLTXH¶:67 µun roman est une action racontée de différents points de 
YXH¶DQG VRLQRUGHUWRDYRLGDQ\ELDVRUSDUWLDOLW\µchacune de ces 
LQWHUSUpWDWLRQVGRLWrWUHHQPRXYHPHQW¶.68  
 
Section 2.1 GHVFULEHGKRZ0DUFHODWWDFNHG6DUWUH¶VDFFRXQWRIKXPDQ
relations for its representation of an insurmountable gap between the self 
DQGRWKHUV6DUWUH¶VDFFRXQWZDVDGHQLJUDWLRQRIêtre owing to its refusal 
to promote the possibility of dialogue between human beings,69 and for 
Marcel, intersubjectivity was the true meaning of être. However, not only 
has the possibility for optimism just been demonstrated with respect to 
human relations in /HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD; a similar optimism is also 
present at the end of Le Diable et le bon dieu. Goetz and Hilda become a 
couple at the end of the play, thereby suggesting that, for Sartre as well as 
for Marcel, intersubjectivity is pivotal to authenticity and the future 
possibility of freedom. Both Le Diable et le bon dieu and Les Séquestrés 
G¶$OWRQD emphasize WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VQHHGWRrecognize and communicate 
with others as a prerequisite for any form of authenticity. Referring to the 
IDLOXUHRI*RHW]¶VSURMHFWWRGR*RRG&KDPSLJQ\ZULWHV 
*RHW]¶VGLDORJXHZLWKPHQKDVSURYHGDIDLOXUH>«@*RHW]UHWXUQVWR
his old ways: a dialogue with God. God is a much more agreeable 
interlocutor. He remains absent from the stage, and one can make Him 
VD\ZKDWHYHURQHZLVKHV+LPWR>«@ 
 
(Champigny (1968), p. 121) 
 
                                         
67 Jean-3DXO6DUWUHµ0)UDQoRLV0DXULDFHWODOLEHUWp¶in his Situations I: essais critiques 
([Paris] : Gallimard, 1947), p. 47; my emphasis. 
68 ibid., p. 46. 
69 µ/jRDXFXQHUpSRQVHQ¶HVWSRVVLEOHLOQ¶\DSODFHTXHSRXUOH³OXL´¶JM, p. 138). 
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Neither oIWKHVHDOOHJHGµGLDORJXHV¶KDV involved any real communication or 
contact with the world, thereby excluding the possibility of authentic 
action. 6LPLODUO\)UDQW]¶VFRQILQHPHQWLQ/HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQDisolates 
and cuts him off from reality; he invents creatures (crabs) in his mind, to 
whom he justifies himself, highlighting his need for others while at the 
same time, as McCall notes, the inhumanity of his self in this sequestered 
state, as pointed to by the FUDEV¶LQKXPDQIRUP70 
 
7RYLHZ6DUWUH¶VSRVLWLRQRQKXPDQUHODWLRQVDVGLDPHWULFDOO\RSSRVHGWR
WKDWRI0DUFHOEHFDXVHRILWVµVSHFWDWRUVKLS¶is therefore a rather superficial 
judgement, which rests on a very literal interpretation of the Sartrean 
analysis of le regard, and of the FKDSWHURQµOHVUHODWLRQVFRQFUqtes avec 
DXWUXL¶LQ/¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW. The same can be said regarding the criticism 
that has been directed at Huis clos, in response to which Sartre felt that he 
had been grossly misunderstood: 
/HVJHQVRQWG¶DLOOHXUVWUqVPDOFRPSULVFHTXHM¶DYDLVYRXOXGLUHFDU
RQV¶HVWVXUWRXWJUDYpGDQVODPpPRLUHTXHµO¶HQIHUF¶HVWOHVDXWUHV¶± 
ce qui voudrait dire que nous devons passer notre temps à être chacun 
OHERXUUHDXGHO¶DXWUH&HQ¶HVWSRXUWDQWSDVGXWRXWFHTXHM¶DLYRXOX
dire. 
(TS, p. 405) 
 
As Jeanson emphasizeVWKHµVLWXDWLRQmorte¶RIWKHFKDUDFWHUVPXVWQRWEH
ignored.71 -HDQVRQH[SODLQVµOHIDLWG¶³rWUHPRUWV´G¶rWUH³HQHQIHU´VRQW
directement applicables à cette mort vivante à quoi se condamnent les 
KRPPHVORUVTX¶LOVUHQLHQWOHXUSURSUHOLEHUWpHWV¶HIIRUFHQWGHQLHUFHOOHGH
OHXUVVHPEODEOHV¶72 But this is not to say that other kinds of human 
relations are impossible. The play is only an analysis of the potential for 
conflict, given the human need for objectification and the first-person 
perspective that constitutes our most immediate view of the world, which 
                                         
70 McCall, p. 143. 
71 Jeanson (1955), p. 27. 
72 ibid., p. 26. 
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can make the self feel like an isolated reality; Huis clos is not a description 
of a universal, eternal human condition.  
 
,QIDFW6DUWUH¶VSRVLWLRQLQ/¶(WUHHWOHQpDQWseems to be rather 
misunderstood in general. In Cahiers pour une morale Sartre writes: µIls 
me disent: >«@/¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW est unHRQWRORJLHG¶DYDQWODFRQYHUVLRQ¶73 
and indeed, there are many instances where /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQWis referred 
to as if it were a complete ontology which Sartre later overthrows. 
Champigny, for example, RYHUO\ULJLGLILHV6DUWUH¶VPRUDOWKRXJKWLQ/¶(WUH
et le néant when he UHIHUVWRµWKHIDLOXUHRI>/¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW¶V@RQWRORJ\
>LQJHQHUDO@WRSURYLGHXVZLWKDYDOLGFRQFHSWRIPRUDOV¶74 in a recent 
article Jones questions whether later discussions of human relations, such 
as those in Cahiers pour une morale, DUHµFRPSDWLEOH¶ZLWK6DUWUH¶VHDUOLHU
account in /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW;75 and =KHQJ¶VDQDO\VLVRI$QGHUVRQ¶V6DUWUH¶V
Two Ethics describes Anderson as arguing that /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW¶V entire 
ontology is to be rejected in authenticity.76 In my opinion however, this 
ZDVQRW$QGHUVRQ¶Vposition. $QGHUVRQ¶Vprincipal DLPZDVWRWUDFH6DUWUH¶V
ethical thought as it was formed and reformed over his lifetime, and to 
understand the reasons behind its evolution so that his moral philosophy 
might be understood in terms of a coherent progression.77 
 
=KHQJ¶VFULWLFLVP mistakenly targets $QGHUVRQ¶VDQDO\VLVRI /¶(WUHHWOH
néant¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIDXWKHQWLFLW\ZKDWKLVDUJXPHQWUHDOO\UHYHDOVLVWKH
                                         
73 Jean-Paul Sartre, Cahiers pour une morale (hereafter CPM), (Paris : Gallimard, 1983 
[composed: 1947-8]), p. 13. 
74 Champigny (1968), p. 9. 
75 7KRPDV-RQHVµ8VHOHVV3DVVLRQV"¶LQGiles, James (ed.), French Existentialism: 
Consciousness, Ethics and Relations with Others (Amsterdam : Rodopi, 1999), p. 175. 
76 <LZHL=KHQJµ6DUWUHRQDXWKHQWLFLW\¶Sartre Studies International, VIII, no. 2 
(December, 2002), accessed online, 
<http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-10060326_ITM> [accessed 30 
November 2006] 
77 ,QGHHGLQKLVERRN$QGHUVRQFRQWLQXHVWRQRWHFRQWLQXLW\LQ6DUWUH¶VODWHUZRUNVZLWK/¶(WUH
et le néant. FRUH[DPSOHµLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWLQWKHDUHDRIKXPDQUHODWLRQVKLSVWKH
Critique remains in some important respects within the parameters of Being and Nothingness¶
(Anderson, p. 102). 
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unsatisfactory nature of Sartre¶VQRWLRn of authenticity at this time. But 
Sartre by no means declared /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW¶VDQDO\VLV to be complete, 
and as was mentioned in Section 1, Sartre himself later declared that he 
was not content with the analysis it gave. Yet, even at the time Sartre 
recognized the need for further development ± particularly with respect to 
ethics. Noting that the emphasis in /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQWwas on conflict and 
inauthenticity, Sartre consequently announced that another work would be 
needed in order to address all the questions which arose regarding the 
nature of authenticity.78 6DUWUH¶Vlater ethical discussions should therefore 
be understood as a response to, and projections beyond his early work; 
/¶(WUHHWOHQpDQWµODLVVHHQWUHYRLU>«@FHTXHsera une éthique qui prendra 
ses responsabilités en face G¶XQHréalité-humaine en situation¶EN, pp. 
673-4; first italics my emphasis), but this situating of the individual had yet 
to be fully developed. 
 
Marcel was right to argue that the ego DQGLWVVSHFWDWRU¶VYLHZZDs an 
obstacle to authentic action but, as has just been demonstrated, this is 
precisely what Sartre himself argued. It must also be noted that Marcel 
recognized the inevitability of considering others as lui/elle before any 
relationship with an Other as toi could develop.79 This is only reinforced by 
the characters in his plays, most of whom have no such reciprocal relations 
with others at all. And even though the relationship between Simon and 
tante Léna (SC) appears to embody the intersubjective understanding that 
Marcel wished to advocate, it is significant that neither Simon nor tante 
Léna shares such a relationship with other characters. Intersubjectivity is a 
two-way relation, requiring the disponibilité RIERWKSDUWLHVLI0DUFHO¶V
theoretical writings strive to emphasize the possibility for such disponibilité, 
                                         
78 µToutes ces questions, qui nous renvoient à la réflexion pure et non complice, ne peuvent 
trouver leur réponse que sur le terrain moral. Nous y cRQVDFUHURQVXQSURFKDLQRXYUDJH¶ (EN, 
p. 676). 
79 See JM, p. 208, for example. 
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the same does not apply in his theatre, which displays only a predominant 
lack of successful inter-personal relations. 
 
With respect to Sartre, Barnes argues that a more positive role should in 
fact be attributed to the ego in his works. Barnes contends: µWKHHJRLVQRW
only a possible trap and an evasion; it is also the instrument that allows 
Sartrean comprehension WRIXQFWLRQ¶80 Importantly, Barnes notes that 
6DUWUH¶VGLVFXVVLRQVRIUHFiprocity and authentic love in his Cahiers pour 
une morale state that although the objectification of the Other makes 
hostility and oppression possible, conflict is not the inevitable consequence. 
µ7KHDXWKHQWLFHQFRXQWHURIIUHHGRPV¶DV%DUQHVSKUDVHVLWVWLOORFFXUVYLD
objectification, in that what the self understands of the Other is defined by 
the ego, body, and bodily expressions with which it is confronted.81 But if 
this allows the self to comprehend what the Other is, such objectification 
also enables the self to comprehend what the Other is not. Consequently, 
WKHVHOILVDEOHWRVLWXDWHWKH2WKHU¶VH[LVWHQFHDQGXQGHUVWDQGWKHLU
character not only in terms of their conditioning, but also in terms of the 
possibles which are open to them. Barnes argues: 
7KHRWKHU¶VERG\DQGWKHRWKHU¶VHJRDUHWRPH what he is. It is 
through them that I involve myself. But I do not thereby limit him to 
being only what he is. Through his body and ego, as expressions of his 
FRQVFLRXVQHVV,FRPSUHKHQGWKHRWKHUµLQWHUPVRIKLVHQWHUSULVHWKDW
is, in terms of what he LVQRW¶0\DZDUHQHVVRIWKHRWKHUDVERG\DQG
as ego does not ensure my respect for him as subject, but here is the 
only pathway to such recognition.  
 
(Aronson and Van den Hoven, p. 157) 
 
Thus, there is no essential link between objectification and inauthenticity; 
WKHVHOI¶VOLPLWHGDFFHVVWRWKHOther does not automatically imply a denial 
RIWKH2WKHU¶VIUHHGRPIRUDOWKRXJKWKH2WKHU¶Vego will always be 
something that is taken into account, this is not to say that it cannot be 
grasped in terms of a project in the making. As Sartre writes in Cahiers 
                                         
80 Hazel Barnes, µ7KH5ROHRIWKH(JRLQ5HFLSURFLW\¶LQ$URQVRQ and Van den Hoven, p. 152. 
81 Aronson and Van den Hoven, p. 157. 
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pour une moraleµ6LQRXVDYRQVDVVXPpOHIDLWG¶rWUHOLEHUWpHWREMHWSRXU
DXWUXL>«@LOQ¶\DSOXVDXFXQHUDLVRQRQWRORJLTXHGHUHVWHUVXUOHSODQGHOD
lutte. -¶DFFHSWHPRQrWUHREMHWHWMHOHGpSDVVH¶ (CPM, p. 26). So both 
Sartre and Marcel argue for the need to transcend the initial dualistic 
outlook of the self, and strive to enter into dialogue with other human 
beings. 
 
As regards Camus, if, DV0DUJHUULVRQEHOLHYHVµ&DPXVGHFOLQHVDGLDORJXH
with his audience, denying them sufficient information to participate 
DFWLYHO\LQWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLYHSURFHVV¶82 this is not to say that Camus did 
not consider dialogue to be important.83 On the contrary, Camus argues 
WKDWµLOQ¶\DSDVGHYLHVDQVGLDORJXH¶Ess, p. 401) ± a phrase reminiscent 
of the Marcellian understanding of être DQGRXUµVXE-KXPDQ¶VWDWXVZLWKRXW
such intersubjective dialogue ± and all of his plays express this need for 
genuine communication. Le Malentendu provides what is perhaps the 
clearest exaPSOHWDNLQJDVLPLODUDSSURDFKWR0DUFHO¶VSOD\V/¶(PLVVDLUH
in particular) in presenting a clear absence of communication, which is then 
explicitly lamented by Maria (and by Clément in /¶(PLVVDLUH) in order to 
advocate the human need for dialogue. Camus writes in his Carnets: 
6LOHKpURVGX0DOHQWHQGXDYDLWGLWµ9RLOj&¶HVWPRLHWMHVXLVYRWUH
ILOV¶OHGLDORJXHétait possible et non plus en porte à faux comme dans 
ODSLqFH,OQ¶\DYDLWSOXVGHWUDJpGLHSXLVTXHOHVRPPHWGHWRXWHVOHV
tragédies est dans la surdité des héros. 
(C II, p. 161) 
The importance of dialogue is also argued for in /¶(WDWGHVLqJH when, for 
H[DPSOHWKHFKRUXVSURQRXQFHWKDWµQRWUHF°XUUHIXVHOHVLOHQFH¶ES, pp. 
116-DQGZKHQ'RUDTXHVWLRQVWKHDXWKHQWLFLW\RIWKHµORYH¶Griving the 
JURXS¶VUHYROXWLRQDU\DFWLRQVLQLes Justesµ>HOOHVH@GHPDQGHVLO¶DPRXU
                                         
82 Hughes, p. 75. 
83 It must be noted that even if &DPXV¶ theatre provided no opportunity for audience 
participation, the rehearsal and production of his theatrical works did constitute such 
participation for Camus and his fellow actors. Indeed, this is why Camus valued theatre so 
KLJKO\µ3RXUPRL>«@OHWKpkWUHP¶RIIUHODFRPPXQDXWpGRQWM¶DLEHVRLQ¶TRN, p. 1723). 
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Q¶HVWSDVDXWUHFKRVHV¶LOSHXWFHVVHUG¶rWUHXQPRQRORJXHHWV¶LOQ¶\DSDV
XQHUpSRQVHTXHOTXHIRLV¶LJ, p. 84).  
 
µ/HSURJUqVHWODJUDQGHXUYUDLHHVWGDQVOHGLDORJXHjKDXWHXUG¶KRPPHHW
QRQGDQVO¶pYDQJLOHPRQRORJXpHWGLFWpGXKDXWG¶XQHPRQWDJQHVROLWDLUH¶
(C II, p. 162), states Camus. Rather than focus too closely on the contrast 
between Sartre¶V DQG&DPXV¶DWKHLVPDQG0DUFHO¶VUHOLJLRXVSHUVSHFWLYH
then, might we not instead understand Sartre¶V DQG&DPXV¶UHMHFWLRQRI
God as representing a more general criticism of dogmatism and action in 
the name of absolutes? Hanna and Onimus in fact blur the boundary 
between the religious and the atheistic when they assert their belief that 
&DPXV¶IXQGDPHQWDOFRQFHUQVare of a religious nature,84 and East argues: 
µ&DPXVQHV¶HVWMDPDLVLQVWDOOpGHIDoRQFRQIRUWDEOHGDQVVRQLQFUR\DQFH
HWPrPHV¶LOUHIXVH'LHXLOVHSRVHQpDQPRLQVGHVTXHVWLRQVVXU'LHX¶85 
Indeed, in his Carnets Camus summarizes the significance of his work as 
IROORZVµ6HQVGHPRQ°XYUHWDQWG¶KRPPHVVRQWSULYpVGHODJUkFH
&RPPHQWYLYUHVDQVODJUkFH"¶C II, p. 129). Camus never renounces God 
in the same categorical way as Sartre, choosing to focus instead on the 
problem of suffering. As was noted with respect to the ending of Le 
Malentendu, for Camus it is still possible that God might exist; what is not 
possible is that God simultaneously incarnates the attributes traditionally 
assigned to Him, given the suffering that exists in the world: µ'HYDQW'LHX
LO\DPRLQVXQSUREOqPHGHODOLEHUWpTX¶XQSUREOqPHGXPDO>«@RXQRXV
ne sommes pas libres et Dieu tout-puissant est responsable du mal. Ou 
                                         
84 µ7KH³KHDUWRIWKHSUREOHP´LQ&DPXVLV³UHOLJLRXV´LIRQHUHIHUVE\WKLVWHUPWRZKDWLVDW
the origin of religions: existential anguish, the sense of guilt, the horror of death, the 
atrocious experience of the Absurd¶(Jean Onimus, Albert Camus and Christianity (Alabama : 
University of Alabama Press, 1970), p. 4); 
µ7RFKDUDFWHUL]e Camus as a religious-moral philosopher means to say that his preoccupation 
is with questions of the nature and meaning of men, their hopes, their possibilities, and their 
GHVWLQ\¶7KRPDV/+DQQDµ$OEHUW&DPXVDQGWKH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK¶LQ*HUPDLQH%UpHHG 
Camus: A Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1962), p. 48). 
85 East, p. 44. It is interesting that, as a Catholic, Bernard East is still able to identify with 
&DPXV¶WKRXJKWWRthe extent that he does in this work. 
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QRXVVRPPHVOLEUHVHWUHVSRQVDEOHVPDLV'LHXQ¶HVWSDVWRXW-SXLVVDQW¶
(MS, p. 81). 
 
As regards Sartre, Ric°ur suggests an interpretation whereby the question 
of the existence of God raised in Le Diable et le bon dieu merely transposes 
SUREOHPVRIRXURZQDJHRQWRWKHSOD\¶VSDUWLFXODUKLVWRULFDOVHWWLQJVR
that GoGDQGWKH'HYLOEHFRPHµWKHILJXUDWLRQRIDQHWKLFDOQRWRID
UHOLJLRXVSUREOHP¶86 $V2¶'RQRKRH¶VDQDO\VLVRI*RHW]¶VµFRQYHUVLRQ¶IURP
µ(YLO¶WRµ*RRG¶FLWHGLQ6HFWLRQ) shows, Goetz can be understood as 
embodying the contradictions of this particular historical moment. Throwing 
the dice so that God can determine his course of action and yet deciding to 
cheat, thereby determining the outcome himself, illustrates the paradoxical 
middle ground between reliance on a pre-established order and choosing a 
coXUVHRIDFWLRQIRURQH¶VVHOI,PSRUWDQWO\IRU6DUWUH3URWHVWDQWLVP¶V
liberation implied a transferral of responsibility from authoritative 
mediators such as bishops and priests to the individual believer, who then 
became entirely accountable for their acWLRQV*RHW]¶VILQDOFRQYHUVLRQZLWK
its overt assertion of atheism, can therefore primarily be understood in this 
light. In contrast to Heinrich, whose faith is purely a mechanism and 
welcomed reinforcement of bad faith,87 *RHW]¶VUHMHFWLRQRI*RGLV
indicative of how he recognizes the responsibility he has for his actions, 
and of a desire to embrace the freedom he realizes he possesses. So 
DOWKRXJK6DUWUH¶V([LVWHQWLDOLVPLVQRPLQDOO\DWKHLVWLF6DUWUHLVQRW
especially interested in the existence of God per se. As he writes in his 
Carnets de la drôle de guerre (composed 1939-µ4XH'LHXH[LVWHRX
                                         
86 3DXO5LF°ur, µ6DUWUH¶V/XFLIHUDQG7KH/RUG¶Yale French Studies, XIV (1954), p. 87. 
87 µ6L'LHXQ¶H[LVWHSDVSOXVPR\HQG¶pFKDSSHUDX[KRPPHV>«@1RWUH3qUHTXLrWHs aux 
FLHX[M¶DLPHPLHX[rWUHMXJpSDUXQrWUHLQILQLTXHSDUPHVpJDX[¶DBD, p. 239). As a 
SDUDOOHOWR*RHW]¶VµGLDORJXHV¶ZLWK*RG+HLQULFKLQIDFWFRQYHUVHVZLWKKLVRZQDevil in order 
to confirm his chosen reality ± that is, unreality ± of Being. 
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Q¶H[LVWHSDVODPRUDOHHVWXQHDIIDLUH ³HQWUHKRPPHV´HW'LHXQ¶DSDVj\
PHWWUHVRQQH]¶88 
 
*RHW]¶VDWWHPSWed dialogue with God is not only shown to prevent him 
from being in communication with others, but also himself, as illustrated by 
*RHW]¶VXQGHUO\LQJXQFHUWDLQW\DERXWWKHUHDOLW\RI the various identities he 
tries WRHPERG\µ-HPHGHPDQGDLVjFKDTXHPLQXWHFHTXHMHSRXYDLVêtre 
aux yeux de Dieu. A préVHQWMHFRQQDLVODUpSRQVHULHQ>«@'LHXF¶HVWOD
VROLWXGHGHVKRPPHV¶DBD, pp. 237-8). Indeed, one ought to question the 
H[WHQWWRZKLFKRQH¶VVHOILVDQ\OHVVHOXVLYHWKDQWKDWRIWKH2WKHUIRUas 
demonstrated particularly well by Huis clos, objectification is just as much 
DSUREOHPZLWKUHVSHFWWRRQH¶VVHOIDVLWLVZLWKUHVSHFWWRRWKHUSHRSOH
Sartre consequently argues: 
OHVDXWUHVVRQWDXIRQGFHTX¶LO\DGHSOXVLPSRUWDQWHQQRXV-mêmes 
pour notre propre connaissance de nous-mêmes. Quand nous pensons 
sur nous, quand nous essayons de nous connaître, au fond nous usons 
des connaissances que les autres ont déjà sur nous.  
(TS, p. 282) 
 
0DUFHODUJXHVDQDOPRVWLGHQWLFDOSRLQWZKHQKHZULWHVµOHVPR\HQVSDU
lesquels nous communiquons avec nous-mêmes ne sont pas vraiment 
GLIIpUHQWVGHFHX[TXLQRXVSHUPHWWHQWGHFRPPXQLTXHUDYHFOHVDXWUHV¶
(JM, pp. 174-DQGWKHGLIILFXOW\RIFRPPXQLFDWLRQZLWKRQH¶VVHOIDVZHOO
as with others is equally emphasized in his plays. µ&¶HVWFHODTXLHVW
LQWROpUDEOH>«] nous ne communiquons même plus avec nous même [sic]¶
(E, p. 98), says Sylvie in /¶(PLVVDLUH. In 5RPHQ¶HVWSOXVGDQV5RPH Pascal 
then illustrates how a more authentic understanding of RQH¶V situation is 
necessary if any form of genuine action is to be possible; it is only when 
Pascal ceases to act pour-autrui and turns his attention towards himself 
that he achieves any lucidity. And a similar emphasis on the importance of 
UHVROYLQJWKHVHOI¶Vinner conflict is also voiced by Camus in /¶(WDWGHVLqJH: 
                                         
88 Jean-Paul Sartre, Les Carnets de la drôle de guerre: novembre 1939 - mars 1940 ([Paris] 
: Gallimard, 1983), p. 138. 
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DIEGO µ4X¶DL-MHGRQFjYDLQFUHHQFHPRQGHVLQRQO¶LQMXVWLFHTXL
QRXVHVWIDLWH¶ 
 
VICTORIA µ/HPDOKHXUTXLHVWHQWRL(WOHUHVWHVXLYUD 
(ES, p. 134)89 
 
It is on this account WKDW0DUFHO¶VSRVLWLRQFDQbe defended against 
accusations that his philosophy is one of interiority, having no contribution 
to make to the social dimension of ethics. $VKHVD\VWR5LF°XU in an 
interviewµRQFRPPHWWUDLWXQHHUUHXUSURIRQGHXQHHUUHXUH[WUrPHPHQW
JUDYHHQSUpWHQGDQWTXHPDSHQVpHV¶HVWYUDLPHQWFRQFHQWUée G¶XQHIDçon 
H[FOXVLYHVXUODYLHLQWpULHXUHHWVXUWRXWFHTXLV¶\UDWWDFKH¶EPR, p. 99). 
6RFLDOFRQFHUQVLQIDFWXQGHUSLQWKHHQWLUHW\RI0DUFHO¶VWKRXJKW. However, 
as the rigidity of specific moral principles immediately abstracts their 
content from reality and its ambiguity, Marcel believes that ethical 
authenticity cannot be dictated and imposed from an exterior source; 
rather, it must begin with the self. 
 
Consequently, it no longer makes sense to talk about the possibility of 
authenticity in general, as this would assume that there is some definable 
VWDWHRIEHLQJZKLFKFRXOGEHGHVFULEHGDVµDXWKHQWLF¶WKHVLWXDWLRQDO
dependency and dialectical nature of ethics that all three philosophers 
argue for excludes such a conception from the start. 6DUWUHZULWHVµIl faut 
la tensionPDLQWHQLUOHVGHX[IDFHVGHO¶DPELJXwWp>«@,OQ¶\DSDVGH
V\QWKqVHGRQQpHjDWWHLQGUH¶CPM, p. 430). To see differences in 
perspective and contradictions within Existentialist ethical thought as a 
genuine problem regarding ExistentiDOLVP¶Vapproach to ethics is therefore 
to misunderstand its message entirely: all three playwrights demonstrate 
that questions of morality are something lived, not a set of problems for 
reason and logic to solve. If characters in their plays struggle with the 
paradoxical, this is only a direct illustration of the dialectical nature of 
                                         
89 Camus also writes in his Carnets: µ&HQ¶HVWSDVOHPRQGHTX¶LOV¶DJLWGHUHIDLUHPDLV
O¶KRPPH¶C II, p. 148). 
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ethical norms and the ethical angoisse this brings, an incarnation of the 
drame humain that is the very essence of their drama. And whilst 
SDUDGR[HVDUHQRWLQKHUHQW&DPXV¶Wheatre as they are in that of Sartre 
and Marcel, they are nevertheless implicit in their absence. The intra-
tensions and inter-tensions Section 2.1 identified in Existentialist ethical 
thought also convey this. Indeed, they could even be said to serve as 
further evidence for the dialectical nature of existence: the point de départ 
for all three is existence and its experience, and this then has the effect of 
producing a dialectic within Existentialist philosophy itself. Rather than 
being seen as negative and grounds for criticism, these inconsistencies can 
therefore be understood as consistent ZLWK([LVWHQWLDOLVP¶VDSSURDFK. Thus, 
conflict within and between the thought of all three thinkers can be 
regarded as founding a dialogue which illustrates their common belief that 
ethics is not about universals but about particulars. 
 
On this interpretation, the further tension created by the theatrical medium 
and the spectatorship it encourages could actually be considered a success, 
as could the tensions concerning the intended message and the received 
message of many of these plays. Neither Marcel, nor Camus, nor Sartre 
would wish the audience to leave the theatre feeling that everything had 
been resolved; their message is precisely that this could never be the case. 
The criticism Section 2.1 VDZ,UHODQGPDNHRI6DUWUH¶VWKHDWUHIDLOVWR
recognize WKHFHQWUDOLPSRUWDQFHRIDPELJXLW\ZLWKUHVSHFWWR6DUWUH¶V
Existentialism as a whole. As Bell emphasized, Sartre discovered that 
ambiguity was something real which needed accepting;90 6DUWUH¶V theatre is 
first and foremost a presentation of this ambiguity. Ireland suggested that 
WKHWHQVLRQVLQ6DUWUH¶VWKHDWUHZHUHLOOXVWUDWLYHRIKRZSartre was unable 
                                         
90 µ)RU6DUWUHDKXPDQEHLQJLVDQDPELJXRXVEHLQJ¶%HOOS2QHRI%HOO¶VPDLQ
DUJXPHQWVFRQFHUQVWKHQHHGWRUHFRJQL]HWKHFHQWUDOLW\RIDPELJXLW\LQ6DUWUH¶VWKRXJKW 
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to µV¶éclipser HWODLVVHUOHVSHFWDWHXUIDFHjIDFHDYHFVRQpSRTXH¶;91 but 
actually, Sartre is confronting spectators with what was, for him, the 
fundamental feature of O¶pSRTXH. ,I6DUWUHIDLOVWRµV¶pFOLSVHU¶ and his own 
ambiguous feelings towards theatre contribute to the ambiguity of his 
plays, in exactly the same way as Camus has been interpreted, this is 
nothing but proof that Sartre was right about the paradoxes that are 
human experience. Contrary to what was suggested in Section 2.1, the 
paradoxical nature of the theatrical medium therefore appears very 
appropriate for voicing Existentialist ethical thought. Thus Marcel 
SURQRXQFHVµ-HGHPHXUHSHUVXDGpTXHF¶HVWGDQVOHGUDPHHWjWUDYHUVOH
drame que la pensée métaphysique se saisit elle-même et se définit in 
concreto¶PA, p. 67).
                                         
91 Ireland, p. 17. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
la symphonie, je ne peux ODFDVVHUQLO¶REMHWGUDPDWLTXH&¶HVWGHOj
TX¶LO>O¶XQLYHUVSUpVHQWp@WLUHVDUpDOLWp 
(TS, p. 96) 
 
This study has revealed DFRPPRQWHQGHQF\WRHTXDWHWKHµPHVVDJH¶RID
play with that of the main protagonist, and critical analyses of theatre and 
its philosophical content often neglect to consider other characters in very 
much detail. However, when considering the ethical significance of 
Existentialist theatre, it is important not to disregard the contribution of 
other characters too hastily. Indeed, an attention to the multiplicity of 
voices in the theatrical works of Marcel, Camus, and Sartre has been 
shown to be crucial for a full appreciation of the ethical thought they 
present - particularly with respect to Camus, for it is only in paying 
attention to the message of other characters that evidence of the 
complexity of his moral philosophy may be found. 
 
Attention paid to the ensemble RI6DUWUH¶VFKDUDFWHUVKDValso helped 
expose the FRQWLQXLW\LQ6DUWUH¶VHWKLFDOWKRXJKWStone and Bowman argue 
that 6DUWUH¶VXQSXEOLVKHGZRUNVIURPWKHV µFRPSHODUH-reading, and 
perhaps a re-LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI6DUWUH¶VZRUNV¶1 They see works such as 
/¶([LVWHQWLDOLVPHHVWXQKXPDQLVPH and Cahiers pour une morale as 
WUDQVLWLRQDOZRUNVEHLQJµFRQFHSWXDOO\WRUQDWWempting, on the one hand, 
WRIXOILOWKHSURPLVHRIDQHWKLFVRILQGLYLGXDO³UDGLFDOFRQYHUVLRQ´LQKHULWHG
from [/¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW], and, on the other, to do justice to social-historical 
FRQGLWLRQLQJ¶, and thus propose that such works might be transitions 
µSUHFLVHO\to GLDOHFWLFDOHWKLFV¶2 Le Diable et le bon dieu has proved to 
represent a similar transition; and the existence of such transitional works 
                                         
1 Stone and Bowman (1986), p. 211. 
2 ibid. 
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WKHUHIRUHPDNHVUHIHUHQFHWRDQ\GHILQDEOHµVWDJHV¶LQ6DUWUH¶VWKRXJKW
misleading. As Contat writes: 
En HIIHWLOQ¶\DSDVGHUXSWXUHGHFRQWLQXLWpHQWUHOHSUHPLHUHWOH
VHFRQG6DUWUH>«@,O\DDXFRQWUDLUHXQGpSDssement et un 
pODUJLVVHPHQW>«@Loin de le contredire, La Critique valide 
rétrospectivement /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW en intégrant dans une 
compréhension plus large, totalisante, une compréhension dont la 
IDLEOHVVHpWDLWG¶rWUHSDUWLHOOH3 
 
7KHUHLVLQIDFWHYLGHQFHWRVXJJHVWWKDW6DUWUH¶VHDUO\HWKLFDOWKRXJKW
was not as individualistic as it is generally portrayed. Goldthorpe argues 
that far fURPEHLQJDQµXQDPELJXRXVWKHVLVSOD\¶ZKRVHFRQWHQWPD\EH
VXPPDUL]HGZLWKWKHVLQJOHOLQHµO¶HQIHUF¶HVWOHV$XWUHV¶HC, p. 93), Huis 
clos¶ context is actually µKLJKO\VSHFLILFDQGUHPHGLDEOH¶4 For Goldthorpe: 
µIt has not been sufficiently recognized that Huis clos presents a triple 
image of the bourgeoisie: the bourgeRLVLQWHOOHFWXDO*DUFLQWKH³SHWLWH
ERXUJHRLVH´ (Inès, employée des postes), and thH³JUDQGHERXUJeRLVH´ 
(Estelle)¶.5 Thus, WKHFKDUDFWHUV¶LQability to recognize themselves (as 
expreVVHGE\(VWHOOH¶Vµ-HPHvois très mal¶HC, p. 46), for example) can 
be elevated to the social level. If Huis clos¶ Hell is situated in a Second 
Empire-style drawing-room, this is no coincidence. For Goldthorpe, the 
prise de conscience that Sartre hoped to induce in his audience is 
VSHFLILFDOO\DERXUJHRLVRQHDQGµDQDPELJXRXVUHIXVDOEHFDXVHWKRVHZKR
indulge in it are ERWK³YLFWLPHV´DQG³FRPSOLFHV´¶6 
 
Stone has argued that /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW¶VWKHRUHWLFDODFFRXQWRIEDGIDLWK is 
also ambiguous, beliHYLQJWKDWµLIZHUH-H[DPLQHVRPHRI6DUWUH¶V
examples we shall find a blurry line between the lie to oneself and the lie to 
DQRWKHU¶7 which then discloses a simultaneous interpersonal origin of bad 
                                         
3 Michel Contat, Explication des Séquestrés d¶$OWRQDGH-HDQ-Paul Sartre (Paris : Archives des 
lettres modernes, no. 89, 1968), pp. 15-16. 
4 Goldthorpe, p. 84. 
5 ibid., p. 92. 
6 ibid., p. 96. 
7 5REHUW96WRQHµ6DUWUHRQ%DG)DLWKDQG$XWKHQWLFLW\¶LQ3DXO$6FKLOSSHGThe 
Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (La Salle, IL. : Open Court, 1981), p. 249. 
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IDLWKHYHQLQWKHQRPLQDOO\µLQGLYLGXDOLVWLF¶/¶(WUHHW le néant, the original 
situation of bad faith is within a social context. Stone sees the role play of 
bad faith as a double performance: a performance that is first and 
foremost an attempt to persuade an Other, so that he/she may confirm the 
reality of this objectified image before it is re-routed back to the self as 
µIDFW¶8 For Stone, pOD\LQJDQ\SDUWLFXODUUROHLVµILUVWDsocial UHDOLW\¶9 and 
VRVLPLODUWR6HFWLRQ¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKHHDUWKO\
crimes of Huis clos¶ characters is too easily dismissed, Stone argues that 
Sartre neglects to give the social contexts which (always) initially set the 
scene for /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW¶VWKHRUHWLFDOGLVFXVVLRQVRIEDGIDLWKdrawing 
on examples such as slaves and masters, jailers, the waiter) the 
recognition they are due. 
 
Section 1.1 introduced the Marcellian method of creuser where, in the 
words of MouniHU0DUFHO¶VWKRXJKWUHSUHVHQWV µXQcheminement plus 
TX¶XQHPLVHHQRUGUH>«@ un déchifrage toujours repris sur place, plus 
TX¶XQSDUFRXUV¶10 Such an approach is also applicable to Camus¶WKRXJKW. 
In a 1955 interview with Nicolas, Camus declared: 
Je peux en tout cas vous dire que tout écrivain se répète en même 
WHPSVTX¶LOSURJUHVVHTXHO¶pYROXWLRQG¶XQHSHQVpHQHVHIDLWSDVHQ
ligne droite, [«@PDLVVHORQXQHVRUWHGHVSLUDOHRODSHQVpHUHSDVVH
SDUG¶DQFLHQVFKHPLQVVDQVFHVVHUGHOHVVXUSORPEHU 
(Ess, p. 1614-15). 
The fact that ambiguity can already be detected in /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQWand in 
Huis clos then allows for a similar interpretation RI6DUWUH¶VZRUN
supporting 6DUWUH¶VDVVHUWLRQLQDQLQWHUYLHZZLWK/pY\WKDWµPDOJUpWRXWMH
VXLVWRXMRXUVUHVWpVXUXQHOLJQHFRQWLQXH¶11 7KDW6DUWUH¶VWKRXJKWHYROYHG
to recognize sociality to a much greater extent cannot be denied; in a 1975 
                                         
8 Schilpp (1981), p. 250. Indeed, even if there is no actual 2WKHUWRDFWIRU*RHW]¶V*RG
+HLQULFK¶V'HYLODQG)UDQW]¶VFUDEVLOOXVWUDWHKRZWKHQRWLRQRIDQ2WKHULVVWLOODQHFHVVLW\ 
9 ibid., p. 251. 
10 Emmanuel Mounier, Introduction aux existentialismes (Paris : Editions Denoël, 1947), p. 
24. 
11 Jean-Paul Sartre, /¶(VSRLUPDLQWHQDQWOHVHQWUHWLHQVGH>HQWUH@-HDQ-Paul Sartre et 
Benny Lévy (Lagrasse : Verdier, 1991), p. 26. 
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interview Sartre himself declared that he did not engage with the dialectic 
until after /¶(WUHHWOHQpDQW.12 But his thought should be seen more as a 
µFRPLQJWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶RIFRPSOH[LWLHVDQGFRQWUDGLFWLRQVRIZKLFKWKHUH
are glimpses from the very beginning.13 6HFWLRQH[SRVHG0DUFHO¶V
RYHUO\ULJLGDQGWKHUHIRUHVXSHUILFLDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI6DUWUH¶VHWKLFDO
thought, which resulted from a failure to see such complexities. As Bell 
UHPDUNVµ3KLORVRSKLFDOUHSXWDWLRQVKDYHEHHQPDGHE\VKRZLQJ6DUWUHWR
be a wildly inconsistent thinker ± sometimes by reading him superficially, 
sometimes by taking what he says out of context, sometimes, as Sartre 
KLPVHOIREVHUYHVE\VWRSSLQJ³WRRVRRQ´DQGQRWIROORZLQJWKH³HYROXWLRQ´
of his philosRSKLFDOWKRXJKW¶14 Yet Sartre himself thought it odd that critics 
studied him in this way.15 Thus it occurs to me that disagreements which 
exist between the ethical positions of Marcel, Camus, and Sartre, might be 
primarily surface misunderstandings, which act to mask an underlying 
agreement in their moral thought. 
 
This totalizing form of analysis reveals how WKHQRWLRQRIµV\PSKRQ\¶LVQRW
only applicable to the theatre of all three Existentialists in terms of a 
µVRXQGLQJWRJHWKHU¶RIWKHFKDUDFWHUV¶different voices, but also in terms of 
symphonic movement.16 As would a musical symphony, both the 
theoretical and the theatrical works of all three revisit and replay motifs 
within different surrounding contexts, creating complexity with the depth 
that is produced. And Camus¶GUDPDWLF°XYUe broadens this further still 
with the symphony of theatrical forms that it constitutes. 
                                         
12 Schilpp (1981), p. 9. 
13 ,QWKHVDPHLQWHUYLHZ6DUWUHGHFODUHGµ,WKLQN,XQGHUZHQWDFRQWLQXRXVHYROXWLRQ
beginning with La Nausée [1938] all the way up to the Critique de la raison dialectique. My 
great discovery was that of the sociality during the war, since to be a solider at the front is 
really to be a victim of a society that keeps you where you do not want to be and gives you 
ODZV\RXGRQ¶WZDQW7KHVRFLDOLW\LVQRWLQLa Nausée, EXWWKHUHDUHJOLPSVHVRILW«¶LELGSS
12-13; my emphasis). 
14 Bell, p. 25. 
15 See the interview in Schilpp (1981), p. 38. 
16 7KLVLQWHUSUHWDWLYHPHWKRGLVLQOLQHZLWK-HDQVRQZKRDWWHPSWVWRµGpJDJHUOHmouvement¶
LQ6DUWUH¶VPRUDOWKRXJKW)UDQFLV-HDQVRQLe Problème moral et la pensée de Sartre (Paris : 
Editions du Myrte, 1947), p. 18). 
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In the introduction it was stated that whether or not these Existentialist 
plays are able to engage with ethics was something to be questioned. 
However, as with discussions about µauthenticity¶ and µinauthenticity¶, what 
has been revealed is that there can be no straightforward answer to this; 
the Existentialist theatre of Marcel, Camus, and Sartre does engage with 
the ethical, and it does not. But I have argued that, in the case of the 
Existentialist ethical thought of all three, this ambiguity is precisely what 
their moral theory expresses, and thus their theatre is entirely 
complementary, if not a further elaboration of their ethical thought. This 
then blurs the boundaries between Existentialist moral µSKLORVRSK\¶DQG
µtheatre¶Thus, in a 1960 interview with Chapsal, Sartre declares: 
$XMRXUG¶KXLMHSHQVHTXHODSKLORVRSKLHHVWGUDPDWLTXH,OQHV¶DJLW
SOXVGHFRQWHPSOHUO¶LPPRELOLWpGHVXEVWDQFHVTXLVRQWFHTX¶HOOHV sont, 
QLGHWURXYHUOHVUqJOHVG¶XQHVXFFHVVLRQGHSKpQRPqQHV,OV¶DJLWGH
O¶KRPPH± qui est à la fois un agent et un acteur ± qui produit et joue 
VRQGUDPHHQYLYDQWOHVFRQWUDGLFWLRQVGHVDVLWXDWLRQ>«@8QHSLqFH
GHWKpkWUH>«@F¶HVWODIRUPHODSOXVDSSURSULpHDXMRXUG¶KXLSRXU
PRQWUHUO¶KRPPHen acte F¶HVW-à-GLUHO¶KRPPHWRXWVLPSOHPHQW(W
ODSKLORVRSKLH>«@F¶HVWGHFHWKRPPH-OjTX¶HOOHSUpWHQGV¶RFFXSHU
&¶HVWSRXUFHODTXHOHWKpkWUHHVWSKLORVRSKLTXHHWTXHODSKLORVRSKLH
est dramatique.17 
 
Exploring the ethical on the stage also draws attention to the performative 
aspect of identity, and the difficulty in establishing the relationship between 
the normative (as pertaining to norms) and the ethically normative (as 
pertaining to ethical justification), as highlighted particularly clearly in 
6HFWLRQ¶V GLVFXVVLRQRI*RHW]¶VILQDOFRQversion in Le Diable et le bon 
dieu.18 Thus, one possibility for further study would be a closer 
investigation of the extent to which philosophical ambiguity may be 
                                         
17 Jean-3DXO6DUWUHµ/HV(FULYDLQVHQSHUVRQQH¶LQKLVSituations IX (Paris : Gallimard, 1972), 
pp. 12-13. 
18 +HUHDSDUDOOHOFDQEHGUDZQZLWK%XWOHU¶VWKHRU\RIJHQGHULGHQWLW\DVSHUIRUPDQFHLQ
relation to which she discusses how the representation of identity in terms of categories calls 
into question the distinction between what is real and what is unreal, what is natural fact and 
what is socio-cultural performance (Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity (New York : Routledge, 1990)). $SSOLFDWLRQRI%XWOHU¶VWKHRU\WR
Existentialist thought might therefore prove fruitful as a new line of investigation. In fact, Inès 
(HC) LVDUJXDEO\DOUHDG\µXQHIHPPHGDPQpH¶DVDUHVXOWRIEHLQJDOHVELDQVHHIRUH[DPSOH
Goldthorpe, pp. 94-5; Kern (1963), p. 59); and the same has been suggested with respect to 
Goetz (DBDZKRVHODFNRIVRFLDOLQWHJUDWLRQLVOLQNHGWRKLVVWDWXVDVµXQEkWDUG¶µ&¶HVWXQ
bâtard de la pire espèce: par la mère. IOQHVHSODvWTX¶jIDLUHOHPDO¶ (DBD, p. 17). See also 
Jeanson (1955), p. 87; Verstraeten, p. 74). 
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introduced by the performativity inherent in the theatrical genre itself. One 
thing is certain, philosophical content cannot be discussed in isolation of 
genre; the theatre and the dynamic inter-relations it involves (as revealed 
by the numerous applications of the notion of spectatorship) is an 
extremely ambiguous medium, and this ambiguity must be taken into 
account. 
 
Finally, this dissertation has uncovered a surprising number of similarities 
between the Existentialist ethical thought of Marcel, Camus, and Sartre. 
The question which therefore arises is whether it has not blurred one 
further boundary stillQDPHO\WKDWZKLFKGLYLGHVµ&KULVWLDQ([LVWHQWLDOLVP¶
IURPµDWKHLVWLF([LVWHQWLDOLVP¶?
 114 
Bibliography 
 
 
Selected Plays 
 
Camus, Albert, Le Malentendu, in his Caligula, suivi de Le Malentendu 
(Paris : Gallimard, 1958); original publication: 1944; first performance: 
1944 
 
---   /¶(WDWGHVLqJH (Paris : Gallimard, 1998 [original publication: 
1948]); first performance: 1948 
 
---   Les Justes (Paris : Gallimard, 1977 [original publication: 1950]); 
first performance: 1949 
 
Marcel, Gabriel, /¶(PLVVDLUH, in his Vers un autre royaume (Paris : Plon, 
1949); no record of performance traced 
 
---   Le Signe de la croix, in his Cinq pièces majeures (Paris : Plon, 
1973); original publication: 1949; republished with epilogue in 1953; 
play never performed 
 
---   5RPHQ¶HVWSOXVGDQV5RPH (Paris : La Table Ronde, 1951); first 
performance: 1951 
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul, Huis clos (Paris : Gallimard, 1947); first performance: 
1944 
 
---   Le Diable et le bon dieu (Paris : Gallimard, 1951); first 
performance: 1951 
 
---   /HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD (Paris : Gallimard, 1960); first 
performance: 1959 
 
 
Primary References 
 
Camus, Albert, /H0\WKHGH6LV\SKHHVVDLVXUO¶DEVXUGH(Paris : Gallimard, 
1942) 
 
---   Lettres à un ami allemand (Paris : Gallimard, 1948) 
 
---   /¶+RPPHUpYROWp(Paris : Gallimard, 1951) 
 
---   Théâtre, récits, nouvelles, préface par Jean Grenier; textes établis 
et annotés par Roger Quilliot (Paris : Gallimard, 1962) 
 
---   Carnets: mai 1935 ± février 1942 (Paris : Gallimard, 1962) 
 
---   Carnets: janvier 1942 ± mars 1951 (Paris : Gallimard, 1964) 
 
---   Essais, introduction par R. Quilliot; textes établis et annotés par R. 
Quilliot et L. Faucon (Paris : Gallimard, 1965) 
 
 115 
Marcel, Gabriel, /¶,FRQRFODVWH, Collection nouvelle de la France Dramatique, 
supplément à La Revue hebdomadaire, no. 13 (Paris : Delamain, 
Boutelleau et Cie, 1923) 
 
---   Journal métaphysique (Paris : Gallimard, 1927) 
 
---   Etre et avoir (Paris : Aubier-Montaigne, 1935) 
 
---   'XUHIXVjO¶LQYRFDWLRQ(Paris : Gallimard, 1940) 
 
---   Homo viator ([Paris] : Aubier-Montaigne, 1944) 
 
---   /H0\VWqUHGHO¶rWUH, (Paris : Aubier-Montaigne, 1951) 
 
---   /H0\VWqUHGHO¶rWUH,, (Paris : Aubier-Montaigne, 1951) 
 
---   /HV+RPPHVFRQWUHO¶KXPDLQ(Paris : La Colombe, 1951) 
 
---   Théâtre et religion (Lyon : Vitte, 1958) 
 
---   /¶+HXUHWKpkWUDOH (Paris : Plon, 1959) 
 
---   µ/HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD : Débat sur la pièce de J.-36DUWUH¶
Recherches et Débats, Centre Catholique des Intellectuels Français, 
nouvelle série, XXXII (September, 1960), pp. 42-66 
 
---   La Dignité humaine et ses assises existentielles ([Paris] : Aubier-
Montaigne, 1964) 
 
---   Positions et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique, 2e ed. 
(Paris : Louvain, 1967) 
 
---   (QWUHWLHQV3DXO5LF°XU*DEULHO0DUFHO(Paris : Aubier-Montaigne, 
1968) 
 
---   Cinq pièces majeures (Paris : Plon, 1973) 
 
---   /¶([LVWHQFHHWODOLEHUWpKXPDLQHFKH]-HDQ-Paul Sartre (Paris : 
Vrin, 1981) 
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul, /¶(WUHHW le néant (Paris : Gallimard, 2004 [original 
publication: 1943]) 
 
---   /¶([LVWHQWLDOLVPHHVWXQKXPDQLVPH(Paris : Gallimard, 1996 
[original publication: 1946]) 
 
---   µ0)UDQoRLV0DXULDFHWODOLEHUWp¶LQKLVSituations I: essais 
critiques ([Paris] : Gallimard, 1947), pp. 36-57 
 
---   4X¶HVW-ce que la littérature? ([Paris] : Gallimard, 1948) 
 
---   Réflexions sur la question juive (Paris : Gallimard, 1954 [original 
publication: 1946]) 
 
---   Questions de méthode ([Paris] : Gallimard, 1960 [original 
publication: 1957]) 
 
 116 
---   Critique de la raison dialectique, Tome I (Paris : Gallimard, 1960) 
 
---   µ/HV(FULYDLQVHQSHUVRQQH¶LQKLVSituations IX (Paris : Gallimard, 
1972), pp. 9-39 
 
---   Un théâtre de situations, ed. by Michel Contat and Michel 
Rybalka (Paris : Gallimard, 1973) 
 
---   Cahiers pour une morale (Paris : Gallimard, 1983 [composed: 
1947-8]) 
 
---  Les Carnets de la drôle de guerre: novembre 1939 - mars 1940 
([Paris] : Gallimard, 1983) 
 
---   µ--36DUWUH	06LFDUG(QWUHWLHQ¶Obliques, 18-19 (1979), pp. 
9-29 
 
---   µ3ODLGR\HUSRXUOHVLQWHOOHFWXHOV¶LQSituations philosophiques 
([Paris] : Gallimard, 1990) 
 
---   /¶(VSRLUPDLQWHQDQWOHVHQWUHWLHQVGH>HQWUH@-HDQ-Paul 
Sartre et Benny Lévy (Lagrasse : Verdier, 1991) 
 
---   Théâtre complet, édition publiée sous la direction de Michel 
Contat, avec la collaboration de Jacques Deguy [et al.], Bibliothèque 
de la Pléiade (Paris : Gallimard, 2005) 
 
 
Secondary References 
 
Anderson, Thomas C., 6DUWUH¶V7ZR(WKLFV)URP$XWKHQWLFLW\WR,QWHJUDO
Humanity (Chicago : Open Court, 1993) 
 
Aronson, Ronald and Adrian Van den Hoven (eds), Sartre Alive (Detroit : 
Wayne State University Press, 1991) 
 
Aronson, Ronald, Camus and Sartre: The Story of a Friendship and the 
Quarrel that Ended It (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2004) 
 
Barnes, Hazel E., Existentialist Ethics (Chicago : University of Chicago 
Press, 1985) 
 
Beauvoir, Simone de, 3RXUXQHPRUDOHGHO¶DPELJXwWp, in Pour une morale 
GHO¶DPELJXwWpVXLYLGH3\UUKXVHW&LQpDV, Collections Idées (Paris : 
Gallimard, 1969) 
 
Bell, Linda A., 6DUWUH¶V(WKLFVRI$XWKHQWLFLW\(Tuscaloosa : University of 
Alabama Press, 1989) 
 
Bottomore, Tom, et al., A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Oxford : Basil 
Blackwell, 1988) 
 
Brée, Germaine (ed.), Camus: A Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1962) 
 
Buber, Martin, I and Thou, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith, 2nd ed. 
(Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark, 1959) 
 117 
Butler, Judith, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 
(New York : Routledge, 1990) 
 
Cain, Seymour, Gabriel Marcel (London : Bowes & Bowes, 1963) 
 
&DVSDU\:LOOLDP5µ'HZH\DQG6DUWUHRQ(WKLFDO'HFLVLRQV'UDPDWLF
5HKHDUVDOYV5DGLFDO&KRLFH¶Transactions ± Charles S. Peirce Society, 
XLII, no. 3 (2006), pp. 367-93 
 
Champigny, Robert J., 6WDJHVRQ6DUWUH¶V:D\-52, reprinted edition 
(New York : Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1968) 
 
---   Humanism and Human Racism: A Critical Study of Essays by 
Sartre and Camus (The Hague : Mouton, 1972) 
 
Chenu, Joseph, Le Théâtre de Gabriel Marcel et sa signification 
métaphysique (Paris : Aubier-Montaigne, 1948) 
 
Contat, Michel, ([SOLFDWLRQGHV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD de Jean-Paul Sartre 
(Paris : Archives des lettres modernes, no. 89, 1968) 
 
Contat, Michel and Michel Rybalka, Les Ecrits de Sartre: chronologie, 
bibliographie commentée (Paris : Gallimard, 1970) 
 
Coombs, Ilona, Camus, homme de théâtre (Paris : Nizet, 1968) 
 
Cooney, William (ed.), Contributions of Gabriel Marcel to Philosophy: A 
Collection of Essays (Lewiston, NY : Edwin Mellen Press, 1989) 
 
Copleston, S. J., Frederick, Maine de Biran to Sartre, A History of 
3KLORVRSK\,;SDUW,,µ%HUJVRQWR6DUWUH¶, Image Books Edition (New York 
: Image Books, 1977) 
 
Cruickshank, John, Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt (New York : 
Oxford University Press, 1959) 
 
Davignon, René, Le Mal chez Gabriel Marcel: comment affronter la 
souffrance et la mort? (Montréal : Bellarmin, 1985) 
 
Drummond, John J. and Lester Embree (eds), Phenomenological 
Approaches to Moral Philosophy: A Handbook (Dordrecht : Kluwer, 2002), 
pp. 269-88 
 
'XUIHH+DUROG$µ$OEHUW&DPXVDQGWKH(WKLFVRI5HEHOOLRQ¶The Journal 
of Religion, XXXVIII, no. 1 (January, 1958), pp. 29-45 
 
East, Bernard, $OEHUW&DPXVRXO¶KRPPHjODUHFKHUFKHG¶XQHPRUDOH
(Paris : Editions du Cerf, 1984) 
 
Freeman, E., The Theatre of Albert Camus: A Critical Study (London : 
Methuen, 1971) 
 
Friedman, Maurice (ed.), The Worlds of Existentialism: A Critical Reader, 
Phoenix ed. (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1973) 
 
Gadourek, Carina, Les Innocents et les coupables (The Hague : Mouton, 
1963) 
 118 
Gallagher, Kenneth T., The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (New York : 
Fordham University Press, 1962) 
 
Galster, Ingrid, Le Théâtre de Jean-Paul Sartre: devant ses premiers 
critiques, T.1: Les pièces créées VRXVO¶RFcupation allemande: Les 
Mouches et Huis Clos (Paris : Jean-Michel Place, 1986) 
 
Gay-Crosier, Raymond, /HV(QYHUVG¶XQpFKHF: étude sur le théâtre 
G¶$OEHUW&DPXV, Bibliothèque des Lettres Modernes (Paris : Minard, 1967) 
 
Giles, James (ed.), French Existentialism: Consciousness, Ethics and 
Relations with Others (Amsterdam : Rodopi, 1999) 
 
Gilson, Etienne (ed.), Existentialisme chrétien: Gabriel Marcel (Paris : Plon, 
1947) 
 
Goldthorpe, Rhiannon, Sartre: Literature and Theory (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 1984) 
 
Hanley, Katharine Rose, Dramatic Approaches to Fidelity: A Study in the 
Theater and Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) (University Press 
RI$PHULFDDFFHVVHGRQOLQHYLDµ7KH0DUFHO7KHDWUH3URMHFW¶The 
Gabriel Marcel Society, <http://www.lemoyne.edu/gms/dacf.pdf> 
[accessed 5 October 2006] 
 
Hanna, Thomas, The Thought and Art of Albert Camus (Chicago : Regnery, 
1958) 
 
Hottois, Gilbert (ed.), Sur les écrits posthumes de Sartre, Annales de 
O¶,QVWLWXWGH3KLORVRSKLHHWGH6FLHQFHVPRUDles (Bruxelles : Editions de 
O¶8QLYHUVLWpGH%UX[HOOHV 
 
Howells, Christina, Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
 
---   (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Sartre (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 1992) 
 
Hughes, Edward J. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Camus (Cambridge 
: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
 
Ireland, John, Sartre: un art déloyal, théâtralité et engagement (Paris : 
Jean-Michel Place, 1994) 
 
Jackson, Julian, France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944 (Oxford : Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 
 
Jeanson, Francis, Le Problème moral et la pensée de Sartre (Paris : 
Editions du Myrte, 1947) 
 
---   Sartre par lui-même (Paris : Editions du Seuil, 1955) 
 
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason (1781), e-text based on 1929 
Norman Kemp Smith translation, 
<http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html> [accessed 31 July 2007] 
 
 119 
Kern, Edith (ed.), Sartre: A Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1962) 
 
---   µ$EDQGRQ+RSH$OO<H«¶Yale French Studies, XXX, J-P Sartre 
(1963), pp. 56-60 
 
.UXNV6RQLDµ6DUWUH¶VCahiers pour une morale: Failed attempt or New 
7UDMHFWRU\LQ(WKLFV"¶Social Text, no. 13-14 (Winter-Spring, 1986), pp. 
184-94 
 
Laraque, Franck, La Révolte dans le théâtre de Sartre, vu par un homme 
du tiers monde (Paris : Jean-Pierre Delarge, 1976) 
 
Lazaron, Hilda, Gabriel Marcel the Dramatist (Gerrards Cross : Smythe, 
1978) 
 
Leak, Andrew N., The Perverted Consciousness: Sexuality and Sartre 
(Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1989) 
 
Lescoe, Francis J., Existentialism with or without God (New York : Alba 
House, 1974) 
 
Lévi-Valensi, Jacqueline, Camus et le théâtre : actes du colloque tenu à 
Amiens du 31 mai au 2 juin 1988, [organisé par] la Société des études 
camusiennes (Paris : IMEC Editions, 1992) 
 
Lewis, Allan, The Contemporary Theatre: The Significant Playwrights of our 
Time 1HZ<RUN&URZQFKµ7KH)UHQFK7KHDWUH± Giraudoux, 
6DUWUH&DPXV¶ 
 
Lorris, Robert, Sartre dramaturge (Paris : Nizet, 1975) 
 
McCall, Dorothy, The Theatre of Jean-Paul Sartre (New York : Columbia 
University Press, 1971) 
 
Mounier, Emmanuel, Introduction aux existentialismes (Paris : Editions 
Denoël, 1947) 
 
Nguyen-van-huy, Pierre, La Métaphysique du bonheur chez Albert Camus 
(Neuchâtel : Baconnière, 1962) 
 
Nicolas, André, 8QHSKLORVRSKLHGHO¶H[LVWHQFH$OEHUW&DPXV (Paris : 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1964) 
 
2¶'RQRKRH%HQHGLFW6DUWUH¶V7KHDWUH$FWVIRU/LIH(Oxford : Peter Lang, 
2005) 
 
Onimus, Jean, Albert Camus and Christianity (Alabama : University of 
Alabama Press, 1970) 
 
3DOPHU-HUHP\1-µ/HV6pTXHVWUpVG¶$OWRQD6DUWUH¶V%ODFN7UDJHG\¶
French Studies, XXIV, no. 2 (1970), pp. 150-62 
 
3DPSOXPH/RXLVµ*DEULHO0DUFHO([LVWHQFH%HLQJDQG)DLWK¶Yale French 
Studies;,,µ*RGDQGWKH:ULWHU¶SS-100 
 
 120 
Parain-Vial, Jeanne, *DEULHO0DUFHOHWOHVQLYHDX[GHO¶H[SpULHQFH(Paris : 
Seghers, 1966) 
 
Pax, Clyde, An Existentialist Approach to God: A Study of Gabriel Marcel 
(The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1972) 
 
5HGIHUQ:DOWHUµHuis clos¶DQGµ/HV6pTXHVWUpVd¶$OWRQD¶ (London : Grant 
& Cutler, 1995) 
 
5LF°XU3DXOµ6DUWUH¶V/XFLIHUDQG7KH/RUG¶Yale French Studies, XIV 
(1954), pp. 85-93 
 
Roberts, David E., Existentialism and Religious Belief, ed. by Roger 
Hazelton (New York : Oxford University Press, 1959) 
 
Royle, Peter, 6DUWUHO¶HQIHUHWODOLEHUWp: étude de Huis clos et des Mouches 
(Québec : Les PressHVGHO¶8QLYHUVLWp/DYDO 
 
---   The Sartre-Camus Controversy: A Literary and Philosophical 
Critique (Ottawa, Canada : University of Ottawa Press, 1982) 
 
Salzmann, Yvan, 6DUWUHHWO¶DXWKHQWLFLWpYHUVXQHpWKLTXHGHOD
bienveillance réciproque (Genève : Labor et Fides [2000]) 
 
Santoni, Ronald E., Sartre on Violence, Curiously Ambivalent (Pennsylvania 
: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003) 
 
Schilpp, Paul A. (ed.), The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (La Salle, IL. : 
Open Court, 1981) 
 
Schilpp, Paul A. and Lewis E. Hahn (eds), The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, 
Library of Living Philosophers Vol. XVII (La Salle, IL : Open Court, 1984) 
 
6LPRQ-RKQ.µ0DGQHVVLQ6DUWUH6HTXHVWUDWLRQDQGWKH5RRP¶Yale 
French Studies, XXX (1963), pp. 61-7 
 
Stone, Robert V. DQG(OL]DEHWK$%RZPDQµ'LDOHFWLFDO(WKLFV$)LUVW/RRN
DW6DUWUH¶V8QSXEOLVKHG5RPH/HFWXUH1RWHV¶Social Text, no. 13/14 
(Winter-Spring, 1986) 
 
7HPEHFN5REHUWµ'LDOHFWLFDQG7LPHLQThe Condemned of Altona¶Modern 
Drama, XII (May 1969), pp. 10-17 
 
Treanor, Brian, Aspects of Alterity (New York : Fordham University Press, 
2006) 
 
Troisfontaines, Roger, 'HO¶H[LVWHQFHjO¶rWUHODSKLORVRSKLHGH*DEULHO
Marcel, 2 vols (Louvain : Editions Nauwelaerts, 1968) 
 
Verstraeten, Pierre, 9LROHQFHHWpWKLTXHHVVDLG¶XQHFULWLTXHGHODPRUDOH
dialectique à partir du théâtre politique de Sartre, Les Essais, 165 (Paris : 
Gallimard, 1972) 
 
Warnock, Mary, Existentialism (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1970) 
 
:HEHU(XJHQµ7KH6XUUHQGHURI*RHW]¶Symposium, XIII (1959), pp. 106-
11 
 121 
:UHV]LQ0LFKDHOµ-HDQ-3DXO6DUWUH3KLORVRSKHUDV'UDPDWLVW¶The Tulane 
Drama Review, V, no. 3 (March, 1961), pp. 34-57 
 
=KHQJ<LZHLµ6DUWUHRQDXWKHQWLFLW\¶Sartre Studies International, 
VIII, no. 2 (December, 2002), accessed online, 
<http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-
10060326_ITM> [accessed 30 November 2006] 
 
 
Bibliographies 
 
Belkind, Allen, Jean-Paul Sartre: Sartre and Existentialism in English:  A 
bibliographical guide (Kent, Ohio : Kent State University Press, 1970) 
 
Gay-Crosier, Raymond, Bibliographie sélective et cumulative des travaux 
récents consacrés à Albert Camus, sponsored by the Department of 
Romance Languages and Literatures, University of Florida, 
<http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/gaycros/Bibliog.htm> [accessed 29 
October 2006] 
 
Lapointe, Francis H. and Claire C. Lapointe, Gabriel Marcel and His Critics: 
An International Bibliography (1928-1976) (New York: Garland Publishing 
Co., 1977) 
 
Lapointe, François H. with the collaboration of Claire Lapointe, Jean-Paul 
Sartre and his Critics : An International Bibliography (1938-
1980), annotated and rev. 2nd ed. (Bowling Green, Ohio : Bowling Green 
State University, Philosophy Documentation Center, 1981) 
 
Rybalka, Michel and Michel Contat, Sartre: Bibliographie 1980-1992, in 
collaboration with Yvan Cloutier, Laura Piccioni, Danièle Calvot (Paris 
: CNRS, 1993) 
 
Rybalka, Michel, in asVRFLDWLRQZLWKWKH*URXSHG¶(WXGHV6DUWULHQQHV
µ%LEOLRJUDSKLH-¶Jean-Paul Sartre.org, 
<http://www.jpsartre.org/article.php3?id_article=27> [accessed 23 
October 2006] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total word count: 39962 
